Daniel Dydzak v. Tani Cantil-Sakauye , 603 F. App'x 622 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, No. 12-56960
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-05560-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding**
Submitted May 13, 2015***
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Daniel David Dydzak, a disbarred California attorney, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging constitutional claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable John C. Coughenour, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 292(b).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
related to his disbarment, and from its order declaring him a vexatious litigant. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a sua sponte
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dydzak’s claims against the federal
judges and California Supreme Court Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye because
they are immune from liability. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)
(“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”).
The district court properly dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of res
judicata Dydzak’s claims against defendants Scott J. Drexel, Joann Remke, the
California Supreme Court, and California Supreme Court Justices Joyce L.
Kennard, Marvin R. Baxter, Kathryn M. Werdegar, Ming W. Chin, Carol A.
Corrigan, and Ronald M. George, because Dydzak alleged nearly identical claims
related to his disbarment against these defendants in a prior federal action in which
there was a final judgment on the merits. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d
953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of res judicata).
The district court properly dismissed Dydzak’s claims against defendant
Beth Jay under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues raised in these
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claims had been previously litigated, and were necessary to the prior judgment.
See McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prior
decision has preclusive effect if the issues at stake are identical, were actually
litigated by the party against whom preclusion is asserted, and were a critical and
necessary part of the prior judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a pre-filing order
against Dydzak after providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard,
developing an adequate record for review, making substantive findings regarding
his frivolous litigation history, and tailoring the restriction narrowly. See Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056, 1057-61 (9th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors to consider before
imposing pre-filing restrictions).
We reject Dydzak’s contentions that the district court lacked jurisdiction and
that its proceedings involved extrinsic fraud or fraud upon the court.
Dydzak’s requests for oral argument, filed on January 26, 2015 and set forth
in his opening brief, are denied.
Dydzak’s remaining requests, set forth in his opening brief, are denied.
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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