Christine Murray v. County of Orange ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE MURRAY, No. 13-55682
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:10-cv-01675-JVS-
MLG
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, a municipal MEMORANDUM*
corporation; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 7, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: LIPEZ,** WARDLAW, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Christine Murray appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
her claim against the County of Orange (the “County”) and the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department (“OCSD”) for violating the Public Safety Officers Procedural
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior Circuit Judge for the First
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Bill of Rights Act (“POBRA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3300-3313. Murray also
appeals the district court’s judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of the
County on her § 1983 claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we reverse and remand.
1. Although the district court relied heavily, and properly, on the Orange
County Superior Court decision in Anderson v. Cnty. of Orange, No. 30-2010-
00376368 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 9, 2012), to grant summary judgment, that decision
has since been reversed by the California Court of Appeal. See Anderson v. Cnty.
of Orange, No. G047161, 2014 WL 1092865 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2014).1 The
liberty interest hearing offered by the County did not satisfy the minimum
requirements of a POBRA administrative appeal. See id. Because the liberty
interest hearing was an inadequate remedy, the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply, Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n v. City of
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We grant Murray’s motion for judicial notice of the California Court of
Appeal’s opinion in Anderson. We may take judicial notice of filings from cases
that are relevant to the issues before us. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126,
1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that courts may take judicial notice of “documents
on file in federal or state courts”); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria
Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e may
take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal
judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 618-19 (Cal. 1975), rendering erroneous the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and OCSD.
2. The district court erroneously concluded that the County was entitled to
judgment on Murray’s Monell claim, focusing on whether Sheriff Hutchens was a
final decisionmaking authority, rather than a final policymaking authority, which is
the key question under Monell. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). A municipality is not liable under § 1983 “unless the
decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect
to the action ordered.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court considered
whether Sheriff Hutchens’s decision to lay off Murray could be reviewed after the
fact by the Human Resources Director. However, that the Human Resources
Director has the authority to rule on grievances does not mean that the Human
Resources Director possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to layoffs in the Sheriff’s Department.
According to the Orange County Charter and Ordinances, the final
policymaker with respect to employment decisions within the Sheriff’s Office
appears to be either the County Executive Officer or the Board of Supervisors.
However, final policymaking authority may be delegated in practice. See Ulrich v.
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City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 986 (9th Cir. 2002); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d
1211, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, because the district court did not engage in
the proper factual inquiry, the record is not sufficiently developed as to whether
Sheriff Hutchens had been delegated final policymaking authority with respect to
employment. We therefore reverse and remand the judgment.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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