Jo Batman v. Facebook, Inc. ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 06 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-16819
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY MEMORANDUM*
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
v.
JO BATMAN,
Objector - Appellant,
V.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-16918
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
v.
JOHN SCHACHTER, on behalf of himself
and his minor son S.M.S.; KIM
PARSONS, on behalf of herself and her
minor daughter C.B.P; ANN LEONARD,
on behalf of herself and her minor
daughter D.Z.; R.P., through her mother
Margaret Becker; J.C., through his father
Michael Carome,
Objectors - Appellants,
V.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-16919
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
v.
WENDY LALLY; ALEC
GREENHOUSE; JONATHAN BOBAK;
ZACHARY COCHRAN,
Objectors - Appellants,
V.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-16929
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
v.
K.D.; C.D., through their father, Michael
Depot,
Objectors - Appellants,
V.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-16936
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
v.
H.L.S., through her mother, Sheila L.
Shane,
Objector - Appellant,
V.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 13-17028
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
THOMAS L COX, Jr.; TRACEY COX
KLINGE; KATIE SIBLEY,
Objectors - Appellants,
v.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
ANGEL FRALEY; PAUL WANG; No. 14-15595
JAMES H. DUVAL, a minor, by and
through James Duval, as Guardian ad D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01726-RS
Litem; WILLIAM TAIT, a minor, by and
through Russell Tait, as Guardian ad
Litem; SUSAN MAINZER; LUCY
FUNES; INSTRAGRAM, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
C.M.D.; T.A.B.; H.E.W.; B.A.W.; A.D.Y.;
R.P.Y.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs -
Appellees,
SAM KAZMAN,
Objector - Appellant,
v.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 17, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, BERZON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Several objectors challenge the district court’s approval of a class action
settlement and the court’s award of attorney’s fees. Objector Kazman appeals the
district court’s decision to deny him attorney’s fees and an incentive award. We
affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving a class
action settlement which awarded $15 to each claiming class member,
notwithstanding the possibility of a $750 statutory penalty. The monetary award of
$15 was reasonable in light of the minimal (if any) harm suffered by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, an award of $750 per claiming class member could implicate due
process concerns.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving a class
action settlement which authorized the distribution of unclaimed funds to cy pres
recipients. We have previously approved of class actions settlements incorporating
cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds, as long as an appropriate nexus existed
between the issues underlying the case and the cy pres recipients. See Lane v.
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court did not err in
finding that an appropriate nexus existed here. As the district court found, “[t]he
recipient organizations focus on consumer protection, research, education
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regarding online privacy, the safe use of social media, and the protection of
minors—the very issues raised in plaintiffs’ complaint.”
3. The settlement does not clearly authorize continued violations of the
law. When approving a settlement, a district court should avoid reaching the
merits of the underlying dispute. Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir. 1996);
see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Franciso, 688 F.2d 615,
625 (9th Cir. 1982). As a result, a district court abuses its discretion in approving a
settlement only if the agreement sanctions “clearly illegal” conduct. Robertson v.
National Basketball Ass’n, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added); see
also Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.
1990). It is not clear whether Facebook’s use of minors’ names and likenesses in
Sponsored Stories violated California law. See C.M.D. v. Facebook, Inc., No.
14-15603, 2015 WL 6575724, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (rejecting some of
plaintiffs’ claims). It is also not clear whether the settlement at issue — which
provides more protection for minors from Facebook’s advertising practices than
existed before — violates state law. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in approving the settlement in the face of this uncertainty.
4. There was no structural conflict of interest requiring the appointment
of separate counsel for the minor subclass. The evidence that a structural conflict
-8-
of interest existed is sparse, especially given that (1) two of the three named
representatives were minors, (2) most of the injunctive relief in the settlement
benefitted only the minors, and (3) the minors were free to opt out of the settlement
(as, in fact, many did). See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th
Cir. 1998); see also C.M.D., 2015 WL 6575724.
The objectors claim that a conflict existed because the minors had
significantly more valuable claims than the adults. We have held that part of the
minors’ case was not meritorious, see C.M.D., 2015 WL 6575724, indicating that
the objectors may have exaggerated the relative strength of minor subclasses’
claims as compared to the adults’ claims. Furthermore, a difference in value of
claims does not necessarily mean there is a structural conflict of interest requiring
separate counsel. See In re Online DVD–Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934,
942–43 (9th Cir. 2015); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by reasoning, in part,
that the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) “may well” preempt
the claims of the minor subclass. The district court did not decide whether COPPA
actually preempts Cal. Civ. Code § 3344. Rather, the district court properly
recognized that its duty was only to determine whether the proposed settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The issue of COPPA
-9-
preemption has not been resolved, and thus the district court appropriately
considered it as a risk of litigation that would exist if the plaintiffs’ case continued.
6. The district court’s attorney’s fees award was not an abuse of
discretion. The district court properly exercised its discretion to use a percentage-
of-recovery approach, see Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 307
F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), and awarded an amount (25% of the net settlement
funds) which matches exactly this Court’s established benchmark rate. See
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). Cross-checking
the award with class counsel’s lodestar confirms the reasonableness of the
attorney’s fees award.
7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Objector
Kazman’s motion for attorney’s fees and an incentive award. The record does not
support Kazman’s contention that he contributed to the district court’s decision to
award class counsel attorney’s fees in an amount lower than requested. The district
court was concerned with the excessiveness of the requested attorney’s fees long
before Kazman became involved. Kazman was also not entitled to attorney’s fees
for arguing that class counsel’s attorney’s fees should be calculated as a percentage
of net (rather than gross) recovery because, as the district court found, the
associated reasonable fee for preparing this argument was de minimis. Of
-10-
Kazman’s 38–page objection to the settlement agreement, only one page was
devoted to the net versus gross recovery argument. Kazman also was not entitled
to an incentive award. Kazman cites little authority for the proposition that
objectors are entitled to incentive awards. Even if objectors are occasionally
entitled to incentive awards, there is no evidence that Kazman personally provided
any “service to the class.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 2013).
AFFIRMED.
-11-
FILED
Batman v. Facebook, Inc., Nos. 13-16819+ JAN 06 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I agree with most of the majority’s disposition of this case. I part ways with
the majority on two issues: the use of cy pres and the denial of objector’s fees. I
discuss each issue in turn.
I
I acknowledge that our case law regarding the use of cy pres in class-action
settlements is rather lax; it generally requires only that “[t]he cy pres remedy . . .
bear[] a direct and substantial nexus to the interests of absent class members.” Lane
v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–41 (9th Cir. 2011). The problems with the application
of cy pres to class actions are legion, and I will not repeat them here. See Marek v.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2013) (M. Smith, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see also Martin H. Redish et al.,
Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action, 62 Fla. L. Rev.
617 (2010). But in this case, the district court had no need to invoke cy pres at all
because the settlement funds can be distributed directly to class members.
I start from the premise that “damage awards are ideally distributed to the
1
class members whose claims are being compromised by the class action
judgment.” 4 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 12:14 (5th ed.
2011). Our case law recognizes that cy pres is a way to “distribute unclaimed or
non-distributable portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class
of beneficiaries.” Lane, 696 F.3d at 819 (quoting Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1036). In
that vein, cy pres should be used only if: (1) it is infeasible to distribute the money
to class members directly, such as when identifying the members of the class is
exceedingly difficult or costly; or (2) funds are left over after a distribution has
been made, and the per-class-member amount remaining is so small as to make a
pro rata redistribution of funds uneconomical. See Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation § 3.07 (Am. Law Inst. 2010); 4 Rubenstein, supra, §§ 12:26,
12:28, 12:30, 12:32 (collecting cases). I would require the district court to find that
one of these conditions is met before making or approving a cy pres award.
The district court did not make such a finding—and neither condition holds
true in this case. The settlement agreement set up a scheme to distribute $20
million (or the amount remaining after paying fees and expenses) to class members
who submitted valid claim forms. Class members were identified and given notice
of the settlement, and over 600,000 class members submitted claims. No money
has yet been distributed. It is thus eminently feasible to distribute the bulk of the
2
net settlement fund to the claiming class members; indeed, when it gave final
approval to the settlement, the district court increased the per-claimant distribution
from $10 to $15, as it was allowed to do under the settlement agreement. I see no
reason why the district court could not have further increased the per-claimant
distribution to avoid giving a huge windfall to the charities identified as cy pres
recipients.1
I also find the district court’s decision odd. During the hearing on
preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, the district court repeatedly
expressed discomfort at being handed too much discretion in making cy pres
awards. The parties explained that the settlement “defaults to a prorated
distribution” of funds to claiming class members with cy pres to be used only
“when we have that point of economic futility”—that is, when the per-claimant
distribution would be very small. Yet, in approving the final settlement, the district
court essentially earmarked an arbitrary—but large—portion of the net settlement
1
The district court suggested it could be “unfair” to increase the per-
claimant distribution because, anticipating the per-claimant distribution would be
$10 or less, some class members may not have submitted claims. I do not
understand this. If there were any problem, it would be one of notice, but the
settlement agreement and long-form notice provided to class members both
explained that the district court can increase the per-claimant distribution if the net
settlement fund is not exhausted by the claims made. Moreover, even accepting the
district court’s premise, I cannot fathom why increasing the per-claimant
distribution to $15 is fair, but raising it a few dollars more is not.
3
fund for charity, with another arbitrary amount going to the claiming class
members. This course of action treated the cy pres recipients as entitled to
something under the settlement agreement, rather than as substitutes for claiming
class members, which contravenes the principles I outlined previously and the
settlement agreement itself.
I would thus find that the district court abused its discretion in approving the
final settlement. But because the settlement agreement allows the district court to
increase the per-claimant distribution, I would not undo the entire agreement.
Instead, I would vacate the district court’s decision and remand with instructions to
set a per-claimant distribution that should exhaust the net settlement fund. If there
were funds remaining after that distribution, a cy pres award would likely be
proper.
II
I would also find that the district court abused its discretion in denying fees
to objector Sam Kazman. The district court admitted that only Kazman suggested
calculating class counsel’s fee award on the net settlement value rather than the
gross settlement value. Contrary to what the district court stated, Kazman’s
objection on this point was not necessarily “commonsense,” as the district-court
judge overseeing this case had, in prior cases, approved attorneys’-fee awards
4
calculated on the gross settlement value. See, e.g., Petersen v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc.,
No. C 11 01996 RS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123018, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2012) (Seeborg, J.) (awarding attorneys’ fees equal to 22% of the gross settlement
value). In addition, the district court acknowledged that a fee award may be proper
“where an objector advances a point not previously made by other parties or
objectors even if the Court would have sua sponte reached the same conclusion.”
See also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 288 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“[O]bjectors must decide whether to object without knowing what objections may
be moot because they have already occurred to the judge.”).
The district court calculated that adopting Kazman’s suggestion reduced
class counsel’s fee award by approximately $300,000. Nonetheless, the district
court concluded that Kazman did not make a material contribution to the class. I
disagree; saving the class $300,000 on attorneys’ fees—or approximately $0.50 per
claiming class member—is clearly a material benefit. See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding a $325,000 increase in the
settlement fund sufficiently material to warrant a reconsideration of objectors’
fees). I would thus find Kazman and his counsel entitled to fees for their trouble in
making this objection.
I recognize that objector fees must be reasonable in light of both the amount
5
of the benefit conferred on the class and the time required to make the objection.
See id.; see also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047–52 (9th Cir.
2002). Kazman’s counsel submitted an affidavit stating that their lodestar—for
Kazman’s entire objection—was approximately $50,000. The district court
determined that any fee award to Kazman would be de minimis because Kazman’s
objection regarding the calculation of class counsel’s fee award occupied only a
small portion of his overall objection to the settlement. As far as I can tell from the
record, the district court did this without inspecting the time records of Kazman’s
counsel2 and without asking Kazman to specify how much time he and his counsel
spent on that part of the objection. Although I understand the district court’s desire
not to haggle over small fee awards, I also think it is an abuse of discretion to
dismiss a fee request as de minimis without having the relevant information. Cf.
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding
that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes factual findings that are
“illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from
facts in the record”). I would thus vacate the district court’s denial of objector fees
2
Kazman’s counsel did not submit their time records with their declaration
but stated that they would submit such records at the district court’s request.
6
and remand with instructions to determine a reasonable fee award.3
3
I also do not understand why the district court approved a settlement giving
millions of dollars to cy pres recipients—which performed no service for the
class—but denied fees to Kazman—whose objection undeniably produced a
material benefit for the class.
7