Kristopher Monterroso v. City of San Diego ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 2 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTOPHER MONTERROSO, No. 20-55980
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:20-cv-00255-CAB-BGS
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO; MATTHEW MEMORANDUM*
PURDY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 31, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Kristopher Monterroso appeals the district court’s order granting qualified
immunity to defendant Officer Matthew Purdy and dismissing Monterroso’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. The parties are familiar with the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
facts as alleged so we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
“[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their
conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district
court held that Officer Purdy had probable cause to arrest Monterroso for driving
under the influence, so Officer Purdy did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
A warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment “if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the officer’s
presence,” id. at 586, or an offense “has been . . . committed by the person being
arrested,” Rodis v. City, Cnty. of S.F., 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).1 “To determine whether an officer had
probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and
then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[O]fficers may draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
1
Under California Vehicle Code section 23152, it is illegal to drive “under
the influence of any alcoholic beverage” or “any drug.”
2
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well
elude an untrained person.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Probable cause is not a high
bar.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We exercise our discretion to consider only the second step of the qualified
immunity analysis. See Evans v. Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir.
2021). We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the
record. See Bill v. Brewer, 799 F.3d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 2015). Regardless of
whether Officer Purdy had probable cause to arrest Monterroso, the arrest did not
violate clearly established law. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. No precedent places
it beyond debate that Officer Purdy violated Monterroso’s constitutional rights by
arresting Monterroso in these alleged circumstances. We give no weight
to Neidermeyer v. Caldwell, 718 F. App’x 485 (9th Cir. 2017), a non-precedential
disposition, which in any event merely identifies some facts that supported
probable cause but does not hold that the lack of such factors vitiates probable
cause, see id. at 486–87.
AFFIRMED.
3