A. Ezor v. State Bar of California ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 22 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. EDWARD EZOR, No. 18-16003
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05338-WHO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 19, 2019**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
A. Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations in connection with
proceedings before the Client Security Fund Commission of the State Bar of
California. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Villa v. Maricopa County, 865 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal for
failure to state a claim); Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th
Cir. 1994) (dismissal on the basis of res judicata). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ezor’s due process claim as barred by
the doctrine of res judicata because Ezor’s claim was raised, or could have been
raised, in an administrative proceeding between the same parties that resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1034 (failure to seek review of
an adverse state administrative decision bars federal suit under § 1983 under the
doctrine of res judicata); State Bar of Cal. v. Statile, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (Ct.
App. 2008) (setting forth requirements of res judicata under California law).
The district court properly dismissed Ezor’s federal wiretapping claim
because Ezor failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” are not sufficient to state a claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Ezor’s state law claim. See Satey v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of
2 18-16003
review and explaining that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed).
We reject as without merit Ezor’s contention that the district judge was
biased against him and that defendants are not entitled to immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.
Ezor’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 2) is denied as
unnecessary because the transcript in question is already in the record.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-16003