United States v. Miguel Osuna-Alvarez , 614 F. App'x 353 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 10 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50636
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:12-cr-04477-LAB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MIGUEL OSUNA-ALVAREZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 6, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Osuna-Alvarez (“Osuna”) appeals his convictions for importation of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, and aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1. Osuna first contends that his jury trial waiver is invalid because it was
not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. “We review the adequacy of a
jury-trial waiver de novo.” United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir.
2013). Where, as here, “the defendant’s mental or emotional state is a substantial
issue,” the district court is required to conduct “an in-depth colloquy which
reasonably assures the court that under the particular facts of the case, the signed
waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.” United States v.
Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825–26 (9th Cir. 1994). We have clarified that “[a]n in-
depth colloquy . . . includes instructing the defendant of the four facts listed in
Cochran.” Shorty, 741 F.3d at 966 (citing United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850,
853 (9th Cir. 1985) (The district court should inform the defendant that “(1) twelve
members of the community compose a jury; (2) the defendant may take part in jury
selection; (3) jury verdicts must be unanimous; and (4) the court alone decides
guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial.”)). In addition, “the district
court should question the defendant to ascertain whether the defendant understands
the benefits and burdens of a jury trial and freely chooses to waive a jury.” United
States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1997).
The district court informed Osuna of the four facts listed in Cochran. When
the court asked Osuna whether he understood, Osuna responded that he did. When
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subsequently questioned as to whether he would like to proceed before a jury or
before the district court judge, Osuna answered, “By you.” The court’s detailed
instructions and colloquy were sufficient to “reasonably assure[]” the district court
that Osuna’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Christensen, 18
F.3d at 826. We therefore affirm the validity of Osuna’s jury trial waiver.
2. Osuna next contends that the district court erred in deeming Osuna
competent to stand trial. We review for clear error. United States v. Gastelum-
Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002). “On defendant’s appeal the
evidence relating to his competency must be considered in the light most favorable
to the Government.” United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008,
1015–20 (9th Cir. 2014). Although Osuna was deemed incompetent shortly after
his arrest, he was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for four
months of treatment and hospitalization. Following treatment and observation, the
treating facility’s psychiatric staff determined that, although Osuna still suffered
from major depressive disorder, his competency to stand trial had been restored.
The staff also diagnosed Osuna with malingering, concluding that psychological
testing revealed a high likelihood that Osuna was deliberately feigning symptoms
and deficits in his legal knowledge. These conclusions were consistent with
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Osuna’s earlier competency evaluation, which acknowledged the possibility that
Osuna’s mental health would improve with treatment. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government, the district court properly relied on the
diagnoses and recommendations set forth in Osuna’s most current psychological
evaluation to conclude that Osuna had regained competence to stand trial.
3. Osuna argues that the district court erred by admitting
methamphetamine evidence, despite the fact that the seal on the package
containing the evidence had been broken. We review a district court’s evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1199
(9th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, a defendant identifies a defect in the chain of
custody, “[t]he prosecution must introduce sufficient proof so that a reasonable
juror could find that [the items] are in substantially the same condition as when
they were seized, and may admit [the items] if there is a reasonable probability [the
items] have not been changed in important respects.” United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768 (9th Cir. 1995). “Furthermore, a defect in the chain
of custody goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence introduced.”
Id. at 769. Here, both investigating officers testified that the methamphetamine
evidence was in substantially the same condition as when it was seized and tested.
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Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
methamphetamine evidence.
4. Osuna argues that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights
and, therefore, that the district court erred by admitting Osuna’s post-arrest
statements. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). We review the
question of voluntariness de novo. Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 675 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2008). A Miranda waiver “must have been made with a full awareness of
both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). However, “coercive
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Thus, where a
defendant contends that his statements were involuntary in light of his mental
illness, he must present evidence to show that his “will was overborne at the time
he confessed.” United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Osuna does not
introduce any evidence that the police coerced or overbore his will at the time of
his confession. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s admission of Osuna’s
post-arrest statements.
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5. Last, Osuna argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for importation of methamphetamine because the Government failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Osuna had intentionally brought drugs into
the United States.1 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. A rational jury could conclude
from the evidence at trial that Osuna intentionally brought drugs into the U.S.,
given that Osuna was the driver and sole occupant of a vehicle in which a large
quantity of drugs were discovered. See United States v. Diaz-Cardenas, 351 F.3d
404, 407 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A jury can infer knowledge when an individual is the
driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. A jury can also infer knowledge from
possession of a large quantity of drugs.” (internal citation omitted)); United States
v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that possession of large
quantity of narcotics with a high street value “was virtually conclusive of guilt”).
Therefore, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Osuna’s conviction
for importation of methamphetamine.
AFFIRMED.
1
Osuna also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction for aggravated identity theft. We address this issue in a
contemporaneously filed opinion.
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