James Coble v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MAY 6 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAMES D. COBLE,                                  No.   21-35371
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05323-BAT
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2022
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: GRABER and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and REISS,** District Judge.
    Plaintiff James D. Coble timely appeals the district court’s judgment
    affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits. We
    review de novo the district court’s order and “will disturb the denial of benefits
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the
    District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    only if the decision ‘contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
    evidence.’” Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
    Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We affirm.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”)
    rejection of the opinions of a psychologist and a mental health therapist in favor of
    the opinions of two psychologists and a physician. Because Coble filed his claim
    after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner’s revised regulation for evaluating
    medical opinions governs. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416
    .920c; see also Woods v. Kijakazi,
    No. 21-35458, 
    2022 WL 1195334
    , at *3–4 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (holding that
    the regulation displaces our earlier guidance on how an ALJ must assess medical
    opinions).1 The ALJ applied the correct legal standard under 
    20 C.F.R. § 416
    .920c,
    explained how persuasive he found each medical opinion based on its
    supportability and consistency with the record, and made “inferences reasonably
    drawn from the record[.]” Tommasetti, 
    533 F.3d at 1038
     (quoting Batson v.
    1
    Coble challenges whether the revised regulation complies with the Administrative
    Procedure Act, but he forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time in his
    reply brief. See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 
    883 F.3d 1102
    , 1109 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]t
    least when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and
    evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power
    Co., 
    328 F.3d 1145
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “we ordinarily will not
    consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in an
    appellant’s opening brief” (citing Kim v. Kang, 
    154 F.3d 996
    , 1000 (9th Cir.
    1998))).
    2
    Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    359 F.3d 1190
    , 1193 (9th Cir. 2004)).
    2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discounting of Coble’s testimony
    regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms, and the
    ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the testimony.
    Garrison v. Colvin, 
    759 F.3d 995
    , 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). For example, although Coble testified that his asthma was triggered by
    general physical activity and pulmonary irritants and was not well controlled by
    medication, the ALJ found that medical evidence undermined Coble’s claims of
    disabling limitations. In 2016, Coble told a treating provider he had not had an
    asthma attack since 2007 or 2008. Spirometry testing showed only “[m]ild airway
    obstruction[,]” and chest and lung examinations were largely normal throughout
    the relevant period. Even after his exposure to fire smoke in 2018 caused increased
    symptoms, Coble’s asthma remained “[s]table” and his symptoms were “relieved
    by use of an inhaler[.]”
    Similarly, Coble testified that he is unable to leave home for lengthy time
    periods or interact with others, has poor concentration and memory, and
    experiences regular and debilitating anxiety attacks. The ALJ permissibly found
    that Coble’s activities, including going to a food festival, performing music in a
    coffee shop, reconnecting with friends, and frequently going out in public, were
    inconsistent with his claims of debilitating psychological symptoms. See Ghanim
    3
    v. Colvin, 
    763 F.3d 1154
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Engaging in daily activities that
    are incompatible with the severity of symptoms alleged can support an adverse
    credibility determination.”). The ALJ further found that Coble’s significant
    improvement with treatment was incongruous with his testimony. The ALJ
    thoroughly and accurately described Coble’s “symptoms, course of treatment, and
    bouts of remission, and thereby chart[ed] a course of improvement[.]” Garrison,
    759 F.3d at 1018.
    3. Substantial evidence supports the Appeals Council’s denial of review
    despite Coble’s submission of an April 2019 medical opinion from Dr. Terilee
    Wingate. To the extent Dr. Wingate’s opinion is based on a new examination of
    Coble, it postdates the ALJ’s decision and does not “relate[] to the period on or
    before the ALJ’s decision.” Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    682 F.3d 1157
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.970
    (b)). The April 2019
    opinion is also substantially similar to Dr. Wingate’s 2016 opinion, which was
    considered by the ALJ, rendering the later opinion cumulative. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.970
    (a)(5) (providing for remand in light of new evidence only if there is “a
    reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of
    the decision”).
    AFFIRMED.
    4