Reynaldo Lopez v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 23 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    REYNALDO LOPEZ, an individual,                  No. 17-56325
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-04497-DSF-AJW
    and
    MEMORANDUM*
    EUNICE DELGADILLO, an individual; et
    al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a Georgia
    corporation and DOES, 1 through 50,
    inclusive,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 11, 2018**
    Before:      SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Reynaldo Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
    in his diversity action alleging age discrimination under the California Fair
    Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291. We review de novo. Deppe v. United Airlines, 
    217 F.3d 1262
    , 1264 (9th
    Cir. 2000). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Lopez failed
    to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s non-
    discriminatory reasons for terminating him were pretextual. See Guz v. Bechtel
    Nat’l, Inc., 
    8 P.3d 1089
    , 1113-14, 1118-19 (Cal. 2000) (setting forth burden-
    shifting framework for analyzing discrimination claims under the FEHA and
    noting that summary judgment for the employer is appropriate where, given the
    strength of the employer’s legitimate reasons, countervailing circumstantial
    evidence is too weak to raise a rational inference of discrimination).
    We reject as meritless Lopez’s contentions concerning ineffective assistance
    of counsel. See Nicholson v. Rushen, 
    767 F.2d 1426
    , 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)
    (“Generally, a plaintiff in a civil case has no right to effective assistance of
    counsel.”).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    2                                      17-56325
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not
    consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. See United States
    v. Elias, 
    921 F.2d 870
    , 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to
    the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      17-56325