Faiupu Myers v. Checksmart Financial, LLC , 701 F. App'x 588 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FAIUPU MYERS,
No. 15-16687
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02209
CHECKSMART FINANCIAL, LLC, MEMORANDUM∗
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Craig M. Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 17, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and DRAIN, ** District
Judge.
Faiupu Myers appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting Checksmart
Financial, LLC’s (“Checksmart”) motion for summary judgment. We have
∗
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see Darring v.
Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986), we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
1. The magistrate judge erred in concluding that Myers’s amended
complaint did not relate back to the date the original complaint was filed. The
magistrate judge erroneously focused on Myers’s knowledge, contrary to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 541
(2010). The Krupski court explained that even when “a plaintiff knows of a
party’s existence [, such knowledge] does not preclude her from making a
mistake with respect to . . . [the defendant’s] status or role in the events giving
rise to the claim at issue, and she may mistakenly choose to sue a different
defendant based on that misimpression.” Id. at 548-49. This type of “deliberate
but mistaken choice does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has
been satisfied.” Id. at 549.
2. While Myers may have known of Checksmart’s existence, she
certainly did not understand its “role in the events giving rise to the claim at
issue . . . .” Id. In Myers’s declaration filed in support of her opposition to
summary judgment, Myers indicated that “[e]very identifying feature of the
facility from the sign on the building, to the displays inside the store, to the cards
2
identified the place as” California Check Cashing Stores (“CCCS”). She further
stated that she “did not know who the persons were firing me worked for
CCC[S] or Checksmart. As I look back at being informed that CCC[S] would
become Checksmart, I regarded the change of name as cosmetic and of no legal
significance to me. I understood both names belonged to the same company so it
made little difference to me.”
3. To determine whether an amendment “relates back” under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C), the correct inquiry must focus upon what
Checksmart “reasonably should have understood about [Myers’]s intent in filing
the original complaint against” CCCS. Id. at 553-54. The record establishes that
Checksmart reasonably should have known within the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m) period that Myers intended to sue it rather than CCCS. Her
original complaint set forth allegations and claims stemming from her alleged
wrongful termination. On her last day of employment, Myers worked at a store
with signage and other identifying markings as CCCS. CCCS is registered to do
business in California, whereas Checksmart is not registered to do business in
the state. The address for the two businesses was identical and the person
identified to accept notice regarding Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”) claims was “Ashley” for both CCCS and Checksmart.
3
4. Additionally, similar to the facts in Krupski, both parties were
represented by the same attorney. As such, Checksmart should have known that
Myers did not name it as a defendant in her original complaint because of a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. Therefore, the first amended
complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint and Myers’s claims
were filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
5. The magistrate judge also erred in its holding that Myers failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12960(d); see also
Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 1985) (a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies before filing a FEHA claim). A plaintiff generally
does not exhaust her administrative remedies under the FEHA unless she names the
prospective defendant in the body or the caption of the charge. Medix Ambulance
Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 109, 118 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2002).
6. While Myers failed to identify Checksmart in either the caption or the
body of her charge, she did identify the fictitious business of CCCS, as well as the
store’s address. She also identified “Ashley” as the individual who informed her of
her termination. Ashley was the Human Resources representative for Checksmart,
as well as CCCS. This was sufficient to identify Checksmart as her employer.
Similar to the facts in Martinez v. Louis Lau, Inc., No. G026937, 2002 WL
4
31772018 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 11, 2002), it is disingenuous for
Checksmart to claim that it was unaware of her charge. As the Martinez court
noted:
The function of an administrative complaint is to provide the basis for
an investigation into an employee’s claim of discrimination against an
employer, and not to limit access to the courts. A strict rule would
harm victims of discrimination without providing legitimate protection
to individuals who are made aware of the charges through the
administrative proceeding.
2002 WL 31772018, at *5 (quoting Martin v. Fisher, 11 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122
(1992)). As such, Myers properly exhausted her administrative remedies on her
FEHA claim.
7. We decline Checksmart’s invitation to rule on its substantive
arguments, which the magistrate judge did not address. Because we are a
reviewing court, we are not inclined to usurp the magistrate judge’s power to
decide the case in the first instance. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248-49 (9th
Cir. 2013) (en banc).
8. Because the magistrate judge erroneously granted summary judgment
in favor of Checksmart, his award of attorney’s fees and costs was also erroneous.
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b) (providing the courts with discretionary authority
to award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
5