Anthony Patel v. Patrick Decarolis , 701 F. App'x 590 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           JUL 3 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTHONY A. PATEL,                               No. 15-55660
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07372-GW-SS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    PATRICK DeCAROLIS; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 26, 2017**
    Before:      PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Anthony A. Patel, a former attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging federal and state law
    claims arising out of defendants’ conduct in his state marital dissolution
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 
    838 F.3d 958
    , 962 (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissal for failure to
    state a claim); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 
    417 F.3d 1060
    , 1063 (9th Cir.
    2005) (order compelling arbitration). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Patel’s damages claims against Judge
    Pacheco on the basis of judicial immunity because the claims arose out of Judge
    Pacheco’s judicial acts. See Swift v. California, 
    384 F.3d 1184
    , 1188 (9th Cir.
    2004) (“It is well established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for
    their judicial acts.”). Moreover, to the extent that Patel sought injunctive and
    declaratory relief against Judge Pacheco under § 1983, Patel has failed to state a
    claim for such relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present
    factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
    omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
    granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
    unavailable.”); Gibson v. United States, 
    781 F.2d 1334
    , 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)
    (elements of a § 1983 action).
    The district court properly determined that defendant law firm Buter,
    Buzard, Fishbein & Royce, LLP, and defendant Royce, are immune from liability
    under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because Patel failed to allege facts sufficient
    2                                        15-55660
    to show that defendants’ state court litigation was objectively baseless. See Sosa v.
    DIRECTV, Inc., 
    437 F.3d 923
    , 929 (9th Cir. 2006) (under Noerr-Pennington,
    “those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally
    immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct”); see also Kottle v.
    Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 
    146 F.3d 1056
    , 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining the
    circumstances where the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
    applicable).
    The district court properly granted the motion of defendant law firm Trope
    & DeCarolis LLP and defendant DeCarolis to compel arbitration because the
    parties entered a valid arbitration agreement encompassing the dispute at issue.
    See Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 
    718 F.3d 1052
    , 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (Federal
    Arbitration Act requires that district courts refer cases to arbitration where a valid
    arbitration agreement covers the dispute at issue); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit
    Indus., Inc., 
    298 F.3d 778
    , 782-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing unconscionability
    under California law). We reject as meritless Patel’s contentions that the district
    court should have stayed the action pending arbitration and Patel’s contentions
    regarding discovery with respect to these claims.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Patel’s motion to amend (Docket Entry No. 34) is denied as moot.
    3                                    15-55660
    AFFIRMED.
    4   15-55660