Sergio Laparra v. Elaine Duke ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SERGIO LAPARRA, No. 17-56278
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-09356-GW-DTB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ELAINE C. DUKE, Acting Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Sergio Laparra appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII and the
Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003), and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laparra’s Title
VII claims because Laparra failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant treated similarly situated employees more favorably. See Leong
v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment appropriate
where plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case by not having evidence of
similarly situated individuals); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641 (“[I]ndividuals are
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laparra’s
disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act because Laparra failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant discriminated
against him because of his alleged disability. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (elements of prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act).
We reject as without merit Laparra’s arguments regarding discovery.
AFFIRMED.
2 17-56278