Josephenie Robertson v. the Republic of Nicaragua ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPHENIE ROBERTSON, M.T.T., No. 17-17156
individually and as the Representative,
Officer and Matriarch of the Traditional D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00852-JST
Authority and Miskitu Government-In-Exile,
Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM*
v.
THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Josephenie Robertson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d
1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Robertson’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because Robertson alleged claims that presented a political
question. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980-82 (9th Cir. 2007)
(district courts have no jurisdiction to hear a case presenting a political question);
see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (setting forth tests to determine
whether case presents a political question); Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
UPS, 177 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (authority to recognize foreign regimes
is committed to the Executive Branch alone).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robertson’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Robertson did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
To the extent that Robertson sought to maintain this action as a class action
lawsuit, Robertson cannot do so because she is not an attorney. See C.E. Pope
Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (a pro se litigant
has no authority to appear as an attorney for others).
2 17-17156
We reject as unsupported by the record Robertson’s contentions regarding
the district court’s denial of her motion for sanctions and treatment of Robertson’s
requests to amend her complaint.
AFFIRMED.
3 17-17156