Jennifer Henderson v. Deborah Johnson , 634 F. App'x 199 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 21 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER LYNN HENDERSON, No. 13-56365
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:12-cv-00015-PSG-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
JENNIFER LYNN HENDERSON, No. 13-56367
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:11-cv-00128-PSG-RZ
v.
JAVIER CAVAZOS, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 19, 2015
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: PREGERSON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges and BASTIAN,** District
Judge.
Jennifer Lynn Henderson appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing
the district court’s analysis de novo, we affirm. Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444,
453 (9th Cir. 2011).
At Henderson’s trial, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to jury
instruction CALCRIM No. 376, which states that the jury could convict Henderson
of murder if it found that she possessed the victim’s property along with some
slight corroborating evidence. In People v. Prieto, the California Supreme Court
held that a nearly identical jury instruction in the context of a nontheft offense
permitted the jury to draw inferences that did not flow “naturally” or “logically”
from the evidence presented. 30 Cal. 4th 226, 249 (2003). Under clearly
established Supreme Court law, such an inference violates due process. See
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1985) (“A permissive inference
violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.”); see
**
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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also Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]
permissive inference jury instruction is constitutional so long as it can be said with
substantial assurance that the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend.” (internal quotations marks omitted)).
In Henderson’s case, the California Court of Appeal, relying on Prieto,
recognized that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 376
but then applied a nonconstitutional standard to evaluate whether the error was
harmless. In other words, the Court of Appeal failed to recognize the instructional
error was of constitutional magnitude; this error amounts to an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Francis,
471 U.S. at 314–15.
In light of the overwhelming evidence against Henderson and the
insignificant role the stolen property evidence played at trial, however, we cannot
say that the instructional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence”
on the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993). The
evidence against Henderson included: (1) testimony that Henderson brought her
daughter to meet the Hawkses to put them at ease; (2) phone records showing that
Henderson was in frequent contact with her husband while the power of attorney
form was edited on their computer and on the day of the murder; (3) Henderson’s
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statements to relatives and a real estate agent before the murder that she was
expecting to receive a large amount of money and a yacht; (4) Henderson’s
involvement in post-crime actions of attempting to access the Hawkses’ bank
account, orchestrating a sham sale of the yacht, and calling Thomas Hawks’s
brother; and (5) evidence that Henderson was aware that her husband previously
killed a man.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Henderson’s 28 U.S.C. §
2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.1
1
We decline to expand the certificate of appealability as none of the
uncertified issues are “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
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FILED
Henderson v Johnson 13-56365
DEC 21 2015
Callahan, Circuit Judge, concurring: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the affirmance of the denial of Henderson’s petition, as the trial
court’s instructional error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence
showing Henderson’s involvement in the victims’ deaths.
However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that CALCRIM No.
376 violates due process under clearly established law. A jury instruction error
rises to the level of a constitutional violation if “the ailing instruction by itself so
infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (citations omitted). The permissive instruction
in CALCRIM 376 did not so infect the entire trial and thus did not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation. Instead, the trial court’s instructional error was only
one involving state law.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Moore, 51 Cal. 4th 1104,
1130–33 (2011), and People v. Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th 226, 249 (2003), examined
essentially identical instructions. The court in both cases explained that informing
the jury that it may infer the defendant’s guilt of murder based on possession of
recently stolen property with other slight corroboration of guilt was error, but not
an error of constitutional magnitude. The court reasoned that due process was not
1
violated in light of the trial courts’ instructions that the prosecution was required to
prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and “other
instructions properly instructed the jury on its duty to weigh the evidence, what
evidence it may consider, how to weigh that evidence, and the burden of proof”
such that “there is no possibility that [the jury instruction] reduced the
prosecution’s burden of proof in this case.” Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th at 248 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moore, 51 Cal. 4th at 1133. Similarly,
here, the jury was instructed on all the elements of the offense and that all elements
of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury also received
other instructions on the burden of proof and how and what evidence to consider.
These other instructions “explain[ed] the particular infirm language to the extent
that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an
unconstitutional presumption.” See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985)
(citation omitted).
Moreover, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.
391 (1991), a permissive inference “is constitutional so long as the inference would
not be irrational.” Id. at 402 n.7 (citing Francis, 471 U.S. at 314–15). The
California Supreme Court determined in Prieto and Moore that this permissive jury
instruction was erroneous under state law because it permitted the jury to draw an
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inference that did not flow “naturally” or “logically” from the evidence, but the
instruction did not violate due process because the inference was rational. Whether
an inference is rational is a lower bar than “flowing naturally and logically,”
contrary to the majority’s conclusion. And the inference is clearly rational – proof
that a defendant was found with the decedents’ property soon after they were
murdered, along with other corroborating evidence, is sufficient for a juror to
conclude that a defendant was involved in the murder. Thus the inference here is
“one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the
jury” under Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. There was no constitutional violation.
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