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 2015-11

Eagle v. Bill Alexander Automotive Center, Inc. , 623 F. App'x 881 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             NOV 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES EAGLE,                                     No. 13-16879
Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01148-JAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BILL ALEXANDER AUTOMOTIVE
CENTER, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 19, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: MELLOY,** IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
James Eagle appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment against
his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Even if Eagle made out a prima facie case of age discrimination, he failed to
present evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on the
issue of pretext. Because Bill Alexander Automotive Center (“Alexander Toyota”)
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Eagle, it was Eagle’s
burden to show that those reasons were pretextual. See Pottenger v. Potlatch
Corp.,
    329 F.3d 740
    , 745–46 (9th Cir. 2003). Eagle’s evidence that younger
salespersons were retained does not establish pretext, because sales manager T.R.
Snow, the employee most similarly situated to Eagle, was also fired despite being
only 33 years old. See Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc.,
    658 F.3d 1108
    , 1113
(9th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, Alexander Toyota’s explanations for firing Eagle are
not incredible simply because they evolved over time. The dealership’s
explanations were compatible with each other, see Nidds v. Schindler Elevator
Corp.,
    113 F.3d 912
    , 918 (9th Cir. 1996), and Alexander Toyota’s claim that Eagle
was partially responsible for the dealership’s poor customer service scores was
credible due to Eagle’s status as a de facto manager.
Though Eagle presented evidence that his coworkers made ageist remarks,
he failed to provide specific and substantial evidence that those remarks were
made, overheard, or endorsed by the supervisor who terminated his employment.
See Mondero v. Salt River Project,
    400 F.3d 1207
    , 1213 (9th Cir. 2005); Pottenger,
    2 329 F.3d at 746
    –47. Similarly, Eagle’s assertion that former supervisor Ryan
Hancock was a decisionmaker lacked supporting evidence, meaning that a rational
jury could not so find. Because Eagle presented only vague and ambiguous
evidence tying the discriminatory remarks to the decision to discharge him, the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Alexander
Toyota. See FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc.,
    104 F.3d 1168
    , 1171 (9th Cir.
1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any
supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”);
Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
    58 F.3d 454
    , 457 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
3