United States v. Rio Young ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NOV 17 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-50317
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00765-PA-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RIO YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 22, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, IKUTA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
1. Young’s first set of statements made in his home should not be
suppressed because Young was not in “custody” under the meaning of Miranda.
In the context of at-home interrogations, the “benchmark” for determining whether
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
a suspect is in custody is whether the home has become a “police-dominated
atmosphere.” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008).
Young’s home had not become a police-dominated atmosphere. Although
the fact that many officers forcefully entered Young’s residence at 6 a.m weighs in
favor of finding custody, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Young
was not in custody. Unlike in Craighead, where a detective had his back to the
closed door and blocking the suspect’s only route out of the storage room, id. at
1086, Young was not similarly restrained. The district court found that the door
connecting the garage to the main portion of the house remained open and
unblocked during the entire interview. Additionally, unlike in Craighead, a
reasonable person in Young’s position would not have felt that he was being
isolated from those who could provide moral support. See id. at 1087. Young was
not moved to the garage to isolate him, but because the rest of the house was too
cluttered to arrange three chairs in one area. Moreover, unlike in Craighead, 539
F.3d at 1087, United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2002), and
United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1987), where the
police unilaterally imposed the isolation between the suspect and those who could
have provided support, Young voluntarily agreed to be interviewed separately from
his mother.
2
It is also significant that Young was told at least twice, including once at the
outset of the interview, that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave.
See Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1087. Here, the recording confirms that a reasonable
person in Young’s position would have understood he could take advantage of
these admonitions. The tone of the interview was non-confrontational, and the
district court found that Young was not frightened or intimidated. See United
States v. Bassignani, 575 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2009) (relying on a recording
to determine that the interview was conducted in an “open, friendly tone,” and the
suspect “participated actively”).
Because a reasonable person in Young’s position would have felt free to
terminate the interview and leave the garage, the district court correctly denied
Young’s motion to suppress his at-home statements.
2. Young’s first set of statements were also voluntary. Based on the
“totality of the circumstances,” Young’s will was not “overborne” by the agents.
United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991). Young was an
intelligent 20-year-old adult who was attending community college and was
knowledgeable about computers. See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008,
1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (finding age and intellectual ability of suspect
important in voluntariness determination). He was responsive throughout the
3
interview. See Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 994, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011). Although
the initial entry into the house was forceful, all agents kept their weapons holstered
and did not physically touch Young again after the protective sweep was complete.
Additionally, they did not attempt to intimidate or threaten him. There was
therefore no “implicit threat of . . . repetition” of any prior physical contact.
Jenkins, 938 F.2d at 940. Because the district court properly determined that
Young’s statements were voluntary, it properly denied Young’s motion to suppress
his second set of statements. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
3. Nor did Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), require the district
court to suppress the second set of statements. A subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings will not “remove the conditions that preclude[] admission of
[an] earlier statement,” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, if a “two-step interrogation
technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warnings,”
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As the facts here bear no
similarity to the two-step interrogation process found impermissible in Seibert, the
district court did not err in denying Young’s motion to suppress the statements
made subsequent to the polygraph examination.
AFFIRMED.
4