United States v. Ulices Montiel ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          NOV 12 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 13-50609
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 3:13-cr-03044-LAB-1
    Southern District of California,
    v.                                               San Diego
    ULICES MONTIEL,
    ORDER
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Barring Further Petition
    for Rehearing is GRANTED. Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing of
    Amended Memorandum tendered November 5, 2015, is ordered filed.
    The amended memorandum disposition filed November 3, 2015, is amended
    by the second amended memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this
    order, as follows:
    On page 2, footnote 1, delete the last sentence: "If Hamilton is believed, he
    never left Defendant’s side until the interrogating officers took over and, thus,
    Defendant could not possibly have thought that Hamilton talked to his boss before
    Defendant confessed."
    With this amendment, Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing of Amended
    Memorandum is DENIED. No further petitions for panel rehearing or for
    rehearing en banc shall be entertained.
    2
    FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 12 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 13-50609
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:13-cr-03044-LAB-1
    v.
    SECOND AMENDED
    ULICES MONTIEL,                                  MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 31, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Ulices Montiel appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, for
    transporting illegal aliens in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(ii). We affirm.
    The sole question presented is whether Defendant’s confession was
    voluntary. We review de novo the conclusion of voluntariness, United States v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Crawford, 
    372 F.3d 1048
    , 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), but review the district
    court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error, United States v. Gamez, 
    301 F.3d 1138
    , 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). We owe special deference to the trial court’s
    credibility determinations. United States v. Nelson, 
    137 F.3d 1094
    , 1110 (9th Cir.
    1998).
    Here, the pivotal issue is whether Agent Hamilton induced Defendant to
    confess by promising him that, if he provided information, he would not be
    charged with a crime. During the drive from the border to El Centro, Defendant
    asked Hamilton if he could avoid being charged with a crime if he gave
    information; Hamilton replied that he would ask his boss.1 Defendant claimed that,
    after they arrived at the station, Hamilton left him alone for ten minutes, while
    parked in a secure area, after which Hamilton returned and asked Defendant,
    "You’re ready to go home?" Hamilton denied that he ever left Defendant alone in
    the car, denied asking that question, and denied making any promise to Defendant.
    The district court believed Hamilton’s version of events, after asking several
    follow-up questions and considering all the circumstances. We defer to the court’s
    1
    Defendant argues that, although Hamilton said that he would ask his boss,
    he did not ask his boss, thereby making a false promise. But Defendant’s claim of
    inducement rests on much more than the foregoing promise; the alleged promise on
    which Defendant relied in his testimony at the district court was the one discussed
    below, in text, which the district court permissibly disbelieved.
    2
    assessment of credibility and see no clear error in the court’s resulting findings of
    fact.
    Given those findings, on de novo review we conclude that the confession
    was voluntary. Indeed, apart from urging this court to reject Agent Hamilton’s
    testimony, Defendant does not point to anything about the circumstances of the
    interrogation or about his own personal characteristics that would have rendered
    the confession involuntary.
    AFFIRMED.
    3