Chad Romine v. Geoff Duppman ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 21 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHAD JAMES ROMINE,                              No.    17-17142
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02012-TLN-EFB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    GEOFF DUPPMAN; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 15, 2018**
    Before:      FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Chad James Romine appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a dispute
    regarding car repair services. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Romine’s request for oral
    argument, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
    review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
    889 F.3d 956
    , 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record,
    Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
    Dismissal of Romine’s federal claims was proper because Romine failed to
    allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
    
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
    construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
    claim for relief); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 
    625 F.3d 550
    , 557 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (setting forth elements of a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations Act); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 
    447 F.3d 1138
    , 1144-45 (9th Cir.
    2006) (setting forth elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1981); Sever v. Alaska
    Pulp Corp., 
    978 F.2d 1529
    , 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth elements of a
    conspiracy claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
    (3)); Crumpton v. Gates, 
    947 F.2d 1418
    ,
    1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth elements of a claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
    because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
    Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
    2                                     17-17142
    stating that “[a]lthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may
    dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure
    the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    17-17142