Lanell Jones v. City of Oakland ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 JUN 25 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LANELL MONIQUE JONES,                            No. 13-15673
    individually and in her representative
    capacity on-behalf of the Estate of Derrick      D.C. No. 4:11-cv-04725-YGR
    Jones,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    CITY OF OAKLAND; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 10, 2015
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Lanell Monique Jones challenges various pretrial rulings made by the
    district court and its order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    of Oakland (the City) in this case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding six pretrial
    conferences. The record establishes that the district court held each pretrial
    conference for the valid purpose of improving the quality of the trial by ensuring
    that the parties were prepared. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a). There is no evidence that
    the district court held these pretrial conferences and issued multiple pretrial orders
    because the district court was biased against Jones.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the
    Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) (exhibit 13(B)), the Amended
    Memorandum of Understanding (AMOU) (exhibit 13(C)), the 2012 report from the
    audit of the Oakland Police Department (exhibit 13(E)), Judge Henderson’s order
    appointing a compliance director (exhibit 13(F)), and the 2011 fifth quarterly
    report by the independent monitor (exhibit 16) on the ground that the probative
    value of those exhibits was substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury would
    draw an improper inference regarding the City’s liability based on the acts alleged
    in the lawsuit underlying the NSA. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Therefore, we need not
    address Jones’s argument that the district court erred in determining that these
    exhibits were inadmissible because they could not be properly authenticated.
    2
    Jones waived the argument that the district court erred when it excluded
    exhibits 14 and 15 by not “specifically and distinctly” arguing the issue in her
    opening brief. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 
    261 F.3d 912
    , 919
    (9th Cir. 2001).
    Even if the district court erred by excluding Officer Daniel Higgins, Captain
    Ersie Joyner, Sergeant Charles Abdullah, and the coroner Robert Zedelis as
    witnesses, Jones failed to demonstrate she was prejudiced by these rulings. See
    Price v. Seydel, 
    961 F.2d 1470
    , 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). All of the documents Jones
    alleges these witnesses could have authenticated had they been allowed to testify
    were either admitted into evidence or properly were excluded for reasons other
    than authentication issues.
    Jones waived the argument that the district court erred when it excluded
    Carolyn Johnson as a witness from Jones’s case in chief because Jones agreed to
    the ruling. See Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20
    v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 
    752 F.2d 1401
    , 1404 (9th Cir. 1985).
    The district court did not err when it granted judgment as a matter of law to
    the City on Jones’s claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . As explained above, exhibits
    13 and 16 were properly excluded, and Jones points to no other evidence in the
    record that shows that any excessive force by Officers Omar Daza-Quiroz and
    3
    Eriberto Perez-Angeles resulted from an official municipal policy or deliberate
    indifference by the City. See City of Canton v. Harris, 
    489 U.S. 378
    , 388 (1989);
    Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 691 (1978). Jones waived any
    argument that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion for judgment as
    a matter of law with respect to her other claims by failing to raise it in her opening
    brief. See Arpin, 
    261 F.3d at 919
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    4