Tuong Hoang v. Supervalu Inc. , 541 F. App'x 747 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 26 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TUONG HOANG and ALEXANDER No. 13-56183
NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of
those similary situated, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-10946-DSF-JEM
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
SUPERVALU INC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 13, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs, who are hourly supermarket pharmacists, filed this putative class
action against their former employers in California state court, alleging various
violations of California wage and hour law. Defendants removed the case to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(2). The district court sua sponte remanded the case to state court on the
ground that Defendants had failed to show “to a legal certainty” that this case
meets the $5,000,000 minimum amount in controversy required for federal
jurisdiction under CAFA. Defendants appeal the remand order. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), and we reverse and remand.
When it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint
whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled[,] . . . we apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard” to determine whether the removing party
has met the amount in controversy requirement. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods
Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). However, when a state-court complaint
clearly and unambiguously alleges that the amount in controversy is less than the
jurisdictional threshold, the “party seeking removal must prove with legal certainty
that CAFA’s jurisdictional amount is met.” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
479 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007).
The jurisdiction section of the complaint in this case states that the “total
amount recoverable for the entire case does not exceed $5,000,000.00.” However,
the prayer for relief does not repeat this limitation, and instead states that Plaintiffs
seek various forms of relief, including declaratory judgments, damages for unpaid
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overtime compensation and penalties “subject to proof,” damages for business
expenses that were not reimbursed, penalty wages, attorneys’ fees and costs,
injunctive relief, disgorgement of funds by the Defendants, liquidated damages,
and interest on their damages. The complaint’s limitation of the total amount
“recoverable” to $5,000,000 cannot reasonably be interpreted to encompass the
total value of all forms of relief requested in the complaint. For example, among
various other remedies, the complaint asks for injunctive relief pursuant to
California Business and Professions Code section 17203. The value of the
requested injunction against Defendants would not be “recovered” by Plaintiffs yet
the value of such an injunction is part of the amount that has been put in
controversy by Plaintiffs’ complaint. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977) (“In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive
relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value
of the object of the litigation.”). The complaint is therefore ambiguous on its face
as to whether the total amount in controversy is less than $5,000,000, so the district
court erred in applying Lowdermilk’s legal certainty test.1 We reverse and remand
1
We need not and do not decide whether Lowdermilk survives Standard
Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), because Lowdermilk does
not apply here.
3
for the district court to determine whether Defendants have met the preponderance
of the evidence standard for removal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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