Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. , 541 F. App'x 773 ( 2013 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                            OCT 04 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    EMILY DIAZ, on behalf of herself and all         No. 11-57239
    others similarly situated,
    D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00775-H-WMC
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                        MEMORANDUM*
    FIRST AMERICAN HOME BUYERS
    PROTECTION CORPORATION, a
    California corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 6, 2013
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and GWIN, District Judge.**
    Emily Diaz appeals the final orders of the district court dismissing her state
    law claims for concealment and unfair competition under Federal Rule of Civil
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissing her fraud, breach of contract and breach of the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Rule 12(b)(1) and denying
    her motion to correct or modify the record under Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 10(e). For the reasons stated here, we vacate dismissal of Diaz’s
    concealment and unfair competition claims and lack jurisdiction to review the
    order denying Diaz’s motion to correct or modify the record.1
    1. Diaz has adequately alleged a cause of action for concealment. Although
    First American relies on United Guaranty Mortgage Indemnity Co. v. Countrywide
    Financial Corp., 
    660 F. Supp. 2d 1163
    , 1186-87 (C.D. Cal. 2009), to argue that
    California Insurance Code § 332 does not impose a duty to disclose, California law
    is to the contrary. See Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins., 
    6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148
    , 150, 152,
    155 (Ct. App. 2003). California law also recognizes an insurer’s “special
    relationship” with an insured, under which an insurer has the duty reasonably to
    inform an insured of her rights under an insurance policy. See Vu v. Prudential
    Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    33 P.3d 487
    , 491-92 (Cal. 2001); Davis v. Blue Cross of N.
    Cal., 
    600 P.2d 1060
    , 1065 (Cal. 1979).
    1
    We address the parties’ remaining contentions in a concurrently filed
    opinion.
    2
    We are not persuaded that Diaz was on notice of First American’s allegedly
    concealed practices by virtue of online consumer complaints. Diaz did not allege
    that she was aware of the online complaints at the time that she acquired her First
    American policy. The fact that the complaints were in the public domain did not
    place her on constructive notice. See Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 
    17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26
    , 35 (Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he contention that publicly available
    information cannot form the basis for a concealment claim is mistaken. The mere
    fact that information exists somewhere in the public domain is by no means
    conclusive.”); 5 B.E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 813, p. 1175
    (10th ed. 2005) (“The mere existence of an opportunity to investigate, or of sources
    of information, will not preclude the plaintiff from relying on the
    representations.”). Furthermore, even if Diaz had constructive knowledge of the
    online complaints, she would have been justified in treating them as the opinions
    of unhappy customers rather than assuming them to be true.
    Diaz also pled concealment with sufficient particularity to satisfy Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 9(b). The first amended complaint alleged that First American denied the
    sewage backup claim on a pretextual ground and that Diaz was required to hire her
    own plumber to fix the problem. It alleged that First American sent an
    incompetent plumber to fix the leaking water heater who was unable to do so and
    3
    tried to get Diaz to agree to replace the water heater. So Diaz was required to hire
    her own plumber, who fixed the problem without replacing the water heater.
    These allegations are linked to the complaint’s concealment allegations, which
    include the allegation that First Amendment denies claims for pretextual reasons
    and uses substandard contractors. The complaint, moreover, alleged that Diaz
    would not have entered into a home warranty contract with First American if she
    had been aware of the facts that First American allegedly failed to disclose. These
    allegations assert causation with sufficient particularity.
    2. In light of Zhang v. Superior Court, 
    304 P.3d 163
     (Cal. 2013), Diaz
    adequately alleged violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, 
    Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200
    , because her claims are premised on fraud, breach of contract
    and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even if First
    American’s alleged conduct also may have violated the Unfair Insurance Practices
    Act. See Zhang, 304 P.3d at 177 (“[W]hen insurers engage in conduct that violates
    both the UIPA and obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law, a
    UCL action may lie.”). Zhang expressly disapproves of Textron Financial Corp. v.
    National Union Fire Insurance Co., 
    13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586
     (Ct. App. 2004), upon
    which First American relies. See Zhang, 304 P.3d at 176.
    4
    The district court’s dismissal of Diaz’s unfair competition claim may not be
    affirmed on the alternative grounds urged by First American. First, as we have
    already explained in connection with Diaz’s claim for concealment, she has alleged
    reliance with adequate particularity. Furthermore, even if Diaz had not pled fraud
    with sufficient particularity, her unfair competition claims are also predicated on
    breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. Second, we reject First American’s contention that Diaz has no claim for
    restitution because her home warranty premiums were paid by the seller. The
    complaint does not disclose who paid the premiums. Furthermore, even if they
    were paid by the seller, this would not necessarily preclude Diaz from relief.
    Regardless of who paid the premiums, there is no question that Diaz was the
    beneficiary of the home warranty plan and that Diaz – at least in some sense – paid
    for the plan by delivering the purchase price of the building to the seller.
    California courts do not categorically bar the recovery of restitution by a plaintiff
    who paid a third party rather than paying the defendant directly. See Troyk v.
    Farmers Grp., Inc., 
    90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589
    , 616-18 (Ct. App. 2009); Shersher v.
    Superior Court, 
    65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634
    , 636 (Ct. App. 2007).
    3. Because Diaz did not file a timely notice of appeal challenging the
    district court’s order denying her Fed. R. App. P. 10(e) motion to correct or modify
    5
    the record, we lack jurisdiction to address it. See Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp.,
    
    673 F.3d 991
    , 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“If there has been no timely notice of appeal
    from an order, a circuit court of appeal has no jurisdiction to review that order.”).
    Diaz points out that she filed a motion to file a replacement brief within 30 days of
    the district court’s Rule 10(e) order, and she argues that this motion should be
    construed as a notice of appeal under Intel Corp. v. Terabyte International, Inc., 
    6 F.3d 614
    , 618 (9th Cir. 1993). Unlike the opening brief in Intel Corp., however,
    Diaz’s motion to file a replacement brief did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R.
    App. P. 3.
    Each party shall bear its own costs of appeal.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    6