George Pfau v. Greg Mortenson , 542 F. App'x 557 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                OCT 09 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GEORGE PFAU; SUSIE PFAU; DAN                     No. 12-35400
    DONOVAN, individually and on behalf of
    all others similarly situated,                   D.C. No. 9:11-cv-00072-SEH
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    GREG MORTENSON; CENTRAL ASIA
    INSTITUTE, a corporation; PENGUIN
    GROUP (USA), INC.; DAVID OLIVER
    RELIN; MC CONSULTING, INC.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 7, 2013**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Plaintiffs George Pfau, Susie Pfau, and Dan Donovan appeal from the
    district court’s dismissal with prejudice of their Fourth Amended Complaint. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and we affirm.
    We review de novo dismissals pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
    317 F.3d 1097
    , 1102
    (9th Cir. 2003). We review a denial of permanent injunctive relief for abuse of
    discretion. Gentala v. City of Tucson, 
    213 F.3d 1055
    , 1060 (9th Cir. 2000). We
    review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint with prejudice for abuse of
    discretion. Okwu v. McKim, 
    682 F.3d 841
    , 844 (9th Cir. 2012).
    The district court properly dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs’ conclusory
    statements and minimal factual allegations do not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement
    that fraud claims be pleaded with particularity. See Vess, 
    317 F.3d at 1106
    .
    Plaintiffs’ fraud-based RICO claims do not adequately plead the required
    elements. See Grimmett v. Brown, 
    75 F.3d 506
    , 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
    Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 
    473 U.S. 479
    , 496 (1985)). Plaintiffs fail to
    allege that the purported misrepresentations caused their injuries. They also fail to
    specify with the requisite particularity Defendants’ individual roles in the alleged
    racketeering scheme, see Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. V. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.,
    
    940 F.2d 397
    , 405 (9th Cir. 1991), to plead an enterprise theory, or to properly
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    plead the predicate acts of mail or wire fraud.
    Plaintiffs’ fraud and deceit claims fail to state more than conclusory
    allegations. The breach-of-contract and breach-of-implied-contract claims fail
    because Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged all the elements of a valid contract
    under Montana law. See Mont. Code Ann §§ 28-2-102, 28-2-103, 28-3-103.
    Because of the defects in the RICO and common-law fraud, deceit, and
    contract claims, the district court was also correct to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for
    unjust enrichment, injunctive relief, an accounting, class status, punitive damages,
    and damages against Penguin on a theory of principal liability.
    Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the
    complaint and denying leave to amend. Plaintiffs have already had multiple
    opportunities to amend, even after the defects in the pleadings were identified in
    extensive briefing on motions to amend and dismiss the Third Amended
    Complaint.
    AFFIRMED.
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