Steve Doyle v. Chrysler Group, LLC , 663 F. App'x 576 ( 2016 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      OCT 24 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    STEVE DOYLE, on behalf of himself and        No.    15-55107
    all others similarly situated,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,            8:13-cv-00620-JVS-AN
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 7, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TROTT, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Steve Doyle sued Chrysler Group1 alleging violations of the California
    Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq., and the California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    1
    Chrysler Group LLC is now known as FCA US LLC.
    Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., for its
    failure to disclose a purported defect in its window regulator replacements. In
    August 2009, Doyle purchased for $100 one such replacement regulator for the
    front driver’s side of his vehicle. The replacement regulator in Doyle’s vehicle has
    never failed, but he alleges that the same model of replacement regulator as well as
    other allegedly similar models of replacement regulators have failed in many other
    vehicles.
    Doyle successfully sought class certification of “‘[a]ll persons and entities in
    the State [of California] . . . who own(ed) or lease(d) a model year 2002 through
    2007 Jeep Liberty Vehicle and who purchased a Replacement Regulator from, or
    otherwise had a Replacement Regulator installed by, Chrysler or its network of
    authorized dealers at any time on or after June 10, 2009’ but before December 9,
    2010 (for MY 2006-2007) or January 11, 2011 (for MY 2002-2005).” Doyle v.
    Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. SACV 13-00620, 
    2014 WL 7690155
    , at *4 (C.D. Cal.
    Oct. 9, 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Class).
    Chrysler timely filed an interlocutory appeal of the class certification ruling. We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    23(f). We reverse and remand.
    2
    I.
    As an initial matter, we note that, contrary to Chrysler’s arguments, Doyle has
    standing to bring this action. Plaintiffs have standing when they spend money
    “that, absent defendants’ actions, they would not have spent.” Maya v. Centex
    Corp., 
    658 F.3d 1060
    , 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). According to Doyle, had the defect
    been disclosed, he either would not have purchased the replacement regulator or he
    would have paid less for it because Chrysler would not have been able to charge as
    much for the product. Doyle thus suffered economic loss when he purchased a
    replacement regulator with an undisclosed safety defect.
    II.
    To obtain class certification, a party must fulfill the requirements of Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
    adequacy—and one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). The district court certified
    the class at issue under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows certification if “questions of
    law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
    only individual members,” and if “a class action is superior to other available
    methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
    We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class.
    3
    A.
    In Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the Supreme Court explained that to satisfy the
    Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, damages must be “capable of
    measurement on a classwide basis.” 
    133 S. Ct. 1426
    , 1433 (2013). In interpreting
    Comcast, we have stated, “[A] methodology for calculation of damages that [can]
    not produce a class-wide result [i]s not sufficient to support certification.” Jimenez
    v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    765 F.3d 1161
    , 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 
    Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434
    –35), cert denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 2835
    (2015). The proposed damages model
    must measure only the damages that are attributable to the theory of liability.
    Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 
    716 F.3d 510
    , 514 (9th Cir. 2013). Although Doyle
    is correct that our court has emphasized that “the need for individualized findings
    as to the amount of damages does not defeat class certification,” Vaquero v. Ashley
    Furniture Indus., Inc., 
    824 F.3d 1150
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 
    Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514
    ; 
    Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1167
    ), it has applied this understanding in cases where
    there existed a common methodology for calculating damages. See, e.g., 
    Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514
    (“Medline’s computerized payroll and time-keeping database
    would enable the court to accurately calculate damages and related penalties for
    each claim.”); Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 
    802 F.3d 979
    , 989 (9th
    Cir. 2015) (“Pulaski’s principal method for calculating restitution employs
    Google’s Smart Pricing ratio, which . . . set[s] advertisers’ bids to the levels a
    4
    rational advertiser would have bid if it had access to all of Google’s data . . . .”). In
    those cases, “damages could feasibly and efficiently be calculated once the
    common liability questions are adjudicated.” 
    Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514
    .
    To the extent Doyle is pursuing a partial reimbursement approach to calculating
    damages, that approach fails to satisfy Comcast because Doyle has not offered a
    model for determining what percentage of the purchase price the reimbursement
    should be. There is thus no way to determine whether the proposed damages
    model measures damages that are solely attributable to the theory of liability.
    Likewise, without details about this partial reimbursement approach, it is unclear
    whether “damages could feasibly and efficiently be calculated once the common
    liability questions are adjudicated.” 
    Id. Because Doyle
    has not demonstrated that partial reimbursement damages can
    be measured on a classwide basis, the predominance requirement is not satisfied.
    B.
    Furthermore, the typicality and adequacy requirements are unsatisfied. Here,
    the class includes both individuals who “purchased a Replacement Regulator” and
    individuals who “otherwise had a Replacement Regulator installed.” That some
    class members, like Doyle, paid for their replacement regulators while others did
    not means Doyle’s claim is not typical of the entire class.
    5
    Moreover, as evidenced by the type of damages he seeks, Doyle fails to
    adequately represent the interests of members who did not purchase replacement
    regulators. Doyle seeks either full or partial reimbursement for the purchase of the
    replacement regulator. But a reimbursement-based damages model will not
    account for class members who “otherwise had a Replacement Regulator
    installed,” because such individuals did not pay for their regulators and therefore
    have no expenses that could be reimbursed. A reimbursement theory of damages
    will benefit only class members who had out-of-pocket expenses in connection
    with the installation of the replacement regulator. Class members who “otherwise
    had a Replacement Regulator installed” would be better off with a lawsuit seeking
    to force future repairs or payment of the cost of future repairs.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE. This case is REMANDED for
    further proceedings.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-55107

Citation Numbers: 663 F. App'x 576

Judges: Trott, Owens, Friedland

Filed Date: 10/24/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024