Deborah Monan v. Michael Astrue , 377 F. App'x 629 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              APR 21 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DEBORAH MONAN,                                   No. 09-15894
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00223-HRH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
    Social Security Administration
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    H. Russel Holland, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 16, 2009 **
    San Francisco, California
    Before: ARCHER, *** CALLAHAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***   The Honorable Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Senior United States Circuit
    Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Deborah Monan (“Monan”) appeals the district court’s judgment remanding
    her claim for disability and supplemental social security benefits for further
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.1
    In granting Monan’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
    concluded that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) had erred by improperly
    rejecting the opinions of Dr. Belmonte and Dr. Tromp. The court then concluded
    that the case was to be remanded for further proceedings. Monan challenges this
    determination on the ground that the proper course of action is to remand for
    payment of benefits.
    We have set forth the following test for determining when evidence should
    be credited and an immediate award of benefits directed:
    “(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting
    such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved
    before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the
    record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were
    such evidence credited.”
    Harman v. Apfel, 
    211 F.3d 1172
    , 1178 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smolen v. Chater,
    
    80 F.3d 1273
    , 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). We review the district court's decision to
    remand a case to the Commissioner for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1173.
    1
    The parties are familiar with the facts of the case, so we repeat them here
    only to the extent necessary to explain our decision.
    2
    Even assuming that a finding of “disabled” were clear based on the opinions
    of Dr. Belmonte and Dr. Tromp, a remand would still be necessary in this case
    because the ALJ did not perform a proper drug and alcohol analysis (“DAA
    Analysis”).
    “‘A finding of “disabled” under the five-step inquiry does not automatically
    qualify a claimant for disability benefits.’” Parra v. Astrue, 
    481 F.3d 742
    , 746 (9th
    Cir. 2007) (quoting Bustamante v. Massanari, 
    262 F.3d 949
    , 954 (9th Cir. 2001)).
    “Under 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(2)(C), a claimant cannot receive disability benefits ‘if
    alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the
    Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.’” 
    Id.
     “Under the
    implementing regulations, the ALJ must conduct a drug abuse and alcoholism analysis
    (“DAA Analysis”) by determining which of the claimant’s disabling limitations would
    remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol.” 
    Id. at 747
    . The DAA
    analysis must be performed after the ALJ has made the five-step disability
    determination. See 
    id.
     In the present case, there was no determination of “disabled.”
    Thus, while the ALJ discussed Monan’s drug use, he could not have performed the
    mandated DAA absent a disability determination.
    Additionally, it is possible that the ALJ did have legally sufficient, albeit
    unarticulated, reasons as to why he rejected the opinions of Dr. Belmonte and Dr.
    3
    Tromp that he could explain on remand. Cf. Salvador v. Sullivan, 
    917 F.2d 13
    , 15
    (9th Cir. 1990).
    Because there is at least one outstanding issue that must be resolved before an
    award of disability benefits can be made, the district court properly remanded
    Monan’s case for further proceedings.2
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    The Commissioner's motion to strike is denied.
    4