Kimberley Bradley v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Security ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 17 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KIMBERLEY ANN BRADLEY,                          No.    18-16511
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00349-DJH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
    ECONOMIC SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    v.
    KELLY SERVICES, INC.,
    Third-party-defendant-
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 11, 2019**
    Before:      WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Kimberley Ann Bradley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
    judgment in her employment action alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal
    Pay Act. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo.
    Colwell v. Bannister, 
    763 F.3d 1060
    , 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bradley’s claims
    alleging a discriminatory pay differential because Bradley failed to establish a
    prima facie case of discrimination. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 
    281 F.3d 1054
    , 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth prima facie case of discrimination
    under Title VII); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 
    178 F.3d 1069
    , 1073-74 (9th Cir.
    1999) (setting forth prima facie case for an Equal Pay Act violation; plaintiff must
    show that the jobs in question are substantially equal).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bradley’s
    retaliation claims because Bradley failed to demonstrate a causal link between her
    protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See Villiarimo, 
    281 F.3d at 1064
     (setting forth prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Lambert v.
    Ackerley, 
    180 F.3d 997
    , 1002-03, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth prima facie
    case of retaliation under 
    29 U.S.C. § 215
    (a)(3)).
    We reject as without merit Bradley’s contentions that the district judge
    demonstrated partiality for defendants.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    2                                    18-16511
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Bradley’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 30) is
    denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       18-16511
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-16511

Filed Date: 12/17/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/17/2019