United States v. Daniel Sesan Leitch , 702 F. App'x 557 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 28 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 14-10050
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:12-cr-0083-AWI
    v.
    DANIEL OLUWA SESAN LEITCH,                       MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 13, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Before: WALLACE, MCKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Daniel Leitch appeals from the judgment following his conviction and
    sentence on one count of receipt or distribution of material involving the sexual
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    exploitation of minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    Leitch first asserts that the district court erred by failing to advise him,
    during his plea colloquy, of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence applicable
    to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Leitch also contends that the district court
    erred by failing to advise him of the mandatory minimum and maximum terms of
    supervised release he could receive. As Leitch did not raise these issues before the
    district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Benz, 
    472 F.3d 657
    ,
    658–59 (9th Cir. 2006). “Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted
    unless the defendant can show that there has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3)
    that affected substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity
    or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. at 659.
    Rule 11(b) requires that a district court taking a defendant’s guilty plea must
    advise the defendant of the applicable mandatory minimum and maximum
    penalties. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I). Here, by failing to so advise Leitch of
    the mandatory minimums and maximums when taking his plea, the district court
    erred and that error was plain. This error, however, did not affect Leitch’s
    substantial rights. To show that the error affected his substantial rights, Leitch must
    establish that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
    2
    have entered the plea.” United States v. Borowy, 
    595 F.3d 1045
    , 1049 (9th Cir.
    2010), quoting United States v. Monzon, 
    429 F.3d 1268
    , 1272 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Because Leitch was accurately advised of the applicable mandatory minimum and
    maximum terms of imprisonment and supervised release on several occasions prior
    to his change of plea, he has not shown that he would have declined to enter the
    plea but for the district court’s error.
    Next, Leitch contends that the district court erred by failing to advise him of
    his right to a unanimous jury verdict. We review the adequacy of a jury-trial
    waiver de novo. United States v. Shorty, 
    741 F.3d 961
    , 965 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule
    23(a) requires that if a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury
    unless, among other things, the defendant waives his right to a jury trial in writing.
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a).
    Here, the district court did not obtain, and the government did not request, a
    written jury waiver from Leitch before proceeding to a bench trial. The
    government and the district court should have followed Rule 23. However,
    “[a]lthough Rule 23 states that the waiver must be in writing, we have held that
    under certain circumstances an oral waiver may be sufficient.” 
    Shorty, 741 F.3d at 966
    . One such circumstance “is where the record clearly reflects that the defendant
    ‘personally gave express consent in open court, intelligently and knowingly.’”
    3
    United States v. Saadya, 
    750 F.2d 1419
    , 1420 (9th Cir. 1985), quoting United
    States v. Reyes, 
    603 F.2d 69
    , 71 (9th Cir. 1979). Our record reflects that Leitch’s
    oral waiver was knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, despite the failure to follow
    Rule 23, Leitch’s oral waiver in this case was sufficient.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-10050

Citation Numbers: 702 F. App'x 557

Judges: Wallace, McKeown, Bybee

Filed Date: 7/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024