Ratcliff v. City of Red Lodge, Department of Police ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 07 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DWIGHT RATCLIFF, No. 16-35941
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C .No. 1:12-cv-00079- SPW
v.
CITY OF RED LODGE, DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM*
OF POLICE, a Political Subdivision of the
State of Montana; AL STUBER, a Red
Lodge Police Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 2, 2017**
Before: TASHIMA, TALLMAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
This case is before us for the second time. Last year, we reversed the district
court’s denial of Officer Al Stuber’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
Officer Stuber was entitled to qualified immunity against Dwight Ratcliff’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims for excessive force and a purportedly unreasonable Terry
stop.1 Ratcliff v. City of Red Lodge, Dep’t of Police, 650 F. App’x 484, 486 (9th
Cir. 2016). On remand, the district court granted the renewed motions for
summary judgment filed by Officer Stuber and the City of Red Lodge Police
Department (the “City”). This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Ratcliff argues that the district court erred when, on remand, it exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Before reaching this question,
however, we must first decide whether Ratcliff waived this argument by failing,
until now, to challenge the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
1. Unlike other bases of subject matter jurisdiction, the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 remains subject to “our normal
rules of appellate procedure,” including the waiver doctrine. See Kohler v. Inter-
Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, a party
waives an “objection to the district court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction by failing to raise it in the district court.” Id. Here, Ratcliff contends
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See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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that he raised the requisite objection in his opposition brief to Officer Stuber’s
renewed motion. But the portion of the brief on which Ratcliff relies only states:
[Ratcliff] acknowledges that with the Ninth Circuit ruling and the manner in
which Judge Molloy framed the § 1983 claim against the city, jurisdiction
based on federal question may not exist. If the Court finds that it no longer
has original jurisdiction and declines supplemental jurisdiction, [Ratcliff]
requests the Court dismiss the Complaint without prejudice, as has been the
practice in this District.
(Emphasis added.) This passage is plainly not an objection to the district court’s
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, but rather conveys Ratcliff’s preference for a
dismissal without prejudice in the event the court declines to exercise such
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hold that Ratcliff waived his right to object to the
district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
2. Even assuming that Ratcliff preserved his objection, his appeal still
fails. While we consider de novo the question of whether the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction, “[w]e review the district court’s decision to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion.” Satey v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Notwithstanding the permissive language in
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§ 1367, Ratcliff contends that the district court erred when it chose to exercise this
jurisdiction.
As an initial matter, Ratcliff is incorrect that, at the time the district court
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Ratcliff’s state law claims, it had already
dismissed all of his federal claims. This case is analogous to Munger v. City of
Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). There, when faced with the
same argument now pursued by Ratcliff, we explained that “[a]fter having granted
qualified immunity to the officers, the district court retained jurisdiction over the §
1983 claims against the police departments.” Id. at 1088 n.4. “The court granted
summary judgment as to these latter federal claims at the same time that it granted
summary judgment on most of the state law negligence claims – in the August 10,
1998 order.” Id. (emphasis added). “Thus, the court was not exercising
jurisdiction over most state law claims after having disposed of the federal claims.”
Id. The same is true here. On June 21, 2016, on remand, the district court
dismissed Ratcliff’s federal claims against Officer Stuber. At that time, it had not
yet dismissed Ratcliff’s § 1983 claim against the City. Instead, it did not dismiss
that claim until October 20, 2016, in the same order in which it dismissed Ratcliff’s
remaining state law claims.
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In any event, “a federal district court with power to hear state law claims has
discretion to keep, or to decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in
§ 1367(c) . . . .” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc). This discretion should be informed by the values of “economy, fairness,
and comity.” Munger, 227 F.3d at 1088 n.4 (quoting Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001). The
district court, noting that the case had been pending in federal court for over four
years and invoking considerations of judicial economy, did not abuse its discretion
in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Ratcliff’s state law claims.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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