Brian Claros-Bey v. J. Shartle , 693 F. App'x 703 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN CLAROS-BEY, No. 16-16872
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:15-cv-00501-BGM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
J. T. SHARTLE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Bruce G. Macdonald, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 11, 2017***
Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Brian Claros-Bey appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We review the denial of a section 2241
petition de novo, see United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2008), and we affirm.
Claros-Bey was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
He was assessed $500 pursuant to the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act
of 1996 (“VVCCA”) and designated to serve his custodial sentence with United
States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Claros-Bey contends that the BOP lacks
authority to collect, through its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”),
the $500 VVCCA assessment. This claim is belied by the language of the
applicable statutes and regulations. Regardless of how the VVCA assessment is
categorized under 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a), the BOP is authorized to collect Claros-
Bey’s VVCCA assessment from wages earned during his period of incarceration.
See D.C. Code § 24-101(a) (any person incarcerated pursuant to the District of
Columbia Official Code is in BOP custody and subject to BOP regulations); id. at
§ 4-516(a) (assessments made pursuant to the VVCCA shall be paid from wages
subsequently earned, including “in a facility of the Department of Corrections or
elsewhere”). Moreover, contrary to Claros-Bey’s contention, his participation in
the IFRP is voluntary and “does not implicate [his] constitutional rights.” See
Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1049.
AFFIRMED.
2 16-16872