Wes Johnson v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 695 F. App'x 218 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 10 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WES JOHNSON, AKA W. W. Johnson,                 No.    16-55161
    AKA Wes W. Johnson,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            2:15-cv-01338-JAK-AS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., as acquirer of
    certain assets and liabilities of Washington
    Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit
    Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for
    Washington Mutual Bank,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 7, 2017**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FABER,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Wes W. Johnson (Johnson) appeals from the district court’s denial of his
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion and dismissal of Johnson’s complaint as barred by
    both the statute of limitations and res judicata. The instant appeal follows a series
    of lawsuits in which Johnson alleged that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase)
    wrongfully foreclosed on Johnson’s property after Johnson attempted to rescind
    the loan on the property pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Because the
    parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    1. The district court correctly held that the statute of limitations barred
    Johnson’s quiet title claim. As the district court held, the limitations period began
    to run in 2009 when Chase attempted to foreclose on the property and filed an
    unlawful detainer action against Johnson, and it continued running. No authority
    supports Johnson’s contention that the statute of limitations stopped running when
    the unlawful detainer action was dismissed with prejudice. Instead, it is clear that
    “[t]he ‘possession’ required to toll the statute of limitations must be ‘exclusive and
    undisputed.’” Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith, 
    52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39
    , 43 (Ct. App. 1996).
    Not only did Johnson’s possession become disputed when Chase filed the unlawful
    detainer action, but it remained so, as demonstrated by the three separate lawsuits
    Johnson filed to establish his right to possession. The record demonstrates that the
    parties have engaged in one on-going dispute since 2009, and Johnson has
    2
    consistently incurred “the expense and inconvenience of litigation” in attempting
    to quiet title. Muktarian v. Barmby, 
    407 P.2d 659
    , 661 (Cal. 1965). Accordingly,
    Johnson’s possession has consistently remained disputed since 2009, and there is
    no basis on which to toll the statute of limitations.
    2. The district court correctly held that res judicata barred Johnson’s quiet
    title action based on his 2009 state court action. Johnson focuses on the district
    court’s decision that the claim raised in the instant action is identical to one
    litigated in that prior proceeding. Under California’s “primary rights” theory, “the
    question of whether a cause of action is identical . . . depends not on the legal
    theory or label used, but on the ‘primary right’ sought to be protected in the two
    actions.” Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
    203 Cal. Rptr. 638
    , 640 (Ct. App. 1984).
    An alleged “invasion of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.”
    
    Id. Johnson’s attempt
    to distinguish the primary right at issue in the instant
    action and the 2009 action is entirely unpersuasive. Both actions focused on the
    same primary right—Johnson’s right to ownership of the property—and the same
    alleged harm to that right—Chase’s purportedly wrongful foreclosure based on an
    invalid Deed of Trust. The district court correctly held that res judicata barred
    Johnson’s action.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-55161

Citation Numbers: 695 F. App'x 218

Judges: Callahan, Owens, Faber

Filed Date: 8/10/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024