Melissa Petrini v. Nancy Berryhill , 705 F. App'x 511 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUL 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MELISSA PETRINI, No. 15-16946
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01583-JD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 12, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,** District Judge.
Claimant Melissa Petrini appeals the denial of her application for
supplemental security income disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
1. The administrative law judge (ALJ) did not err in weighting the
various physician opinions. The inconsistencies cited by the ALJ amounted to
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for assigning
“limited weight” to Dr. Rutter’s opinions about Petrini’s symptoms, limitations,
and ultimate disability. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.
2005). For example, the same day Dr. Rutter opined that Petrini was entirely
“disabled from work” due to “symptoms of mood lability, irritability and poor
concentration,” Petrini reported to Dr. Rutter that her mood lability and irritability
were mild. Dr. Rutter’s treatment records from that day also reflect his
observations that Petrini had no cognitive disturbance; that she was well-organized
and goal-oriented; and that her attention span and mood had improved. As far back
as Dr. Rutter’s first appointment with Petrini, the treatment records––which
reflected that Petrini had a “very good” memory––contradicted Dr. Rutter’s later
impairment opinions, which claimed that Petrini had a “poor memory.”
By explaining that Dr. Kalman’s opinions were inconsistent with his
recorded observations and relied too heavily on Petrini’s representations found not
to be credible, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence for assigning “limited weight” to Dr. Kalman’s opinions. See
id.; Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 598–600, 602 (9th Cir.
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1999). For example, Dr. Kalman’s mental status evaluation of Petrini was fairly
normal, and Dr. Kalman’s notes recorded his observations that Petrini was
oriented, logical, and goal-directed. Petrini reported to Dr. Kalman that she was
able to perform several activities of daily living and that she got along well with
friends and family. These relatively positive reports and observations contradicted
Dr. Kalman’s opinions that Petrini had fairly severe symptoms and marked
limitations. It was also proper for the ALJ to discount Dr. Kalman’s findings and
opinions, because they were “premised to a large extent” upon Petrini’s subjective
reports, which the ALJ found not to be credible.1 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 598–600,
602 (citation omitted).
The ALJ properly incorporated Dr. Palmer’s opinions into the residual
functional capacity (RFC) finding and did not err in her explanation of the
opinions’ weight. Dr. Palmer’s opinions about Petrini’s limitations on attendance,
endurance, and ability to handle stress were not inconsistent with Dr. Bilik’s
opinions. The structure, citations, and language of the ALJ’s decision show that the
ALJ properly “translated” the opinions of Drs. Bilik and Palmer into an RFC that
embraced the limitations found by both doctors, even though the RFC finding did
not mirror the language of their opinions. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d
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Petrini did not appeal the ALJ’s finding about her credibility.
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1169, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807
F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is responsible for translating and
incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”).
2. Because the ALJ permissibly discounted the opinions of Drs. Rutter
and Kalman, she was not required to incorporate their opinions into the RFC
finding. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.
2004). In addition, because the ALJ properly “translated” the opinions of Drs. Bilik
and Palmer into the RFC assessment, the ALJ was permitted to limit her
hypothetical questions to the conditions reflected in the RFC. See
Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173–75.
3. In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not consider
whether an order for an award of benefits on remand would have been appropriate.
We have considered Petrini’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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