Patrick Leonard v. City of Los Angeles , 669 F. App'x 912 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 25 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK LEONARD, an individual and               No.   14-56796
    STEVEN BARRETT, an individual,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,            2:13-cv-05867-GW-AJW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal
    Corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 21, 2016**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TALLMAN, PARKER,*** and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
    for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Patrick Leonard and Steven Barrett (Plaintiffs) are firefighters who sued
    their employer, the City of Los Angeles, after they failed a psychological exam and
    were transferred out of the Arson Counter Terrorism Section of the Los Angeles
    Fire Department (Arson). Leonard and Barrett brought procedural due process
    claims against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of property and
    liberty interests, as well as state claims under the California Peace Officer and
    Firefighter Procedural Bill of Rights Acts (POBRA and FFBOR). The district
    court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims, so we have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, and construing all facts in the light
    most favorable to Plaintiffs, see Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 
    665 F.3d 1076
    , 1083
    (9th Cir. 2011), we affirm.
    1. Plaintiffs’ property interest claim fails because Plaintiffs do not have a
    protected property interest in their assignment to Arson. We have held that
    individuals do not have a property interest in a promotion where the promotion is
    contingent on meeting certain requirements. Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 
    147 F.3d 867
    , 871–73 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiffs did not meet one of the statutory
    requirements for an assignment as an investigator with peace officer
    powers—passing a psychological exam—so they had no vested rights in their
    Arson assignment. See 
    id. Plaintiffs concede
    that passing this exam was
    2
    advertised as a requirement for the assignment, that they were told by superiors
    they would have to pass the exam to stay in Arson, and that the exam was also a
    statutory requirement. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment
    on Plaintiffs’ property interest claim.
    2. Plaintiffs’ liberty interest claim fails for lack of publication. To succeed
    on a liberty interest claim, Plaintiffs must show that the City disseminated
    stigmatizing information about them. See Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
    238 F.3d 1123
    , 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2001). We agree with the district court that there is
    no evidence that the City disseminated information about Plaintiffs’ psychological
    disqualifications. The five pages of deposition testimony cited by Plaintiffs as
    evidence of publication are insufficient because (1) this evidence is not part of the
    record on appeal, see Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 
    842 F.2d 1074
    , 1078 (9th
    Cir. 1988), and (2) even if we could consider these pages, they provide nothing
    more than inadmissible rumors and speculation.
    3. Plaintiffs’ POBRA/FFBOR claims also fail because Plaintiffs were not
    subject to punitive action. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3254(b), 3304(b). An
    officer/firefighter is not subject to punitive action by being denied a promotion
    based on merit during a probationary period, even if the denial leads to a decrease
    in pay. Guinn v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 
    184 Cal. App. 4th 941
    , 945–47 (2010).
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    Plaintiffs neither completed their probationary period nor met all of the
    requirements for an Arson assignment. Thus, they were not subject to punitive
    action when they were transferred out of Arson to other positions within the fire
    department. See 
    id. In light
    of our disposition, we need not reach the question of whether the
    procedures offered to Plaintiffs to contest their transfer were constitutionally
    adequate.
    Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED.
    4