Johnny Andoe v. Kevin Kemph ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 18 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHNNY R. ANDOE,                                No. 16-35861
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00287-REB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KEVIN KEMPH, Director; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    Ronald E. Bush, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
    Submitted July 11, 2017***
    Before:      CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
    Johnny R. Andoe, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional
    claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    Andoe consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    ***
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Hamilton v. Brown, 
    630 F.3d 889
    , 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order)
    (dismissal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii)). We reverse and remand.
    Dismissal of Andoe’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Andoe
    failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct caused actual
    injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 349-53
    (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury
    requirement). However, Andoe was not given an opportunity to amend this claim
    prior to dismissal of the action. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    66 F.3d 245
    , 248 (9th
    Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies
    and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Moreover, Andoe
    alleged in his verified complaint that he was transferred to another prison in
    retaliation for filing grievances, and the district court did not evaluate Andoe’s
    retaliation claim. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 
    408 F.3d 559
    , 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)
    (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Hebbe
    v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (pro se pleadings are liberally
    construed). We reverse the judgment, and remand for the district court to consider
    Andoe’s retaliation claim in the first instance, and to determine whether leave to
    2                                     16-35861
    amend the complaint would be appropriate.
    We reject as meritless Andoe’s contentions regarding the district court’s
    treatment of his motion to reassign the case.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    3                                  16-35861