Anthony Lapointe v. Unknown Bienovidas , 693 F. App'x 629 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY GREGORY LAPOINTE, No. 14-16713
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02108-DJH-
MEA
v.
UNKNOWN BIENOVIDAS, Sergeant; et MEMORANDUM*
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 6, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit
Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Anthony Gregory LaPointe appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment grant in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to serious threats to his safety. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott
Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because LaPointe
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any of the defendants
consciously ignored, failed to respond, or were otherwise deliberately indifferent to
a serious threat to LaPointe. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)
(“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless
the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying LaPointe’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion because LaPointe failed to show how allowing
additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See Tatum v. City
& Cty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review
and requiring a movant to “identify by affidavit the specific facts that further
discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would preclude summary
judgment”).
2
We reject as without merit LaPointe’s contention that the district court erred
by withdrawing its referral of defendants’ summary judgment motion to a magistrate
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
AFFIRMED.
3