Satya Reddi v. Hughes & Hughes LLP , 695 F. App'x 279 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SATYA V. REDDI, No. 15-56739
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:15-cv-01054-JVS-DFM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HUGHES & HUGHES LLP; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Satya V. Reddi appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his prior marriage
dissolution action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (Federal Rule of Civil
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Procedure 12(b)(6)); Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d
1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (res judicata). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Reddi’s action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Reddi raised, or could have raised, his claims in
his prior state court action, which involved the same primary rights, the same
parties or privies, and resulted in a final judgment. See Manufactured Home
Cmtys. Inc., 420 F.3d at 1031 (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court
judgment federal courts look to state law.”); DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352
P.3d 378, 382 n.1 & 386-87 (Cal. 2015) (setting forth requirements for res judicata,
defining primary rights doctrine, and discussing privity). Contrary to Reddi’s
contentions, his allegations regarding improper garnishment of his funds do not
negate the preclusive effect of res judicata. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262,
1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and
the same wrong by the defendant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in
the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different
forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Reddi’s action
without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
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(setting forth standard of review and explaining that it is not an abuse of discretion
to dismiss without leave to amend when any proposed amendment would be
futile).
We reject as without merit Reddi’s contentions that the district court violated
his right to due process.
We will not consider matters not properly raised before the district court.
See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the
district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Appellees Hughes & Hughes LLP, L. Bergman Hughes, B.A. Hughes,
Ewing Wald, S. Hughes, Kaiho, McNamara Mattos, LeMas Farrimond, and
Trivedi’s request for a pre-filing order, set forth in their answering brief, is denied
without prejudice to a separately filed motion for such relief. See Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
factors for the district court to consider for imposing pre-filing restrictions).
Appellees J.J. Coleman, Moshtael, Sullivan, A.M. Coleman, Kennedy,
Lopez Cooper, A. Hughes, and Madanipour’s request for sanctions and a pre-filing
order, set forth in their answering brief, is denied without prejudice to a separately
filed motion for such relief. See id.; see also Fed. R. App. P. 38.
AFFIRMED.
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