Adrian Chaparro v. C. Ducart , 695 F. App'x 254 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADRIAN ARMANDO CHAPARRO, No. 16-15693
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-04955-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CLARK E. DUCART, Warden, in his
Official and Individual Capacity; E.
CONTRERAS, Correctional Officer, in his
Official and Individual Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Adrian Armando Chaparro, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
defendants violated his right to the free exercise of religion. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both summary judgment and an
officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Hughes v. Kisela, 841 F.3d 1081,
1084 (9th Cir. 2016). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004).
We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chaparro’s claim
for damages against all defendants in their official capacity on the basis of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442
(9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state
official acting in his or her official capacity.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ducart
because Chaparro failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Ducart personally participated in any constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca,
652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he
or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a
“sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Contreras on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear
to every reasonable official that it was unlawful to follow the Inmate Attendance
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Policy and remove Chaparro from the chapel ducat list after he failed to attend a
chapel service. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (discussing
qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if “every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Canell v. Lightner,
143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (relatively short-term and sporadic
interference with prayer activities does not violate free exercise clause).
We reject as meritless Chaparro’s contention that the district court
erroneously failed to take into consideration his claim under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Even if Chaparro’s complaint
was construed as raising a RLUIPA claim, his RLUIPA claim fails because
Chaparro only seeks monetary damages, which are not available under RLUIPA.
See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (RLUIPA does not
authorize money damages against state officials sued in their official or individual
capacities).
AFFIRMED.
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