Central Oregon Landwatch v. Kent Connaughton ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 23 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CENTRAL OREGON LANDWATCH, an                    No.    15-35089
    Oregon non-profit corporation;
    WATERWATCH OF OREGON, an Oregon                 D.C. No. 6:13-cv-02027-AA
    non-profit corporation,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    KENT CONNAUGHTON, in his official
    capacity as Regional Forester of Region 6; et
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    CITY OF BEND,
    Intervenor-Defendant-
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 13, 2017
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: BERZON, WATFORD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Plaintiffs-appellants Central Oregon LandWatch and WaterWatch of Oregon
    (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    to defendants-appellees the United States Forest Service (the Forest Service or
    Service) and City of Bend, Oregon (the City) (collectively, defendants) and denial
    of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The City has long sourced drinking
    and municipal water from Tumalo Creek and Bridge Creek, tributaries of the
    Deschutes River, and has been authorized by the Service to operate an intake
    facility and pipeline for withdrawing that water on the Deschutes National Forest.
    Plaintiffs instituted the underlying action after the Forest Service approved
    issuance of a Special Use Permit (SUP) authorizing the City to upgrade its intake
    facility, construct a new pipeline, and operate the system for 20 years subject to
    certain requirements (these actions are collectively referred to as the Bridge Creek
    Water Supply System Project (the Project)). Plaintiffs contend that the Forest
    Service’s decision to authorize the Project, as detailed in its Environmental
    Assessment (EA) and Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact, was
    arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Federal Land Policy and Management
    Act (FLPMA), National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National
    Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
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    1. Plaintiffs contend that the Project violates Inland Native Fish Strategy
    (INFISH) guidelines LH-1 and LH-3, meaning it is not consistent with the
    Deschutes National Forest Plan (the Forest Plan) and therefore violates FLPMA
    and NFMA. These INFISH guidelines direct the Forest Service to “avoid effects
    that would retard or prevent attainment of the [interim water temperature Riparian
    Management Objectives (RMOs) established by INFISH] and avoid adverse
    effects on inland native fish.”
    The Forest Service views RMOs as benchmarks against which to measure
    progress towards ultimate goals. This interpretation “is entitled to substantial
    deference.” Great Old Broads for Wilderness v. Kimbell, 
    709 F.3d 836
    , 850 (9th
    Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). It is also supported by the interim nature of the
    RMOs and their appropriate application to larger stream systems.
    Nor does INFISH require eliminating all existing activities to attain interim
    RMOs; rather, it requires that any new activities maintain existing conditions or
    move towards improvement. The Service determined that the Project would
    improve conditions in Tumalo Creek and would therefore comply with INFISH by
    “trending toward attainment” of the RMOs.
    Lastly, the Forest Service was not required to impose minimum instream
    flow requirements in authorizing the SUP. Doing so would do little to improve the
    conditions of Tumalo Creek. The Forest Service determined that the Project would
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    positively impact stream flows in Sub-reach A1; would have no or minimal impact
    in Sub-reach A2, where under the current SUP the City’s unused diverted water
    returns to Tumalo Creek; and would have no or minimal impact on Reach B
    because that reach is mostinfluenced by the Tumalo Irrigation District’s diversion,
    over which the Forest Service lacks control.
    Accordingly, the Forest Service’s decision that the Project is consistent with
    the Forest Plan was not arbitrary and capricious.
    2. Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service violated NEPA because the
    Service only discussed two alternatives in detail: (1) implementation of the Project,
    and (2) a “no action” alternative based on the existing SUP. Plaintiffs contend that
    (1) the “no action” alternative was not a true “no action” alternative, (2) analyzing
    two near-identical alternatives is inadequate, and (3) the Service was required to
    analyze a no- or reduced-diversion alternative.
    “[W]ith an EA, an agency only is required to include a brief discussion of
    reasonable alternatives,” N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
    
    545 F.3d 1147
    , 1153 (9th Cir. 2008), and there is no “minimum number of
    alternatives that an agency must consider,” as it is the “the substance of the
    alternatives” that matters. Native Ecosys. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    428 F.3d 1233
    , 1246 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the purpose of the SUP was to “authorize use of
    National Forest System lands for planned upgrades to the City’s existing Bridge
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    Creek intake facility and replacement of the City’s aging Bridge Creek water
    supply pipelines.” The Forest Service determined that the surface water formed a
    “critical component of the City’s dual-source [water] supply.”
    Plaintiffs do not object to the stated purpose and need, but contend that the
    Service was required to analyze “a true no action alternative involving no
    withdrawal” or a “reduced diversion alternative” and that the two alternatives
    studied in detail were insufficient. The EA did, however, describe the additional
    alternatives considered and dismissed from detailed study. See N. Alaska Envtl.
    Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 
    457 F.3d 969
    , 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“An agency need not []
    discuss alternatives similar to alternatives actually considered, or alternatives
    which are infeasible, ineffective, or inconsistent with the basic policy objectives
    for the management of the area.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The EA explained that groundwater-only options would “compromise the City’s
    ability to provide a safe and reliable water supply,” reduce water flows in other
    parts of the Deschutes River, be costly, and be less reliable than a dual-source
    system. The EA also flagged possible environmental concerns posed by the
    groundwater-only option, including reduced surface stream flows (which are fed
    by groundwater) and increased energy consumption caused by pumping
    groundwater. This discussion was sufficient.
    The Forest Service also did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by defining
    5
    its “no action” alternative as a continuation of the existing SUP, as doing so is
    permitted by its own regulations, Council of Environmental Quality regulations,
    and circuit precedent. See 
    36 C.F.R. § 220.7
    (b)(2)(ii); 
    46 Fed. Reg. 18,027
     (Mar.
    23, 1981); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
    623 F.3d 633
    , 642
    (9th Cir. 2010); Akiak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    213 F.3d 1140
    , 1148 (9th
    Cir. 2000).
    The authority on which plaintiffs rely is not to the contrary. Neither Western
    Watersheds Project v. Abbey, 
    719 F.3d 1035
     (9th Cir. 2013), nor Muckleshoot
    Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 
    177 F.3d 800
     (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
    establish that an EA’s analysis in detail of two similar alternatives in and of itself is
    inadequate, where other alternatives were also considered, albeit briefly, and
    rejected. Instead, to mount a successful challenge under NEPA, plaintiffs must
    establish the existence of “a viable but unexamined alternative.” Muckleshoot, 
    177 F.3d at 814
     (citation omitted). Plaintiffs fail to make this showing. “[T]he
    alternatives considered were reasonable in light of the cited project goals,” and the
    Forest Service’s alternatives analysis was not arbitrary and capricious. City of
    Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    123 F.3d 1142
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 1997);
    see also Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    860 F.3d 1244
    , 1257 (9th Cir. 2017) (considered alternatives were not inadequate
    although “quite similar to each other”).
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    3. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service’s analysis of the impact
    of climate change on the Project and level of stream flows in Tumalo Creek was
    inadequate. Plaintiffs argue that the analysis was arbitrary and capricious because
    the Service (1) used a qualitative, not quantitative, analysis and (2) called for
    additional monitoring and future adjustments, rather than taking a “hard look” at
    the impacts of climate change before authorizing the SUP.
    The Service was not required to conduct a quantitative analysis. NEPA
    provides for analysis of impacts “in proportion to their significance” and requires
    “only brief discussion of other than significant issues.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.2
    (b).
    Here, the Forest Service determined that climate change would have the same
    potential impact on stream flows under either alternative, and therefore only a brief
    discussion of climate change’s impact on the Project area was required.
    Furthermore, we allow agencies to describe environmental impacts in qualitative
    terms when they explain their reasons for doing so and “why objective data cannot
    be provided.” League of Wilderness Defs.-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
    U.S. Forest Serv., 
    689 F.3d 1060
    , 1076 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The
    Service did just that, explaining “why precise quantification was unreliable” and
    therefore discussion in qualitative terms was required. 
    Id. at 1077
    .
    Moreover, the Service’s provision for future monitoring did not conflict with
    NEPA’s “hard look” requirement, particularly because the Service’s qualitative
    7
    analysis was sufficient on its own. The Service also explained why the monitoring
    would allow for better evaluation of climate change and its impact on the Project
    area. Therefore, the Forest Service took an adequate “hard look” at the impact of
    climate change on the proposed action and Tumalo Creek.
    AFFIRMED.
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