Jeannie Bruesch v. Carolyn Colvin , 609 F. App'x 481 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 08 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEANNIE NICOLE BRUESCH, No. 14-35124
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01453-HU
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 6, 2015**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Jeannie Bruesch appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Social Security Act. Bruesch contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
erred by failing to include in his residual functional capacity finding or in his
question to the vocational expert his finding at step three of the sequential
evaluation process, and doctors’ findings, that Bruesch had moderate difficulties
with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s judgment de novo. See Molina v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately
captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the
assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical [record].”
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). In Stubbs-
Danielson, we held that a finding that a claimant had the residual functional
capacity “to perform simple, routine, repetitive sedentary work,” as well as a
hypothetical question that reflected the same limitations, adequately incorporated
limitations related to pace and other mental limitations regarding attention,
concentration, and adaption that had been identified by doctors. Id. at 1173-76.
We explained that only one doctor had assessed whether the claimant could
perform unskilled work on a sustained basis, and this doctor had concluded that the
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claimant could do so despite the doctor’s additional finding that the claimant had a
slow pace. Id. at 1174-75.
In assessing Bruesch’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that she
was limited to “understanding, remembering and carrying unskilled instructions.”
In his hypothetical question to the vocational expert, the ALJ described a person
who “would be limited to unskilled work.” Like the doctor in Stubbs-Danielson,
Dr. Gregory Cole concluded that despite Bruesch’s tendency to give up easily on
tasks and her slow pace, she was able to sustain simple, routine tasks. Two other
psychologists similarly concluded that despite Bruesch’s limitations in
concentration, persistence, or pace, she was capable of performing her past relevant
work. Accordingly, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding and
hypothetical question were consistent with the restrictions identified in the medical
record and thus adequately described Bruesch’s limitations. See id. at 1174-75; see
also Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2011)
(requiring hypothetical question posed to vocational expert to account specifically
for “moderate limitation[s] in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace”).
AFFIRMED.
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