Iacob v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FILIP C. IACOB, No. 17-15433
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00923-JAD-GWF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Filip C. Iacob appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his employment action alleging violations of Title VII and Nevada law. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s racial
discrimination and retaliation claims because Iacob failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether his employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
and non-retaliatory reasons for its actions were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha
Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth prima
facie elements of discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and burden
shifting framework, and noting that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be
specific and substantial); see also Apeceche v. White Pine County, 615 P.2d 975,
977-78 (Nev. 1980) (a discrimination claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330 is
analyzed under federal anti-discrimination law).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s hostile
work environment claim because Iacob failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he was subjected to sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct.
See Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating prima
facie requirements for hostile work environment claim under Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s claim of
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because appellee was immune from
liability. See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 722, 728-29 (Nev. 2007)
(explaining discretionary immunity under Nevada law and adopting federal test for
determining if immunity applies); see also Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944,
2 17-15433
950 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]ecisions relating to the hiring, training, and supervision of
employees usually involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended
[discretionary immunity] to shield.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because Iacob failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether appellee engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct or whether Iacob suffered severe or extreme emotional
distress. See Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Nev. 1983)
(setting forth elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under
Nevada law).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-15433