Jerry Adams, Jr. v. Gary Swarthout ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 5 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JERRY ADAMS, Jr., No. 15-56681
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:13-cv-00124-MMM-JC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 6, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Jerry Adams, Jr., a California state prisoner, challenges the denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Reviewing the denial of his petition de novo, Stanley
v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011), we affirm.
Adams first contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to move for severance of his case on the basis of prejudice resulting from
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
evidentiary spillover if tried with his co-defendants, and instead, moving for
severance solely on the basis of undue delay.
Adams’ petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996; therefore, our review of this ineffective assistance claim is “doubly
deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). The California
Court of Appeal determined that trial counsel’s conduct was reasonable because
evidence relevant to the charges against Adams’ co-defendants would support
Adams’ alibi defense and would not be prejudicial. Given the presumption of
reasonableness afforded to trial counsel’s conduct, see Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), the California Court of Appeal’s determination that
Adams failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel was not an
unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. See Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
Adams also contends that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his
challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The California
Court of Appeal undertook a comparative juror analysis and evaluated the totality of
the circumstances when considering Adams’ contention that the State impermissibly
exercised peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors E.H. and P.B. on the
basis of their race. Although reasonable minds certainly could doubt the veracity of
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the prosecutor’s explanations for the challenges at issue, we cannot say that, on this
record, the state court “had no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor’s
race-neutral justifications and conclude [Adams] had shown a Batson violation.”
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341 (2006).
AFFIRMED.
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