Cleto Sigueiros v. William Knipp , 644 F. App'x 731 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 04 2016
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
CLETO SIQUEIROS, No. 12-17024
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-02939-MMC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM KNIPP,
Respondent-Appellee,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2016
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges and
GETTLEMAN,** Senior District Judge.
California state prisoner Cleto Siqueiros appeals the district court’s denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), petitioner is entitled to relief only if he demonstrates that the state
court’s denial of his claim was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States”; or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Petitioner contends that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to call as witnesses at trial his brother and wife.
Accordingly, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the
Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011). To establish a successful ineffective assistance claim under Strickland,
petitioner must have demonstrated both that trial counsel's conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists that,
**
The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
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but for counsel's substandard performance, the decision reached by the fact finder
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984).
Because there are theories that could have supported the California Supreme
Court’s decision denying petitioner’s request for habeas relief that fairminded
jurists would not disagree are inconsistent with Strickland, petitioner’s claims fail.
See Harrington, 562 at 102. With respect to the first element of the Strickland
standard – performance – the state court could reasonably have concluded that,
given each of these witnesses’ significant bias and credibility issues, counsel’s
decision not to call them as trial witnesses fell within an objective standard of
reasonableness.
The state court could also have reasonably determined that petitioner did not
suffer any prejudice from not having his brother and wife testify. In light of the
victim’s testimony that petitioner’s wife and brother tried to persuade her to accuse
someone else of the abuse, their testimony likely would have had a negligible
effect on the victim’s credibility. This is particularly true given petitioner’s own
testimony that he previously molested the victim, thereby corroborating the
victim’s testimony that abuse had occurred. Petitioner’s confession also weakened
the effect his wife’s testimony would have had because, contrary to her declaration,
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abuse had in fact occurred and was admitted by petitioner. Consequently,
petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
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