Wanda Thomas v. John McHugh ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 27 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WANDA THOMAS,                                    No.   14-16669
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
    1:12-cv-00535-LEK-KSC
    v.
    RYAN D. MCCARTHY, Acting                         MEMORANDUM*
    Secretary, Department of the Army,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 14, 2017**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: RAWLINSON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and WATTERS,***
    District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Susan P. Watters, United States District Judge for the
    District of Montana, sitting by designation.
    In December, 2011, Thomas joined an action in the District of Hawaii with
    nine other plaintiffs against the Secretary of the Army (the Army), alleging
    violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq.
    and denial of Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment.
    The district court severed Thomas’s claims, and granted summary judgment
    in favor of the Army on the basis that Thomas failed to exhaust her administrative
    remedies and, in the alternative, that her claims failed on the merits. Thomas
    moved for reconsideration, arguing that administrative exhaustion would be futile,
    and, alternatively, that dismissal of her Title VII claim violated the International
    Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Treaty),
    660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force on January 4, 1969. The court denied
    Thomas’s motion as meritless.
    We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de
    novo and a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See
    Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 
    727 F.3d 950
    , 954 (9th Cir. 2013). A district court’s
    decision to order separate trials is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
    Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc., 
    779 F.3d 973
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2015).
    1.     Treaties that are not self-executing do not create “obligations
    enforceable in the federal courts.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
    542 U.S. 692
    , 735
    2
    (2004). Because Title VII cannot be preempted by a non-enforceable treaty, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for
    reconsideration based on the provisions of the Treaty. See Brown v. General Svcs.
    Admin., 
    425 U.S. 820
    , 835 (1976) (describing Title VII as “the exclusive judicial
    remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment”).
    2.     We need not determine at this juncture whether a futility exception
    should be read into the exhaustion requirements of Title VII because Thomas’s
    “bare assertions of futility are insufficient” to demonstrate the existence of a viable
    futility claim in any event. Diaz v. United Agr. Employee Welfare Ben. Plan & Tr.,
    
    50 F.3d 1478
    , 1485 (9th Cir. 1995).
    3.     Summary judgment under Title VII is appropriate where no material
    issue of fact is raised. See Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 
    847 F.3d 678
    , 686
    (9th Cir. 2017). Because Thomas failed to raise a material issue of fact as to her
    Title VII claims, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in
    favor of Defendant. As the district court noted, any conflict between Thomas and
    her supervisor arose from performance issues and personal incompatibility rather
    than racial discrimination. In addition, Thomas was unable to identify any
    protected activity that could serve as the basis for a claim of retaliation.
    3
    4.     Severance of a party’s claims for a separate trial is not an abuse of
    discretion if the district court determines that the party’s injuries are “distinct and
    independent” from that of the other parties. See 
    Rush, 779 F.3d at 975
    . As the
    district court found, Thomas’s claims were distinct from those of the other
    plaintiffs temporally and in terms of her work assignment. Therefore, the district
    court acted within its discretion in severing Thomas’s claims.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-16669

Judges: Rawlinson, Smith, Watters

Filed Date: 10/27/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024