Infospan, Inc. v. Emirates Nbd Bank Pjsc , 903 F.3d 896 ( 2018 )


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  •                        FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    INFOSPAN, INC.; INFOSPAN                        No. 16-55090
    (GULF) INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,                  D.C. No.
    8:14-cv-01679-JVS-AN
    v.
    EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC,                           OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 11, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Filed September 7, 2018
    Before: Marsha S. Berzon and N. Randy Smith, Circuit
    Judges, and P. Kevin Castel,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith
    *
    The Honorable P. Kevin Castel, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2          INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    SUMMARY**
    Personal Jurisdiction
    The panel reversed the district court’s judgment
    compelling arbitration of claims concerning a contract and
    remanded for dismissal on the ground that the district court
    lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
    The panel reversed the district court’s determination that
    the defendant waived its personal jurisdiction defense through
    its litigation conduct. The panel concluded that the defendant
    preserved the defense by timely asserting it and litigating it to
    an adverse ruling, and did not waive the defense by litigating
    other defenses and counterclaims in a related matter between
    similar parties.
    The panel held that the district court lacked personal
    jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and
    injunctive relief because the defendant, a United Arab
    Emirates bank, lacked sufficient contacts with the United
    States.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                    3
    COUNSEL
    Daniel Scott Schecter (argued) and Nima H. Mohebii, Latham
    & Watkins LLP, Los Angeles, California; Stephanie N.
    Grace, Latham & Watkins LLP, San Diego, California;
    Kathryn H. Ruemmler and J. Scott Ballenger, Latham &
    Watkins LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellant.
    William A. Isaacson (argued), Sandra M. Calhoun, Jonathan
    Shaw, and David Boyd, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,
    Washington, D.C.; David L. Zifkin, Boies Schiller Flexner
    LLP, Santa Monica, California; Terry Bird, Bird Marella
    Boxer Wolpert Nessim Drooks Licenberg & Rhow, Los
    Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    OPINION
    N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    A defendant that timely asserts that the district court lacks
    personal jurisdiction and litigates the issue to an adverse
    decision from the district court does not waive the personal
    jurisdiction defense by vigorously litigating defenses to the
    merits, including by asserting counterclaims against other
    parties. Emirates NBD Bank PJSC (the “Bank”) was entitled
    to litigate its defenses and counterclaims in a related matter
    between similar parties without waiving the issue of personal
    jurisdiction, because the Bank had timely asserted the
    personal jurisdiction defense and received an adverse ruling
    (that jurisdiction was proper) from the district court.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s waiver
    determination, and remand for dismissal because the district
    court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Bank.
    4         INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    I.
    The underlying dispute in this matter concerns a contract
    between InfoSpan (Gulf), Inc. (“InfoSpan Gulf”), a Cayman
    Islands corporation, and the UAE Bank. Early in 2007,
    InfoSpan Gulf approached Emirates Bank International
    (which later merged with the National Bank of Dubai to
    become the Bank) in Dubai with a proposal to provide stored
    value cards to customers in the United Arab Emirates
    (“UAE”). In May 2007, the parties reached an agreement and
    entered a contract (the “SVC Agreement”). All negotiations
    took place in Dubai. Under the SVC Agreement, InfoSpan
    Gulf would provide the Bank with innovative prepaid stored
    value cards . The cards would help the Bank provide a better
    banking solution for migrant workers by allowing the workers
    to transmit money internationally via short message service
    (“SMS”) text messages, receive direct deposits, and make
    purchases. InfoSpan Gulf and the Bank would each share in
    the fees associated with the cards. The cards would be
    processed by InfoSpan Gulf and issued by Emirates Bank
    International in the UAE. The parties entered the SVC
    Agreement in Dubai, and the SVC Agreement stated that it
    was governed by UAE law and subject to jurisdiction in the
    UAE courts.
    Over the ensuing two years, the relationship between the
    Bank and InfoSpan Gulf broke down, culminating in the
    Bank’s termination of the SVC Agreement on May 4, 2009.
    In 2011, InfoSpan Gulf and its affiliate InfoSpan, Inc.
    (“InfoSpan”) sued the Bank in federal district court in
    California alleging tort and contract claims (“InfoSpan I”).
    The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on personal
    jurisdiction grounds, and the district court initially granted the
    Bank’s motion on July 27, 2012. However, after InfoSpan
    INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                    5
    moved for reconsideration, the district court partially reversed
    course, finding personal jurisdiction for InfoSpan to assert its
    tort claims against the Bank. In reversing its ruling on
    InfoSpan’s claims, the district court did not disturb its ruling
    that there was no personal jurisdiction over InfoSpan Gulf’s
    contract claims.
    The parties next litigated whether InfoSpan Gulf was an
    indispensable party. The Bank also sought to have InfoSpan’s
    tort claims sent to arbitration, asserting that they arose out of
    the SVC Agreement between InfoSpan Gulf and the Bank.
    The court resolved the indispensable party and arbitration
    issues against the Bank, and InfoSpan Gulf was voluntarily
    dismissed to preserve diversity jurisdiction.
    In 2014, the Bank requested leave to amend its answer to
    allege counterclaims against InfoSpan for the return of funds
    paid to InfoSpan Gulf under an alter ego theory. In its
    proposed amended pleading, the Bank again asserted and
    preserved its objection to personal jurisdiction. InfoSpan
    argued that the counterclaims were subject to a mandatory
    arbitration clause. The Bank did not oppose arbitration;
    instead it reasserted that all claims (including InfoSpan’s tort
    claims) should be subject to arbitration. The district court
    denied the amendment on timeliness grounds without
    reaching the arbitration issue.
    After the district court denied the amendment, InfoSpan
    initiated a second federal lawsuit (“InfoSpan II”) against the
    Bank in California on October 17, 2014. This second suit is
    the subject of the present appeal. In the second lawsuit,
    InfoSpan sought to compel arbitration under the SVC
    Agreement of its declaratory judgment claim, asserting that
    the Bank’s breach of contract and related claims lacked merit.
    6        INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    InfoSpan claimed that, although no such claims were
    pending, there remained an imminent threat that they would
    be asserted.
    As it turned out, after InfoSpan voluntarily amended its
    complaint in InfoSpan I in November 2014, the Bank
    reasserted its counterclaims in its answer to the amended
    complaint (the Bank again reasserted its objection to personal
    jurisdiction in its amended answer). However, the Bank later
    voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims without prejudice in
    InfoSpan I.
    Meanwhile, in InfoSpan II, the Bank moved to dismiss the
    suit on personal and subject matter jurisdiction grounds. The
    district court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion to
    dismiss. InfoSpan then sought to amend its complaint to add
    InfoSpan Gulf as a party and seek arbitration of InfoSpan
    Gulf’s contract claims (previously dismissed in InfoSpan I for
    lack of personal jurisdiction) in the United States. The Bank
    did not oppose the amendment, but it once again expressly
    reserved its objections to jurisdiction. After InfoSpan Gulf
    was added, the Bank renewed its motion to dismiss—pointing
    to the district court’s earlier ruling that personal jurisdiction
    was lacking as to the contract claims.
    In its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court
    held that the Bank had waived its personal jurisdiction
    defense and submitted to jurisdiction by litigating InfoSpan
    I. The district court specifically identified the Bank’s decision
    to litigate its counterclaims in InfoSpan I proceedings as a
    component of the waiver. With respect to subject matter
    jurisdiction, the district court held that there was a cognizable
    case-or-controversy over arbitration arising from the Bank’s
    refusal to arbitrate the claims in California.
    INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                    7
    After the district court entered final judgment, compelling
    arbitration in InfoSpan II, the Bank timely appealed.
    Meanwhile, InfoSpan I went to trial on the tort claims,
    resulting in a defense verdict on all claims. InfoSpan timely
    appealed the adverse judgment, which we affirmed in
    InfoSpan I, No. 17-55000.
    II.
    We review the “district court’s determination that [the
    Bank] waived” the defense of personal jurisdiction “for an
    abuse of discretion.” CFPB v. Gordon, 
    819 F.3d 1179
    , 1187
    (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
    137 S. Ct. 2291
    (2017). “[T]he
    first step of [the] abuse of discretion test is to determine de
    novo whether the [district] court identified the correct legal
    rule to apply to the relief requested.” Enyart v. Nat’l
    Conference of Bar Examiners, Inc., 
    630 F.3d 1153
    , 1159 (9th
    Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    ,
    1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). If not waived, we review
    the merits of the personal jurisdiction issue de novo. See
    Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 
    453 F.3d 1151
    , 1154 (9th Cir.
    2006).
    III.
    The district court suggested that, although the Bank fully
    litigated the merits of its personal jurisdiction defense in
    InfoSpan I, it nonetheless waived the issue by vigorously
    defending the case after the personal jurisdiction issue was
    decided against it. Specifically, the district court faulted the
    Bank for its assertion of counterclaims against InfoSpan in
    InfoSpan I and its other strategic efforts to get the case sent to
    arbitration in the UAE.
    8        INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    Our cases are clear that once the issue of personal
    jurisdiction has been adjudicated on the merits against a
    party, that party may fully participate and defend the
    litigation up to and including filing its own counterclaims.
    See Hillis v. Heineman, 
    626 F.3d 1014
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (acknowledging the Ninth Circuit rule that “the filing of a
    permissive counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of a
    personal jurisdiction defense asserted in the same pleading”
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); SEC v.
    Ross, 
    504 F.3d 1130
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (identifying Ninth
    Circuit precedent that filing a “compulsory counterclaim . . .
    does not thereby waive any jurisdictional defenses [the party]
    has previously or concurrently asserted” and filing a
    “permissive counterclaim” likewise does not waive
    jurisdictional defenses “asserted in the same pleading”
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Stewart v.
    Ragland, 
    934 F.2d 1033
    , 1036 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
    where a party timely asserts a personal jurisdiction defense
    and the court “denies the motion . . . the party may proceed to
    trial on the merits without waiving the jurisdictional
    challenge”); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 
    743 F.2d 1325
    ,
    1330 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold that the filing of a
    permissive counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of a
    personal jurisdiction defense asserted in the same pleading.”).
    In concluding that the Bank’s litigation conduct amounted
    to waiver of the issue of personal jurisdiction, the district
    court relied on our decision in Peterson v. Highland Music,
    Inc., 
    140 F.3d 1313
    (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of
    reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 15, 1998). The district court’s
    reliance on Peterson was misplaced. Peterson’s waiver
    holding is limited to improper “deliberate, strategic” conduct
    with respect to how the issue of personal jurisdiction itself is
    asserted, such as by “sandbagging” opposing counsel. See 
    id. INFOSPAN V.
    EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                               9
    at 1318–19. Peterson did not find fault with a party’s
    vigorous litigation of its other claims or defenses in
    conjunction with or after litigating a timely asserted personal
    jurisdiction defense to an adverse decision by the district
    court. See 
    id. The cases
    cited in Peterson, suggesting waiver of an
    asserted personal jurisdiction defense, involved
    circumstances (1) where the defense was listed in the answer
    but never affirmatively litigated, Cont’l Bank, N.A. v. Meyer,
    
    10 F.3d 1293
    , 1296–97 (7th Cir. 1993); Yeldell v. Tutt,
    
    913 F.2d 533
    , 538–39 (8th Cir. 1990); and (2) where the
    district court invited discovery on the jurisdictional issue and
    a renewed motion to dismiss if evidence supported a lack of
    personal jurisdiction, but the defendant did not avail himself
    of the opportunity, Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 
    38 F.3d 909
    , 915 (7th Cir. 1994). See 
    Peterson, 140 F.3d at 1318
    –19
    (citing the foregoing cases). In each case, waiver arose from
    the defendant’s conduct in failing to properly request a ruling
    on the issue of personal jurisdiction—not from vigorous
    litigation of remaining claims or defenses following an
    adverse ruling on personal jurisdiction.
    In both InfoSpan I and II, the Bank timely asserted
    personal jurisdiction as a defense and litigated the issue to a
    decision from the district court. Nothing more was required
    to preserve the issue,1 and subsequent litigation of defenses
    1
    Here, the Bank reasserted its personal jurisdiction defense at every
    turn after receiving an adverse ruling on the issue. A party need not
    continuously seek re-consideration of the issue to preserve it for appeal.
    Absent an invitation from the district court to re-litigate the issue in light
    of a material change in the facts or the pleadings, a defense of personal
    jurisdiction that has been timely asserted and litigated to an adverse
    decision from the district court will remain preserved for appeal.
    10         INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    and counterclaims did not waive the Bank’s properly
    preserved defense of personal jurisdiction. Because the
    district court reached its waiver determination on the basis of
    an erroneous interpretation of our decision in Peterson, we
    conclude that it abused its discretion. See 
    Enyart, 630 F.3d at 1159
    (“If the [district] court failed to [identify the correct
    legal rule], [the panel] must conclude it abused its discretion.”
    (quoting 
    Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262
    )).
    IV.
    On the merits, InfoSpan and InfoSpan Gulf have not met
    their burden to identify sufficient facts to establish specific
    personal jurisdiction over the Bank in California.2 The district
    court did not address the merits of the personal jurisdiction
    issue in its order denying the defense on waiver grounds. But
    the court did address the merits of the personal jurisdiction
    issue at the outset of InfoSpan I. That ruling, although not law
    of the case in InfoSpan II, correctly determined that InfoSpan
    Gulf had not alleged that the Bank had sufficient contacts
    with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction over
    the contract claims asserted.
    2
    InfoSpan and InfoSpan Gulf agree that California courts do not have
    general personal jurisdiction over the Bank. They do cite Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) as an alternative basis for jurisdiction, but
    exercising jurisdiction under this standard must be “consistent with the
    United States Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Given the
    dearth of evidence with respect to the Bank’s contacts with the United
    States, this standard likewise cannot be met. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v.
    Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 
    485 F.3d 450
    , 462 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
    “scant, fleeting, and attenuated” contacts with the United States were
    insufficient for jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)).
    INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                   11
    “Federal courts apply state law to determine the bounds
    of their jurisdiction over a party.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v.
    Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 
    874 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (9th Cir. 2017)
    (quoting Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 
    851 F.3d 1015
    , 1020
    (9th Cir. 2017)). “California authorizes its courts to exercise
    jurisdiction ‘to the full extent that such exercise comports
    with due process.’” 
    Id. (quoting Williams
    , 851 F.3d at 1020);
    see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10.
    “Due process ‘constrains a State’s authority to bind a
    nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.’” 
    Id. at 1068
    (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 
    571 U.S. 277
    , 283 (2014)).
    “A nonresident defendant must have ‘certain minimum
    contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
    suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
    substantial justice.’” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting Int’l
    Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316 (1945)). “The
    inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction
    over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the relationship
    among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” 
    Id. (quoting Walden,
    571 U.S. at 284).
    Two principles animate the “defendant-
    focused” inquiry. Walden, [571 U.S. at 284].
    First, the relationship between the nonresident
    defendant, the forum, and the litigation “must
    arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant
    himself’ creates with the forum State.” 
    Id. (quoting Burger
    King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
    471 U.S. 462
    , 475 (1985)). Second, the minimum
    contacts analysis examines “the defendant’s
    contacts with the forum State itself, not the
    defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
    there.” 
    Id. [at 285].
    It follows that “a
    12       INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC
    defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or
    third party, standing alone, is an insufficient
    basis for jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at [286].
    Id. (emphasis omitted). 
    With these principles in mind, there
    are three requirements for personal jurisdiction in contract
    cases: “(1) the defendant must . . . purposefully avail himself
    of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum; (2) the
    claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
    defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
    jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial
    justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and original alterations omitted) (quoting Dole Food
    Co. v. Watts, 
    303 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). The
    plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs;
    if this threshold burden is met, the defendant must establish
    that the third prong is not met—i.e. that exercise of
    jurisdiction is not fair—to avoid jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 1068
    –69.
    In this case, a UAE bank entered a contract with a
    Cayman Islands corporation to provide pre-paid cards in the
    UAE. There is no indication that the Bank conducted any
    unilateral activities in California (or elsewhere in the United
    States, with the exception of a single inspection of facilities
    in Miami). There is certainly no evidence that any minimal
    contacts with California, through email and phone calls to
    California or through an investigation conducted in California
    by one of the Bank’s agents, form the basis for InfoSpan
    Gulf’s contract-focused claims, which arise from the Bank’s
    and InfoSpan Gulf’s conduct in the UAE. Accordingly, there
    is no basis for personal jurisdiction over the Bank in this suit
    for declaratory judgment.
    INFOSPAN V. EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC                13
    V.
    We reverse the district court’s decision that the Bank
    waived its personal jurisdiction defense, and we conclude (for
    the same reasons the district court identified in InfoSpan I)
    that there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over the Bank
    in this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.
    REVERSED.