United States v. Ruben Castaneda ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10525
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. CR-15-01299-GMS
v.
RUBEN LEE CASTANEDA,
Defendant-Appellant. MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 9, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.
After a stipulated facts bench trial, Ruben Lee Castaneda was convicted on
September 27, 2016 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and sentenced on December 19, 2016 to 51 months in prison,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
followed by three years of supervised release. Castaneda now appeals, challenging:
(1) the district court’s decision not to suppress evidence found in his backpack; (2)
its finding that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; (3) its application of the
Sentencing Guidelines; and (4) a condition of his supervised release. We affirm the
district court’s decision on all challenged issues.
1. The district court did not err in determining that the firearm, ammunition,
and other contents of Castaneda’s backpack were admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine pursuant to an inventory search. An inevitable discovery ruling
-- which presents a mixed issue of law and fact -- is reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d
1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 1998). For the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply in the
case of an inventory search: (1) the police must have had legitimate custody of the
property to be inventoried, either as a result of lawful arrest or by some other method;
and (2) the inventory search must be conducted according to standard agency
procedures. United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373, 375–76 (9th Cir.
1990).
Here, the district court did not err by determining police had legitimately taken
custody of the backpack in order to protect it. Castaneda was observed to have the
backpack in his possession shortly before his arrest; there was no secure place
available to leave the property; and no willing third party was on hand to take
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custody of the property. Further, police were not required to seek out a friend or
family member to take custody of Castaneda’s property. See Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (“The reasonableness of any particular governmental
activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less
intrusive’ means.”). Under these circumstances, the police could lawfully take
custody of Castaneda’s backpack in order to protect it. See Mancera-Londono, 912
F.2d at 376 (holding that the rental car entered police custody lawfully when all
occupants were arrested and no third party was present).
Nor did the district court err in determining that the inventory search of the
backpack was conducted according to standard agency procedures: the officers
testified that all arrestees’ property was searched and catalogued during the booking
process, written policies supported their testimony, and the policies were sufficiently
detailed regarding the situation at hand. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648 (holding that
it is not “unreasonable for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession,
in accordance with established inventory procedures”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, any mixed motives police had for conducting the inventory search
do not affect the validity of the inventory search, as the backpack would have been
inventoried according to routine procedure regardless. United States v. Bowhay,
992 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1993).
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2. The district court did not err when it found that Castaneda voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights. A district court’s finding that a Miranda waiver was
knowing and intelligent is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United States
v. Liera, 585 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2009). The validity of a Miranda waiver is
assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors:
(i) the defendant’s mental capacity; (ii) whether the defendant signed a written
waiver; (iii) whether the defendant was advised in his native tongue or had a
translator; (iv) whether the defendant appeared to understand his rights; (v) whether
the defendant’s rights were individually and repeatedly explained to him; and (vi)
whether the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system. United
States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).
It is undisputed that Castaneda did not sign a written waiver and that his rights
were explained to him only once. It is also undisputed that Castaneda speaks and
understands English, and that he had prior experience in the criminal justice system.
In light of Castaneda’s detailed responses to questions and demeanor throughout
most of the interview, the district court did not err by finding that he had sufficient
mental capacity at the time of waiver -- regardless of any alleged methamphetamine
use or sleep deprivation -- and by giving credence to Castaneda’s statement that he
understood his rights. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 855
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that heroin withdrawal did not render a Miranda waiver
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invalid because the defendant “spoke and interacted” during the interview),
overruled on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Aguila–Montes de Oca,
655 F.3d 915, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Additionally, because the district
court did not err by determining that the backpack evidence was admissible, it did
not err by finding that Castaneda’s statements were not provoked by confrontation
with illegally seized evidence.
3. The district court did not err by applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) without
making the prosecution prove that Castaneda knew that the firearm was a sawed-off
shotgun. We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo, its application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case for abuse of discretion,
and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167
(9th Cir. 2008). The plain language of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) does not include a scienter
requirement, and mens rea is not typically required at the sentencing stage unless a
sentencing factor: (1) alters the maximum penalty available for the crime committed;
(2) negates the presumption of innocence or relieves the prosecution’s burden of
proving guilt; or (3) creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986).
Here, the enhancement for a sawed-off shotgun only affects the minimum
penalty, not the statutory maximum of ten years. See United States v. Goodell, 990
F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1993). Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) does not negate the
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presumption of innocence or the burden of proof as to the underlying violation of §
922(g), i.e., being a felon in possession of a firearm. See id. at 500 n.4. Finally, the
enhancement does not create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. See
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89–90 (holding that Pennsylvania’s use of “visible possession
of a firearm” as a sentencing factor did not “transform[] against its will a sentencing
factor into an ‘element’ of some hypothetical ‘offense’”).
4. The district court did not commit plain error by requiring Castaneda “to
participate in a mental health program as directed by the probation officer which
may include taking prescribed medication” as a condition of his supervised release.
When, as in this case, a defendant does not object to a supervised release condition
in the district court, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. United
States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). Plain error is (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. Id.
Although district courts generally have broad discretion in imposing
supervised release conditions, “[w]here [] a particularly significant liberty interest is
at stake, the district court must follow additional procedures and make special
findings.” United State v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004)). Forcing an
individual to take certain psychoactive medications constitutes “a ‘particularly
severe’ invasion of liberty,” and thus the district court must make “on-the-record,
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medically-grounded findings that court-ordered medication is necessary” and
“involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary.” Williams, 356 F.3d at
1053–57 (citation omitted).
Here, without making findings on a medically-informed record, the district
court required Castaneda to “participate in a mental health program as directed by
the probation officer, which may include taking prescribed medication.” To pass
muster, this condition must be understood as limited to medications that do not
implicate Castaneda’s significant liberty interests. United States v. Daniels, 541
F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2008). While he is on supervised release, Castaneda may
challenge prescribed medication that he believes, in good faith, implicates his
significant liberty interests. Further, he may refuse to take the medication without
violating the terms of his supervised release until the district court either rules that
the medication does not implicate his liberty interests or makes the required
Williams findings.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
AFFIRMED.
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