Cash Ferguson-Cassidy v. City of Los Angeles , 705 F. App'x 611 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 5 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CASH JEROME FERGUSON-CASSIDY,                    No.   15-56573
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:14-cv-06768-SVW-JPR
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES
    POLICE DEPARTMENT; JACOB
    MAYNARD, Police Officer II, LAPD Serial
    No. 34820, in his official capacity and in his
    individual capacity,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 14, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and EATON,** Judge.
    Cash Jerome Ferguson-Cassidy appeals a judgment in favor of the
    defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International
    Trade, sitting by designation.
    § 1291 and affirm.
    1. Ferguson-Cassidy argues that the district court erred with respect to a
    jury instruction concerning the use of excessive force and another relating to his
    burden of proof. Because Ferguson-Cassidy failed to object to these instructions at
    the time they were given, we review for plain error. See Hunter v. Cty. of
    Sacramento, 
    652 F.3d 1225
    , 1230 (9th Cir. 2011). The district court has
    “substantial latitude” in tailoring jury instructions, see Mockler v. Multnomah Cty.,
    
    140 F.3d 808
    , 812 (9th Cir. 1998), and its instructions were, far from being clearly
    erroneous, correct statements of the law.
    2. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to exclude
    evidence of the Board of Police Commissioners’ report on Officer Jacob
    Maynard’s use of force. See Harper v. City of L.A., 
    533 F.3d 1010
    , 1030 (9th Cir.
    2008). The district court excluded this report due to concern that it would confuse
    the jury and divert the jury’s attention away from the evidence presented at trial
    regarding Maynard’s use of force. The court’s ruling was not an abuse of
    discretion, particularly because Ferguson-Cassidy’s counsel was in no way
    restricted from introducing any evidence relevant to the shooting and the court also
    excluded two other reports with contrary conclusions.
    3. Ferguson-Cassidy also argues that the jury’s verdict should be
    overturned because Maynard’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. “A
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    jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Johnson
    v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 
    251 F.3d 1222
    , 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation
    omitted). Here, a reasonable jury crediting as true Maynard’s testimony could
    have concluded that Maynard’s use of force was an objectively reasonable
    response to an immediate threat to his own safety. See Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 396–97 (1989) (describing the factors to be considered in light of the
    totality of the circumstances). Whatever inconsistencies there may have been in
    Maynard’s testimony, “[i]t was within the province of the jury to resolve[.]”
    United States v. Geston, 
    299 F.3d 1130
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2002).
    4. Ferguson-Cassidy also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
    for a new trial. We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. Molski v. M.J.
    Cable, Inc., 
    481 F.3d 724
    , 728 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the district court properly
    denied the motion for a new trial because there was no showing that “the verdict
    [was] contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, [was] based upon false or
    perjurious evidence, or [that there was] a miscarriage of justice.” 
    Id. at 729
    (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 
    212 F.3d 493
    , 510 n.
    15 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    5. Finally, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a
    motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Desertrain v. City of L.A., 
    754 F.3d 1147
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, in light of Ferguson-Cassidy’s extreme
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    delay in seeking leave to amend, the district court did not err in denying his request
    to add new defendants and claims on the eve of trial.
    AFFIRMED.
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