United States v. Jesus Medina-Castro , 575 F. App'x 800 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                MAY 28 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 13-50452
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:12-cr-05143-LAB-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JESUS MEDINA-CASTRO,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 16, 2014
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and TIGAR, District
    Judge.**
    Jesus Medina-Castro appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea
    to bulk cash smuggling, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a). We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Jon S. Tigar, District Judge for the U.S. District Court
    for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate Medina-Castro’s
    sentence and remand for resentencing.
    The district court’s finding during sentencing that Medina-Castro knowingly
    smuggled 17.88 kilograms of methamphetamine was not “supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence—‘a showing that the relevant fact is more likely
    true than not.’” United States v. Highsmith, 
    268 F.3d 1141
    , 1142 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (quoting United States v. Collins, 
    109 F.3d 1413
    , 1420 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus,
    Medina-Castro’s “sentence must be vacated [because] the district court
    demonstrably relie[d] upon false [and] unreliable information.” United States v.
    Safirstein, 
    827 F.2d 1380
    , 1387 (9th Cir. 1987). Specifically, the district court
    relied on “[u]nreasonable inferences and material assumptions” to enhance
    Medina-Castro’s penalty. 
    Id. The district
    court’s assumption that Medina-Castro knew about the drugs,
    and did not mind transporting drugs, is unsupported by the record. First, the
    emails between Medina-Castro and Ricardo Manriquez indicate that Medina-
    Castro was only aware of the potential violation of currency reporting requirements
    at the border. Medina-Castro was also explicitly assured that no narcotics were
    involved.
    2
    Second, there is no indication that Medina-Castro’s “bad feeling about the
    situation” sprung from his knowledge that he was transporting narcotics—rather,
    that “bad feeling” could have just as easily pertained to his reluctance to violate
    currency reporting requirements. Medina-Castro neither had any prior interaction
    with the criminal justice system, nor had he ever transported contraband. Although
    Medina-Castro possessed a valid border-crossing visa, evidence before the district
    court established that he had not entered the United States for approximately a year
    prior to his arrest. Thus, the district court’s inference of knowledge from Medina-
    Castro’s “bad feeling” was thus unreasonable because the statement “could support
    inferences of other activities, legal or illegal, as readily as they support an
    inference of trafficking in narcotics.” 
    Id. at 1386.
    Third, in light of the unique facts presented in this case, the district court
    abused its discretion and committed procedural error in presuming awareness of
    the narcotics on the part of Medina-Castro based on mere possession. In sum,
    then, because the “trial court inferred that [Medina-Castro] was a participant in a
    crime with which he was not charged [and t]he inference directly resulted in the
    enhancement of [Medina-Castro’s] penalty,” the district court violated Medina-
    Castro’s due process rights. 
    Id. at 1385.
    3
    We remand this case for resentencing. “While we believe that on remand
    the district judge would be fair and impartial, this case presents an unusual
    circumstance wherein reassignment to a different judge is desirable” and would
    serve “[t]he appearance of justice.” United States v. Reyes, 
    313 F.3d 1152
    , 1160
    (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, upon remand, this case shall be reassigned by the Clerk of
    the Southern District of California to another district court judge.
    VACATED; REMANDED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-50452

Citation Numbers: 575 F. App'x 800

Judges: Pregerson, Nguyen, Tigar

Filed Date: 5/28/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024