United States v. Arturo Astorga-Gonzalez ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-10431
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:11-cr-01089-DCB-
HCE-1
v.
ARTURO ASTORGA-GONZALEZ, MEMORANDUM*
AKA Arturo Astorga-Gonzales, AKA
Arturo Gonzalez Astorga,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Arturo Astorga-Gonzalez (“Astorga”), having been previously removed
from the United States, sought to reenter using a letter from immigration services
stating that he had an appointment in Riverside, California to replace his resident
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
alien card. He was convicted of attempted illegal reentry when the jury did not
believe his claim that five days before his attempt to reenter, border guards told
him that he could legally reenter. On appeal, he argues that: (a) he was entitled to
an entrapment by estoppel instruction; (b) a government agent was improperly
allowed to address an element of the charged offense; (c) the prosecutor misstated
the requisite mens rea element in her closing argument; and (d) his 78-month
sentence is substantively unreasonable. We find none of the contentions
persuasive and affirm his conviction and sentence.1
1. Because Astorga did not request an entrapment by estoppel instruction in
the district court, his claim is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Bear,
439 F.3d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 2006). There are five elements to the affirmative
defense of entrapment by estoppel: “(1) an authorized government official
empowered to render the claimed erroneous advice, (2) who has been made aware
of all the relevant historical facts, (3) affirmatively told him the proscribed conduct
was permissible, (4) that he relied on the false information, and (5) that his reliance
was reasonable.” United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history,
we do not restate them here except as necessary to explain our decision.
2
Astorga argues that “either the district court committed reversible plain error
by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the affirmative defense of entrapment
by estoppel, or defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an
instruction.”2 This argument fails because Astorga did not present an adequate
factual basis for the instruction. There was no evidence that he fully informed the
guards of his situation, or that the guards affirmatively told him he could reenter
the United States. Moreover, it does not appear that he asserted reliance when he
was first arrested. Also, defense counsel may have declined to advance an
entrapment defense in order to avoid having Astorga cross-examined on the
specifics of the defense. Astorga has not shown that he was entitled to a sua
sponte instruction or that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
such an instruction.
2. When Agent Soria in response to a question stated that Astorga did not
have a legal right to be in the United States, defense counsel objected, and the
agent clarified his answer to explain that his review of the government’s
documents did not disclose any paper authorizing Astorga’s reentry. This response
2
With his reply brief, Astorga submitted a press release. The
government filed a motion to strike the press release and Astorga responded with a
request for judicial notice. The request for judicial notice is granted and the
motion to strike is denied.
3
did not directly address an element of the charged crime and defense counsel did
not object. Astorga has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to exclude this evidence. See United States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173,
1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, in context, the agent’s comment was not likely
to have had any effect on the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004).
3. Astorga claims that the prosecutor misstated the mens rea standard in her
closing argument. Because there was no contemporaneous challenge to the
statement, we review only for plain error. Astorga’s contention is not persuasive
because: (a) in context it is doubtful that the prosecutor’s statement was improper;
(b) the jury was properly instructed and we have held that instructions carry more
weight than argument, see United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc); and (c) it is unlikely that the statement had any effect on the jury’s
verdict.
4. Astorga asserts that his 78-month sentence, which was at the low end of
the Guidelines, is unreasonable because his prior crimes occurred more than eight
years ago when he was 21 or younger. We review criminal sentences for
reasonableness and in doing so consider whether the district court’s sentencing
decision was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d
4
1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court addressed the mitigating
factors offered by Astorga and determined that they only supported reducing his
sentence to the low end of the Guideline range. Astorga has not carried his burden
of showing that this was unreasonable.
Astorga’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
5