Edin Castellanos v. Jeremy Maya ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDIN S. CASTELLANOS, No. 17-15034
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:15-cv-00272-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEREMY J. MAYA, ID #019799,
individually and in his official capacity, as a
Peace Officer for the California Highway
Patrol,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, TORRUELLA,*** and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Juan R. Torruella, United States Circuit Judge for the
First Circuit, sitting by designation.
Appellant Edin S. Castellanos (“Castellanos”) sued Appellee Jeremy J.
Maya (“Officer Maya”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing constitutional claims
for—as relevant here—malicious prosecution, excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and deliberate
fabrication of evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause. The district court
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Officer Maya on some of these
claims, and a jury found in favor of Officer Maya on the rest. Castellanos appeals.
We affirm.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Officer
Maya on Castellanos’s malicious prosecution claim. The mere fact that
Castellanos’s account “conflicts with that of the law enforcement officers involved
is not enough to defeat the presumption that [the] prosecutor exercise[d]
independent judgment” in determining that probable cause existed to support the
criminal charge. Newman v. Cty. of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2006).
Instead, Castellanos needed to present further evidence that the “officers interfered
with the prosecutor’s judgment in some way, by omitting relevant information, by
including false information, or by pressuring the prosecutor to file charges.” Id. at
995.
Castellanos failed to present such evidence. Officer Maya testified in his
deposition that Castellanos behaved in an unruly manner and failed to comply with
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multiple commands. Officer Maya’s sworn account, portions of which were
confirmed by a fellow officer, was consistent with the police report supporting the
charge against Castellanos under California Penal Code § 148(a). And as in
Newman, any discrepancies in the officers’ account did not “concern the conduct
for which [Castellanos] was ultimately charged—resisting, obstructing, or delaying
an officer,” 457 F.3d at 996.
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Officer
Maya on the portion of Castellanos’s First Amendment claim alleging that Officer
Maya retaliated against him for initially requesting a blood test but ultimately
refusing to sign the relevant consent form. “Intent to inhibit speech” was an
element of this claim, and there was no evidence that Officer Maya “intended to
interfere with [Castellanos’s] First Amendment rights.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.
Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 14 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 1994)). At
best, there was a dispute of fact regarding whether Officer Maya was angry about
the delay caused by Castellanos’s change of heart—not whether Officer Maya
intended to chill Castellanos’ expression as such.
In any event, the jury “implicitly found” that Officer Maya did not propel
Castellanos into the holding cell wall when it rejected Castellanos’ First and Fourth
Amendment claims at trial. See Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 810
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& n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). The jury instructions made clear that those two claims
turned on that one allegation. Because the alleged retaliatory action was the
alleged pushing into the wall, and the jury found the pushing did not occur, any
error in granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Maya on the blood-test
portion of Castellanos’s First Amendment retaliation claim was harmless.
3. The district court properly denied Castellanos’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law on his Fourth Amendment claim.1 Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50(b), such a motion may not be granted unless “the evidence
permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the
jury’s verdict.” Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). At
trial, Officer Maya denied propelling Castellanos into the holding cell wall. The
jury apparently believed Officer Maya and concluded that Castellanos—whose
blood-alcohol content was more than double the legal limit—hit his head during
the brief time between when Officer Maya exited the holding cell and when
another officer entered it, perhaps by falling onto the bench or by trying to stand
up, stumbling, and hitting some portion of the cell.
The record does not compel a contrary conclusion. The jury could have
considered the discrepancy in the officers’ testimony about whether Castellanos
1
On appeal, Castellanos does not contend that he was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on his other claims.
4
was seated on the left or right bench but, consistent with their instructions, declined
to decide that the discrepancy meant that Officer Maya’s testimony must be false.
Alternatively, the jury could have decided—as defense counsel argued during
closing—that there was no discrepancy at all because Castellanos might have
moved between the benches when the officers saw him, somehow injuring himself
in the process.
4. For much the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Castellanos’s motion for a new trial. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59, such a motion may be granted only “if ‘the verdict is contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to
prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of justice.’” Silver
Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.
1999)). None of those circumstances are present here. As Castellanos himself
acknowledges, the case turned on whether the jury believed him or Officer Maya.
The jury believed Officer Maya.2
2
Castellanos is mistaken to maintain that it was misconduct for opposing
counsel to advance an opposing version of the facts. Both officers testified that
they did not see how Castellanos was hurt, but that does not mean that the only
possible explanation for Castellano’s injuries was Castellano’s account.
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5. The district court properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
testimony from Castellanos’s criminal defense attorney that Castellanos refused to
plead guilty to driving under the influence in exchange for dismissal of the
§ 148(a) charge3 unless the prosecutor stipulated that Castellanos was factually
innocent on the latter charge. Allowing the testimony would have given Officer
Maya the right to rebut it by, for example, calling the prosecutor to explain his or
her position in the plea negotiations. That would have indeed, as the district court
put it, “open[ed] up a complete Pandora’s box.” The risk of wasting time and
confusing the jury substantially outweighed whatever probative value the
testimony from Castellanos’s attorney might have had.
Castellanos also argues that the district court erred by limiting the testimony
of his police practices expert and not admitting various materials the expert used to
arrive at his opinions. But Castellanos argues only that the excluded testimony
(and presumably the excluded materials) “would have assisted the jury in its tasks
per [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702.” He fails to explain why, and we fail to see
how, any error in this regard “more likely than not affected the verdict,” United
States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
3
The district court properly excluded evidence of Castellanos’s acquittal on
the § 148(a) charge. See, e.g., Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1471 (9th Cir.
1994).
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Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 2001)). So even if there had been error, it was
harmless.4
6. We decline to disturb the award of costs in favor of Officer Maya.
“[A] party may demand judicial review of a cost award only if such party has filed
a proper motion,” Walker v. California, 200 F.3d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1999), within
seven days, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Even if we “were to construe [Castellanos’s]
Notice of Appeal as a motion for review,” Walker, 200 F.3d at 626, Castellanos
still moved too late. Officer Maya emphasized this lapse in his answering brief,
but Castellanos offered no response in his reply brief, let alone a convincing
argument for excusing his failure to file a timely motion. Castellanos has thus
waived any such argument.
AFFIRMED.
4
In his opening brief, Castellanos challenged two jury instructions and a
portion of the special verdict form. But rather than arguing that these alleged
errors warrant reversal, Castellanos made clear that he was seeking only “guidance
to the parties and the [district court]” on these issues in the event of a new trial.
Because we decline to order a new trial, we decline to consider these arguments.
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