First Amendment Coalition v. Usdoj ( 2017 )


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  •                       FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION,                          No. 15-15117
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                            4:12-cv-01013-
    CW
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE,                                            ORDER AND
    Defendant-Appellee.                    AMENDED
    OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 15, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Filed August 25, 2017
    Amended November 29, 2017
    Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit
    Judges, and Frederic Block,* District Judge.
    Order;
    Opinion by Judge Block;
    *
    The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior District Judge for the Eastern
    District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2          FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Concurrence by Judge Berzon;
    Concurrence by Judge Murguia
    SUMMARY**
    Attorney’s Fees
    The panel reversed the district court’s denial of the First
    Amendment Coalition’s request for attorney’s fees under the
    Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).
    The panel unanimously held – albeit for three different
    reasons – that the First Amendment Coalition was eligible for
    attorney’s fees and remanded solely for the district court to
    determine the fees to which the First Amendment Coalition
    was entitled.
    Judge Block, in the lead opinion, first held that there had
    to be a causal connection between the litigation and the
    voluntary disclosure of the memorandum in this Freedom of
    Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation. In her concurring
    opinion, Judge Murguia agreed, but in her concurring
    opinion, Judge Berzon disagreed, believing that under the
    FOIA statute causation was not required.
    Judge Block next held that reversal was required because
    the district court, in denying fees, employed an incorrect legal
    standard because it failed to consider and apply the factors
    set forth in Church of Scientology v. United States Postal
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                3
    Serv., 
    700 F.2d 486
     (9th Cir. 1983). Judge Murguia disagreed
    with this part of Judge Block’s opinion because the factual
    finding which the district court made was not clearly
    erroneous, but nonetheless held that fees were warranted
    under the facts of this case. Judge Berzon believed that fees
    were recoverable simply because there was no causation
    requirement.
    4        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    COUNSEL
    Jonathan L. Segal (argued), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los
    Angeles, California; Diana Palacios and Thomas R. Burke,
    Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, San Francisco, California; for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Sushma Soni (argued) and Sharon Swingle, Attorneys;
    Douglas N. Letter, Director, Appellate Staff; Hashim M.
    Mooppan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Chad A.
    Readler, Acting Attorney General; Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Bruce D. Brown, Katie Townsend, and Adam A. Marshall,
    Washington, D.C., as and for Amicus Curiae Reporters
    Committee for Freedom of the Press.
    ORDER
    The opinion filed on August 25, 2017, and published at
    
    869 F.3d 868
    , is amended as follows:
    On page 49 of the slip opinion, within Judge Murguia’s
    opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
    add a footnote after the sentence “First Amendment Coalition
    failed to prevail primarily because of unilateral Government
    actions, outside its control.” The footnote—new footnote
    four—reads: “In her opinion, Judge Berzon suggests that my
    reasoning implies bad faith on the part of the government in
    this case. I am not aware of the circumstances surrounding
    the DOJ’s action, but the fact that the district court was not
    made aware of the White paper’s disclosure was critical for
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                             5
    First Amendment Coalition’s inability to prevail on the merits
    and establish eligibility for attorney fees.”
    With this amendment, Defendant-Appellee’s motion to
    amend the opinion and stay the mandate (Docket Entry No.
    57) is DENIED as moot.
    OPINION
    BLOCK, District Judge:
    In September 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki,1 an American
    citizen who had been targeted by the Central Intelligence
    Agency (“CIA”) as a terrorist, was killed in a drone attack in
    Yemen. This spawned parallel litigations under the Freedom
    of Information Act (“FOIA”) for the release of legal
    memoranda prepared by the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”)
    Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) addressing the legality of
    the targeted killing of U.S. citizen terrorists. Plaintiff-
    appellant First Amendment Coalition (“FAC”) sued in the
    Northern District of California (“NDCA”), while—in
    consolidated litigation—the American Civil Liberties Union
    (“ACLU”) and the New York Times (“NY Times”) sued in
    the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”).
    After the SDNY granted summary judgment in the
    Government’s favor, the Second Circuit reversed and ordered
    the release of one responsive OLC memorandum (“OLC-
    1
    This spelling is used by the district court and in the parties’ briefs.
    We adopt it, except in some quotations in which the name is spelled “al-
    Aulaqi” or “al-Aulaki.”
    6          FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    DOD memo”). Thereafter, the DOJ disclosed a second
    responsive memorandum (“OLC-CIA memo”) in the NDCA
    litigation. Nonetheless, the district court denied FAC’s
    request for attorney’s fees under FOIA.
    We all agree—although for different reasons—that FAC
    is eligible for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we REVERSE
    and REMAND to the district court to determine the fees to
    which FAC is entitled.2
    I
    More than a year prior to al-Awlaki’s death, two NY
    Times reporters, Scott Shane and Charlie Savage, submitted
    separate FOIA requests to OLC. Shane’s request, submitted
    in June 2010, sought “all Office of Legal Counsel opinions or
    memoranda since 2001 that address the legal status of
    targeted killings, assassinations, or killing of people
    suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by
    employees or contractors of the United States government.”
    New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
    756 F.3d 100
    , 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
    Savage’s request, submitted in October 2010, sought “a
    copy of all Office of Legal Counsel memorandum analyzing
    the circumstances under which it would be lawful for United
    States Armed Forces or intelligence community assets to
    target for killing a United States citizen who is deemed to be
    a terrorist.” 
    Id.
    2
    A determination of eligibility “does not automatically entitle the
    plaintiff to attorney’s fees.” Church of Scientology v. United States Postal
    Serv.,
    700 F.2d 486
    , 489 (9th Cir. 1983). “Entitlement to attorney’s fees
    is left to the discretion of the district court.” 
    Id.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                         7
    FAC was the first to file a FOIA request after al-Awlaki’s
    death. On October 5, 2011, it asked the DOJ for “a legal
    memorandum prepared by OLC concerning the legality of the
    lethal targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born
    radical cleric who, according to federal government officials,
    was killed September 30, 2011 in a U.S. drone strike in
    Yemen.” FAC alleged that “[t]he memorandum was the
    subject of a story (‘Secret U.S. memo sanctioning killing of
    Aulaqi’) in the September 30, 2011 Washington Post, in
    which multiple (albeit unnamed) administration officials
    discussed the memorandum and internal government debates
    on the legal issues addressed in it.”
    Two days later, on October 7, 2011, the NY Times made
    another FOIA request, identical to the Savage request, and
    twelve days later, on October 19, 2011, the ACLU submitted
    FOIA requests to three agencies—DOJ, the Department of
    Defense (“DOD”), and the CIA—seeking various documents
    concerning the targeted killings of United States citizens in
    general, and al-Awlaki, his son, and another American
    citizen, Samir Khan, in particular.
    All FOIA requests were met with resistance by the
    agencies; they were the subject of either a so-called “no
    number, no list” response or a so-called Glomar response.3
    Not surprisingly, FAC, the NY Times, and the ACLU sued.
    The NY Times was the first to strike. It initiated its action in
    the SDNY on December 20, 2011; the ACLU brought suit,
    3
    “A no number, no list response acknowledges the existence of
    documents responsive to the request, but neither numbers nor identifies
    them by title or description.” New York Times, 756 F.3d at 105. A
    Glomar response “neither confirms nor denies the existence of documents
    pertaining to the request.” Id.
    8          FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    also in the SDNY, on February 1, 2012, and the two cases
    were consolidated. FAC commenced its lawsuit in the
    NDCA later that month, on February 29, 2012.
    On June 21, 2013, the DOJ issued a modified response to
    FAC’s FOIA request, “acknowledging the existence of one
    responsive OLC opinion pertaining to the Department of
    Defense”—the OLC-DOD Memo—but “refusing to confirm
    or deny the existence of responsive records related to any
    other agency.” A similar acknowledgment had previously
    been made a year before in the SDNY litigation by the OLC,
    DOD, and CIA.4 See New York Times, 756 F.3d at 108; see
    also New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
    915 F. Supp. 2d 508
    , 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Declaration of
    John E. Bies, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, ¶ 30 (“Bies
    Decl.”)); Declaration of Robert E. Neller, Lt. General, United
    States Marine Corps, Director of Operations for the Joint
    Staff at the Pentagon, ¶ 17 (“Neller Decl.”)). The OLC-DOD
    Memo was an “OLC opinion pertaining to the Department of
    Defense marked classified . . .[t]hat . . . contain[ed]
    confidential legal advice to the Attorney General, for his use
    in interagency deliberations, regarding a potential military
    4
    Unlike the NY Times and FAC, which only submitted FOIA
    requests to the OLC, the “ACLU submitted FOIA requests to three
    agencies: DOJ (including two of DOJ’s component agencies, [the Office
    of Information Policy] and OLC), DOD, and CIA.” New York Times,
    756 F.3d at 106. Therefore, each agency was responsible for responding
    to the ACLU’s request, and all three “modified their original responses in
    light of statements by senior Executive Branch officials on the legal and
    policy issues pertaining to United States counterterrorism operations and
    the potential use of lethal force by the United States Government against
    senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda who are United States citizens.” Id.
    at 105–07.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                              9
    operation in a foreign country.” New York Times, 756 F.3d at
    112 (citing Bies Decl. ¶ 30).
    Despite acknowledging its existence, the Government
    refused to disclose the OLC-DOD memo—as well as any
    other related documents—in both litigations, claiming an
    assortment of FOIA exemptions and privileges.5 Each district
    court granted the Government’s summary judgment motions.
    The SDNY decision came first, on January 3, 2013, and the
    NY Times and ACLU appealed to the Second Circuit. The
    NDCA decision came more than a year later, on April 11,
    2014, while the Second Circuit appeal was sub judice.
    In between the SDNY and NDCA decisions, there were
    a number of public disclosures that subsequently impacted the
    Second Circuit’s decision. As recounted by the circuit court,
    [a]fter the [SDNY] entered judgment for the
    Defendants, one document and several
    statements of Government officials . . .
    became publicly available. The document was
    captioned “DOJ White Paper” and titled
    “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed
    Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior
    5
    In the SDNY action, the Government submitted Vaughn
    indices—filings identifying records withheld with explanations for why
    they were withheld—which identified unclassified documents, such as “an
    e-mail chain reflecting internal deliberations concerning the legal basis for
    the use of lethal force against United States citizens in a foreign country
    in certain circumstances” and “e-mail traffic regarding drafts of the speech
    given by [Jeh] Johnson at Yale Law School and a speech delivered by
    Attorney General Holder at Northwestern University School of Law.”
    New York Times, 756 F.3d at 107.
    10        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or an
    Associated Force”
    (“White Paper”).6 New York Times, 756 F.3d at 110. In the
    White Paper “the Government ma[de] public a detailed
    analysis of nearly all the legal reasoning contained in the
    OLC-DOD Memo,” which the Second Circuit had reviewed
    in camera. Id. at 116. As the circuit court noted, the White
    Paper had been “leaked to the press” on February 4,
    2013—soon after the SDNY granted summary judgment for
    defendants—and it was subsequently “officially disclosed”
    four days later by the Office of Information Policy “in
    response to a FOIA request submitted by Truthout,” a non-
    profit political news organization. Id. at 110 n.9, 116.
    Based upon the release of the White Paper and the
    Government officials’ statements, the Second Circuit
    concluded that “waiver of secrecy and privilege as to the legal
    analysis in the [OLC-DOD Memo] ha[d] occurred.” Id. It
    accordingly ordered, inter alia, the disclosure of a redacted
    version of the OLC-DOD Memo, and submission to the
    district court of “other legal memoranda prepared by OLC . . .
    6
    The “several statements of Government officials” to which the
    Second Circuit refers include John O. Brennan, “testifying before the
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 7, 2013, on his
    nomination to be director of CIA, [who] said, among other things, ‘The
    Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal boundaries within
    which we can operate.’” New York Times, 756 F.3d at 111 (quoting Open
    Hearing on the Nomination of John O. Brennan to be Director of the
    Central Intelligence Agency Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence,
    113 Cong. 57 (Feb. 7, 2013)). They also include a May 2013 letter
    Attorney General Eric Holder wrote to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman
    of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in which Holder stated that “[t]he
    decision to target Anwar al-Aulaki was lawful . . . .” Id.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                         11
    for in camera inspection and determination of waiver of
    privileges and appropriate redaction.”7 Id. at 124.
    In so holding, the Second Circuit paused to distinguish the
    NDCA’s decision denying FAC’s FOIA request for the OLC-
    DOD memo, even though that decision—unlike the
    SDNY’s—was rendered after the White Paper had surfaced.
    It believed that the NDCA had been “under the impression
    that there ha[d] been no official disclosure of the White
    Paper,” and therefore, “did not assess its significance,”
    whereas before the circuit court, “the Government ha[d]
    conceded that the White Paper, with its detailed analysis of
    7
    On June 30, 2014, in response to the Second Circuit’s mandate,
    Judge McMahon—the presiding SDNY judge—ordered the Government
    to disclose for in camera review “[u]nredacted copies of the ‘other legal
    memoranda prepared by OLC and at issue here’” within twenty-one days
    of the order. New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 11-
    9336 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (order instituting circuit court mandate)
    (citing New York Times, 756 F.3d at 124). On July 9, 2014, Judge
    McMahon approved “a short postponement of the date by which the
    Government must produce the documents contemplated by the mandate”
    to August 15, 2014. New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
    No. 11-9336 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014) (order approving postponement of
    in camera lodging). The procedure for the in camera review “g[ave] the
    Government an opportunity to explain, under seal and in camera, why it
    ha[d] not waived potentially applicable privileges . . . .” Id.
    12         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    legal reasoning, ha[d] in fact been officially disclosed.”8 New
    York Times, 756 F.3d at 116.
    Not surprisingly, FAC sought to vacate—by a timely
    motion for reconsideration—the NDCA’s order granting the
    DOJ’s motion for summary judgment. It also moved for
    attorney’s fees and costs.
    The district court directed that before the Government
    filed its response to FAC’s motion, the parties should “meet
    and discuss whether the Second Circuit’s order that the DOJ
    disclose the OLC-DOD memorandum mooted the instant
    case.” Thereafter, on August 28, 2014, the parties submitted
    a joint status report, stating that “[o]n August 15, 2014,
    Defendant United States Department of Justice (“Defendant”)
    8
    The Second Circuit’s effort to distinguish the NDCA’s failure to
    order the release of the OLC-DOD memo because it believed that the
    district court was of the “impression” that it was not officially disclosed
    was charitable since, in addition to being officially disclosed to Truthout,
    the White Paper was also disclosed to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
    Senate Select Intelligence Committee, House Judiciary Committee, and
    House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Morever, in its
    memorandum in opposition to the Government’s summary judgment
    motion, FAC expressly advised the district court of the release of the
    White Paper and the various prior statements of the Government officials.
    See Pl. Opp. to MSJ at 2–4, 12, 21, First Amendment Coalition v. United
    States Dep’t of Justice (N.D.C.A. 2013) (No. 12-1013). The memorandum
    was filed on October 3, 2013, six months prior to the NDCA’s decision of
    April 11, 2014, granting the Government’s motion and dismissing the
    complaint. Specifically, FAC told the court that when it was released, “the
    President’s spokesman confirmed that the White Paper was authentic, that
    it was the official position of the Government, and that it was adapted
    from classified memoranda which had been provided to Congress.” Id. at
    3. The memorandum also alluded to the fact that the White Paper “along
    with copious other pieces of official evidence” had previously “been
    submitted to the [district court.]” Id. at 4.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                       13
    released to Plaintiff First Amendment Coalition (“Plaintiff’)
    a second memorandum pertaining to a contemplated CIA
    operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi.” Joint Status Report at 2,
    First Amendment Coalition v. United States Dep’t of Justice
    (N.D.C.A. 2014) (No. 12-1013) (emphasis added).9 This
    second memorandum (“OLC-CIA memo”) was largely
    redacted but had concluded, as had the OLC-DOD memo,
    that “we do not believe the Constitution prohibits the
    proposed lethal action” that was being contemplated against
    al-Awlaki. Both memoranda were addressed to the Attorney
    General, but differed in two respects: The OLC-DOD memo,
    written on July 16, 2010, discussed the legality, under both
    the Constitution and federal criminal laws, of lethal
    operations by the DOD and CIA against al-Awlaki. The
    OLC-CIA memo was written on February 19, 2010, six
    months earlier, and discussed only the constitutionality of
    lethal operations by the CIA against al-Awlaki.
    The parties agreed that “these disclosures resolved all
    substantive disputes in the case,” but “disagreed regarding
    whether the Court should vacate its summary judgment order
    and whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees.”
    The district court vacated its summary judgment order,
    but held that based upon the parties’ concession that “no
    substantive issues remain,” the case had been rendered moot
    9
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bies stated, in a written
    declaration, that the Government also released on August 15, 2014 a
    redacted version of the OLC-CIA memo to the NY Times and ACLU
    “consistent with a court order from the [SDNY],” notwithstanding the
    SDNY’s order that all documents be submitted in camera. Since the
    Government publicly disclosed the OLC-CIA memo in the NDCA
    litigation, there was obviously no longer a reason to submit it for in
    camera review.
    14         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    since the parties had decided “to abandon their right to
    review.” In so holding, the court reasoned that “Plaintiff
    abandoned its right to pursue its motion for reconsideration,
    to appeal this Court’s summary judgment order and to
    challenge the redactions to the OLC-DOD memorandum and
    the CIA memorandum.” And as for the defendant, “[n]ot
    only did the government abandon its right to seek en banc
    review in the Second Circuit or to file a petition for a writ of
    certiorari, it voluntarily disclosed the CIA memorandum to
    Plaintiff in this case . . . .” (emphasis added). The district
    court then denied FAC’s motion for attorney’s fees because
    “Defendant in this case released the documents largely as a
    result of the Second Circuit’s ruling in NY Times, not as a
    result of the ruling in this case.”
    This appeal followed.10
    II
    “Because an award of fees under [FOIA] is discretionary,
    we review for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its
    discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous
    factual findings or an incorrect legal standard.” United Ass’n
    of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting
    Indus., Local 598 v. Dep’t of Army Corps of Engineers,
    10
    In oral argument before this panel, Jonathan Segal, counsel for
    appellant, disclosed confidential information related to offers made by his
    opponent in mediation before the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program. This
    is in clear violation of Ninth Circuit Rule 33-1(c)(4), which states that any
    written or oral communication made in Ninth Circuit Mediation Program
    settlement discussions may not be disclosed to anyone who is not a
    participant in the mediation. The panel reiterates the importance of
    maintaining confidentiality in the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program. The
    wrongfully disclosed information was not considered in deciding the case.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                  15
    
    841 F.2d 1459
    , 1461 (9th Cir. 1988) (abrogated on other
    grounds by United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters
    Comm. For Freedom of Press, 
    489 U.S. 749
     (1989))
    (citations omitted).
    FOIA was enacted in 1966. “Without question, the Act
    is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official
    information long shielded unnecessarily from public view
    . . . .” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    , 361 (1976).
    In other words, “the statute’s goal is ‘broad disclosure,’ and
    the exemptions [to disclosure] must be ‘given a narrow
    compass.’” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    562 U.S. 562
     (2011)
    (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 
    492 U.S. 136
    , 151
    (1989)).
    Congress passed substantial amendments in 1974, among
    them an attorney’s fees provision awarding fees and costs to
    a FOIA plaintiff who had “substantially prevailed.” 1974
    Amendment to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No.
    93-502, 
    88 Stat. 1561
    . The fees provision “has as its
    fundamental purpose the facilitation of citizen access to the
    courts to vindicate the public’s statutory rights,” and “‘a
    grudging application’ of the attorney fees provision ‘would be
    clearly contrary to congressional intent.’” Exner v. Fed.
    Bureau of Investigation, 
    443 F. Supp. 1349
    , 1351 (S.D. Cal.
    1978) (citing Nationwide Building Maintenance, Inc. v.
    Sampson, 
    559 F.2d 704
    , 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), aff’d 
    612 F.2d 1202
     (9th Cir. 1980). In keeping with FOIA’s broad reach,
    the statute contemplates that there may well be parallel
    litigation in different venues. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 
    553 U.S. 880
    , 903 (2008); see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 
    564 U.S. 299
    ,
    317 (2011).
    16       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Congress did not provide any context to the cryptic
    “substantially prevailed” standard, but decisional law did. In
    Church of Scientology, we explained:
    To be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees
    in a FOIA suit, the plaintiff must present
    convincing evidence that two threshold
    conditions have been satisfied. The plaintiff
    must show that: (1) the filing of the action
    could reasonably have been regarded as
    necessary to obtain the information; and
    (2) the filing of the action had a substantial
    causative effect on the delivery of the
    information.
    
    700 F.2d at 489
    .
    Although we did not specifically employ the word
    “catalyst,” we remanded to the district court to assess whether
    the plaintiff had substantially prevailed—and therefore was
    eligible for attorney’s fees—in light of the disclosure of a
    number of documents during the course of litigation before
    the complaint was dismissed. Church of Scientology,
    therefore, represented a “catalyst theory of recovery”;
    namely, an “alternate theory for determining the prevailing
    party if no relief on the merits is obtained.” Kilgour v. City
    of Pasadena, 
    53 F.3d 1007
    , 1010, as modified on denial of
    reh’g (9th Cir. 1995). Thereafter, the catalyst theory was, for
    a number of years, consistently applied in FOIA fee award
    cases within the Ninth Circuit, and was similarly employed
    by our sister circuits both before and after Church of
    Scientology. See, e.g., Long v. I.R.S., 
    932 F.2d 1309
     (9th Cir.
    1991) (reciting Church of Scientology standard); Nationwide
    Bldg. Maint. Inc. v. Sampson, 
    559 F.2d 704
     (D.C. Cir. 1977);
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                          17
    Maynard v. C.I.A., 
    986 F.2d 547
     (1st Cir. 1993); Vermont
    Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 
    546 F.2d 509
     (2d
    Cir. 1976);11 Cazalas v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
    
    660 F.2d 612
     (5th Cir. 1981); Clarkson v. I.R.S., 
    678 F.2d 1368
     (11th Cir. 1982).
    In 2001, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
    application of the catalyst theory to the recovery of attorney’s
    fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the
    Americans with Disabilities Act, holding that the theory
    would impermissibly “allow[] an award where there is no
    judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the
    parties.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West
    Virginia Dep’t. of Health & Human Res., 
    532 U.S. 598
    , 605
    (2001). We then held, in Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Locke,
    
    572 F.3d 610
    , 614 (9th Cir. 2009), that Buckhannon, by
    analogy, would also apply to FOIA and, therefore, abrogated
    our decision in Church of Scientology. But, as we explained
    in Locke, in 2007 Congress “modified FOIA’s provision for
    the recovery of attorney fees to ensure that FOIA
    complainants who relied on the catalyst theory to obtain an
    award of attorney fees would not be subject to the
    Buckhannon proscription.” 
    Id. at 615
    . Since then, the FOIA
    attorney’s fees statute has read:
    (i) The court may assess against the United
    States reasonable attorney fees and other
    litigation costs reasonably incurred in any
    11
    The district court in Exner embraced the catalyst theory language
    in Vermont Low Income, 443 F. Supp at 1353. We conclusorily affirmed
    the result, simply commenting that “[t]he record supports both the findings
    and the court’s conclusion,” Exner, 
    612 F.2d at 1207
    , but did not, until
    Church of Scientology, specifically adopt and apply the catalyst theory.
    18        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    case under this section in which the
    complainant has substantially prevailed.
    (ii) For purposes of this subsection, a
    complainant has substantially prevailed if the
    complainant has obtained relief through either
    – (I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written
    agreement or consent decree; or (II) a
    voluntary or unilateral change in position by
    the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not
    insubstantial.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E).
    Subsection (E)(i) is identical to FOIA’s earlier fee award
    provision. But subsection E(ii)(II), relevant to this appeal,
    expressly allows recovery based on “a voluntary or unilateral
    change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim
    is not insubstantial.”12
    As we further explained in Locke, this new provision
    “addresse[d] a relatively new concern that, under [the prior
    statute], Federal agencies ha[d] an incentive to delay
    compliance with FOIA requests until just before a court
    decision [was] made that [was] favorable to a FOIA
    requester.” 
    Id.
     (quoting 153 Cong. Rec. S15701-04 (daily ed.
    Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy, sponsor of the 2007
    Amendments)). Section E(ii)(II) was designed to clarify,
    therefore, “that Buckhannon does not apply to FOIA cases,”
    since under that provision, “a FOIA requester can obtain
    attorney’s fees when he or she files a lawsuit to obtain
    12
    The Government appropriately concedes that FAC’s claim was not
    insubstantial.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                            19
    records from the Government and the Government releases
    those records before the court orders them to do so.” 
    Id.
    We have not had an opportunity since the passage of the
    2007 amendment to decide whether it restores the causation
    standard under the catalyst theory applied in Church of
    Scientology. But six circuit courts to have addressed the
    impact of the amendment have held that it simply reinstated
    the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory of recovery. See Brayton
    v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
    641 F.3d 521
     (D.C. Cir. 2011); Warren v. Colvin, 
    744 F.3d 841
     (2d
    Cir. 2014); Havemann v. Colvin, 
    537 Fed. Appx. 142
     (4th
    Cir. 2013); Batton v. I.R.S., 
    718 F.3d 522
     (5th Cir. 2013);
    Cornucopia Institute v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture,
    
    560 F.3d 673
     (7th Cir. 2009); Zarcon, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
    
    578 F.3d 892
     (8th Cir. 2009). In doing so, they have
    implicitly rejected the notion that subsection E(ii)(II) should
    be construed literally to allow for the recovery of attorney’s
    fees without the need to establish causation once there is a
    voluntary disclosure or change in position subsequent to the
    initiation of FOIA litigation.
    Judge Murguia and I believe that we should join our sister
    circuits in holding that, under the catalyst theory, there still
    must be a causal nexus between the litigation and the
    voluntary disclosure or change in position by the
    Government. Thus, the plaintiff in this case had to present
    “convincing evidence” that the filing of the action “had a
    substantial causative effect on the delivery of the
    information.” Church of Scientology, 
    700 F.2d at 489
    .13
    13
    Notably, although we are not bound by their view of the law, the
    parties agree that the Church of Scientology causation standard applies,
    although they, of course, disagree as to its application in the present case.
    20         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    In doing so we explicitly reject the notion that the 2007
    amendment eliminated the need to establish causation once a
    lawsuit has been initiated. The statute cannot plausibly be
    read that way. There may be a host of reasons why the
    Government has voluntarily released information after the
    filing of a FOIA lawsuit. One obvious example is that
    previously classified information may have subsequently
    become unclassified for reasons having nothing to do with the
    litigation, or “administrative compliance with statutory
    production requirements, rather than. . . [the] FOIA suit
    triggered the release of the bulk of the documents.” Van
    Strum v. Thomas, No. 88-4153, 
    1989 WL 90175
    , at *1 (9th
    Cir. Aug. 2, 1989). Thus, as we recognized in Church of
    Scientology, while it is true that “the mere fact that
    defendants have voluntarily released documents does not
    preclude an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff,” it is
    equally true that “the mere fact that information sought was
    not released until after the lawsuit was instituted is
    insufficient to establish that a complainant has ‘substantially
    prevailed.’” 
    700 F.2d at
    491–92 (citing with approval Cox v.
    United States Dep’t of Justice, 
    601 F.2d 1
    , 6 (D.C. Cir.
    1979)).14
    III
    In Church of Scientology we remanded to the district
    court to make factual findings regarding three factors which
    14
    It is difficult to conceptually square Judge Berzon’s opinion that
    causation is irrelevant with the reality that the bringing of the litigation
    was itself a cause for what subsequently occurred. Causation, therefore,
    is very much in play, requiring the plaintiff to establish under the plain
    reading of the statute—both before and after the amendment—that it
    thereafter “substantially prevailed.”
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                            21
    a court should consider in determining whether the plaintiff
    had substantially prevailed: (1) “when the documents were
    released,” (2) “what actually triggered the documents’
    release,” and (3) “whether [the plaintiff] was entitled to the
    documents at an earlier time.” Id. at 492.
    Unlike Church of Scientology, there is no need to remand
    to determine eligibility since the undisputed material facts
    meet those criteria.15 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
    456 U.S. 273
    , 292 (1982) (citing Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co.,
    
    419 U.S. 318
    , 331–332 (1974)) (“[A] remand is the proper
    course unless the record permits only one resolution of the
    factual issue. All of this is elementary.” (emphasis added)).16
    A. When the Document Was Released
    The NDCA litigation spanned almost two and a half
    years, from its inception on February 29, 2012 until the OLC-
    CIA memo was released on August 15, 2014. In Church of
    Scientology we embraced the district court’s observation in
    Exner “that when information is delivered may be as
    important as what information is delivered.” 
    700 F.2d at
    490
    15
    There may be other factors in a given case that may be relevant to
    whether the plaintiff had substantially prevailed, but these three factors
    clearly suffice in the present case.
    16
    Judge Murguia does not join in Part III because she “do[es] not
    agree that the district court clearly erred in its causation finding.”
    Murguia Concurrence at 42. But reversal is required whenever a district
    court employs “an incorrect legal standard,” United Ass’n of Journeymen,
    
    841 F.2d at 1461
    , and I believe, as explained in this Part, that the district
    court committed legal error in its cryptic causation conclusion by failing
    to recognize and apply the correct legal standard, namely the factors
    articulated in Church of Scientology.
    22       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    (citing Exner, 
    443 F. Supp. at 1353
    ). We also noted the
    district court’s “support” in Exner for the requisite causal
    nexus “in that plaintiff faced formidable opposition by the
    government at every juncture,” and “[i]t was unlikely, in the
    district court’s view, that the action would have produced
    such favorable results, without the ‘dogged determination’ of
    plaintiff.” 
    Id.
    The same can be said of the present case. FAC was met
    with abject resistance throughout the entire litigation until the
    OLC-CIA memo was produced roughly two and a half years
    after the lawsuit was initiated, and almost a year and seven
    months after the Government waived any secrecy or privilege
    with the official release of the White Paper.
    B. What Actually Triggered the Document’s Release
    There is no question that the Second Circuit’s decision in
    the SDNY litigation was an impetus for FAC to continue its
    litigation. But what actually triggered the release of the
    OLC-CIA memo was that FAC sought to vacate the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment. It was the appellant’s
    “dogged determination,” therefore, that led the district court
    to “direct” the parties to discuss whether the litigation was
    moot, and which resulted in the Government’s decision—as
    acknowledged by the lower court—to “voluntarily disclose[]
    the CIA memorandum to [FAC].” Because of FAC’s efforts,
    the public then learned that the OLC-DOD memo was not the
    first memo addressing the justification for the drone attack,
    nor was it identical to the prior OLC-CIA memo. Plaintiff’s
    litigation, therefore, “triggered the release of additional or
    key documents.” Van Strum, 
    1989 WL 90175
    , at *1.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                 23
    C. Whether Plaintiff Was Entitled to the Document at
    an Earlier Time
    There is no reason why the district court failed to
    recognize, as the Second Circuit did, that the official release
    of the White Paper—coupled with all the prior public
    statements of high-ranking Government officials—
    constituted a waiver of any secrecy and privilege that the
    Government had asserted. The district court, therefore, erred
    in granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.
    But for this error, the district court litigation would have
    ended earlier. Thus, FAC had to endure unnecessarily
    protracted litigation. It is counterintuitive to punish FAC for
    expending additional legal fees to pursue the litigation, when
    it would have sooner been entitled to the release of both
    memoranda—and the right to recoup its counsel fees—if not
    for the district court’s error.
    IV
    In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it
    failed to consider and apply the relevant factors that we
    articulated in Church of Scientology for determining whether
    FAC had substantially prevailed. Its limited view of
    causation was at odds with Church of Scientology’s more
    enlightened view that, as here, multiple factors may be at
    play. It was, moreover, inconsistent with Congress’
    intent—once again—that the award of FOIA counsel fees
    “has as its fundamental purpose the facilitation of citizen
    access to the courts,” and should not be subject to “a grudging
    application.” Exner, 
    443 F. Supp. at
    1351–52 (citing
    Nationwide Building, 
    559 F.2d at 715
    ).
    24        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Since we have determined eligibility as a matter of law
    because there are no material facts in dispute, remand is
    required solely for the district court to determine the fees to
    which FAC is entitled.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
    I agree with the result reached by both of my colleagues.
    But I have a fundamental disagreement with both of them
    regarding the reach of the Freedom of Information Act
    (FOIA) fees provision, and so concur only in the judgment.1
    Contrary to Judge Block’s position, the text of the fees
    provision, 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E), plainly does not require
    a causal nexus between the litigation and the agency’s
    disclosure. It is inappropriate and impermissible to read one
    in, even though other courts have done so.
    Judge Block represents that a majority of the panel holds
    that a FOIA plaintiff “ha[s] to” present evidence that the
    litigation had a “substantial causative effect” on the
    disclosure to be eligible for fees absent a judgment in her
    favor. Lead Op. at 19 (internal citations omitted); see also 
    id.
    (reading other circuits’ law to affirm “the need to establish
    causation” between the litigation and a voluntary agency
    disclosure for a plaintiff to be eligible for fees) (emphasis
    1
    With the exception of footnote 10 of Judge Block’s opinion, which
    I join.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                       25
    added).2 Judge Murguia says that she concurs in this part of
    the lead opinion. Concurring Op. at 42. But the alternative
    theory of fee eligibility propounded in Judge Murguia’s
    concurrence—which, as I shall explain, is as textually
    insupportable as the causal nexus requirement— necessitates
    neither a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff nor a
    showing of causation. Because Judge Murguia and I,
    although for different reasons, would hold that even absent a
    judgment, causation is not always a necessary condition of
    fee eligibility for FOIA complainants, there is in fact no
    majority for the holding that causation has to be
    demonstrated.
    I
    Our inquiry begins with the statute. If the text is clear, as
    it is here, it ends there as well. United States v. Ron Pair
    Enters., Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    , 241 (1989).
    A FOIA complainant is eligible for attorney fees if she
    has “substantially prevailed.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E)(i). A
    person has “substantially prevailed” if she “has obtained
    relief through either – (I) a judicial order . . . or (II) a
    voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if
    the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”            
    Id.
    § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). We are concerned with subsection (II).
    Parsing that subsection, it has three elements. First, the
    complainant must have “obtained relief”; in this context, the
    requestor must have received from the agency some of the
    information she was suing for. Second, the relief must have
    2
    I will refer to Judge Block’s opinion for the court as the “lead
    opinion.”
    26       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    been obtained through “a voluntary or unilateral change” in
    the agency’s position. This element contemplates the willing
    disclosure of information to the complainant by an agency, in
    contrast to one brought about by “judicial order” or
    “enforceable written agreement or consent decree,” as
    envisioned in subsection (I). Lastly, the claim must be “not
    insubstantial.” Id. No more, no less. Conspicuously absent
    from Congress’s definition of a “substantially prevailing”
    complainant is the existence of a “causal nexus between the
    litigation and the voluntary disclosure or change in position
    by the Government.” Lead Op. at 19.
    Nor does the text of the applicable provision offer any
    language that could include a hidden causation requirement.
    First, to “obtain relief” from an agency simply means to
    receive the information a requestor is seeking, whether that be
    documents, a Vaughn index, or a response acknowledging the
    existence of relevant documents. The fact of relief does not
    relate to the impetus behind the agency’s action.
    The next element of the provision—“a voluntary or
    unilateral change in position by the agency”—if anything cuts
    against a reading that requires a “substantially prevailing”
    complainant to demonstrate causation. “Voluntary” may
    mean “done without any present legal obligation” to do so,
    but in another sense it means “not constrained, impelled, or
    influenced by another.”        Webster’s Third New Int’l
    Dictionary 2499 (1971) (emphasis added). A “unilateral”
    disclosure is one “done, made, undertaken, or shared by one
    of two or more persons or parties,” id. at 2564, which
    includes actions taken by one party independently of the
    other. These words, standing alone, indicate independent
    action not caused by the complainant’s litigation.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                            27
    The last stone to turn over—the “not insubstantial”
    element—yields no implicit causal nexus requirement, either.
    Whether a claim is “substantial,” or “not insubstantial,”3
    bears on whether the claim has or may have merit. That the
    claim could have merit may well explain why the agency
    turned over the requested information after the lawsuit was
    filed. So the substantiality of the claim may serve as a proxy
    or substitute for causation (a notion borne out by the
    legislative history, discussed later). But it is not itself a
    causation requirement; substantiality is a different inquiry
    from motive or causation.
    Those three elements are all a FOIA complainant needs
    to “substantially prevail[]” and thus be eligible for attorney
    fees.4 This provision obviously embraces cases in which a
    requestor could demonstrate that the lawsuit did spur an
    agency’s hand-over of documents before the case matures to
    judgment, but it extends equally to instances in which the
    agency decides to release the document for other reasons.
    In short, Congress spelled out in detail the meaning of
    “substantially prevailed,” but did not include any causation or
    motive requirement. We are not free to interpose one.
    “There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
    3
    “The double negative in the amendment was not my proposal and
    I accept no responsibility for that grammatical infraction.” 153 Cong.
    Rec. S10,989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
    4
    A complainant who is “eligible” for fees is not necessarily “entitled”
    to them; I am only concerned here with the effect of the statutory
    amendments on eligibility for fees. See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Locke,
    
    572 F.3d 610
    , 614 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To obtain an award of attorney fees
    under the FOIA, a plaintiff must demonstrate both eligibility and
    entitlement to the award.”).
    28        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has
    affirmatively and specifically enacted.” Lamie v. U.S.
    Trustee, 
    540 U.S. 526
    , 538 (2004) (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted). We may not read into this quite
    specific statute something that is not there. See, e.g., United
    States v. Ressam, 
    553 U.S. 272
    , 273 (2008) (holding that a
    plain reading of “carrying an explosive ‘during the
    commission of’” a felony foreclosed a relational requirement
    between the felony and the explosives).
    II
    The lead opinion does not (and could not) locate the
    causal nexus requirement in the amended statutory text.
    Instead, it finds the causation requirement in cases pre-dating
    both Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
    Department of Health & Human Resources, 
    532 U.S. 598
    (2001), and the statutory amendments to FOIA. See Lead Op.
    at 19–20 (citing Church of Scientology v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
    
    700 F.2d 486
    , 489, 491–92 (9th Cir. 1983)).
    As the lead opinion notes, Lead Op. at 17,
    Buckhannon was understood by this Court to foreclose
    attorney fees under the “catalyst theory” that had been
    embraced by most courts of appeals. See Or. Nat. Desert
    Ass’n, 
    572 F.3d at 616
     (agreeing with two other circuits that
    Buckhannon applied to FOIA). Oregon Natural Desert
    Association also recognized that the 2007 FOIA amendments
    legislatively overruled Buckhannon with respect to attorney
    fees under FOIA.5 
    Id. at 617
    .
    5
    Oregon Natural Desert Association states that the statutory
    amendments reinstated the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory, perhaps
    implying a causation requirement. 
    572 F.3d at
    614–15. The statement to
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                          29
    Where I part ways with the lead opinion is in interpreting
    precisely what the statutory amendments did—specifically,
    how they overruled Buckhannon. The lead opinion represents
    that the amendments “simply reinstated the pre-Buckhannon
    catalyst theory of recovery,” Lead Op. at 19, including the
    requirement of a causal nexus.              In adopting this
    characterization, the lead opinion is in good company—as it
    notes, several other circuits have assumed that the
    amendments restored the status quo ante. See, e.g., Summers
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    569 F.3d 500
    , 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
    (“Congress amended the FOIA to incorporate the catalyst
    theory.”); Batton v. IRS, 
    718 F.3d 522
    , 525 (5th Cir. 2013)
    (construing the statutory amendments to “codif[y]” the
    catalyst theory, including the requirement that the litigation
    had a “substantive causative effect” on the disclosure);
    Zarcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    578 F.3d 892
    , 894 (8th Cir. 2009)
    (reading the statutory amendments to “definitively establish[]
    that the ‘catalyst theory’” applies to attorney fees under
    FOIA). These courts, like the lead opinion, have understood
    the amendments simply to effect an erasure of Buckhannon
    as applied to FOIA, reinstating the pre-Buckhannon case law
    that requires a causal nexus. See, e.g., Conservation Force v.
    Jewell, 
    160 F. Supp. 3d 194
    , 202, 205–06 (D.D.C. 2016)
    (rejecting a FOIA plaintiff’s eligibility for fees because “the
    catalyst analysis is all about causation” and the plaintiff failed
    to demonstrate a causal link) (citing among others Cox v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Justice, 
    601 F.2d 1
     (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Lead Op. at 20
    (citing Church of Scientology, 
    700 F.2d at 489
    ). But none of
    those opinions did business with the language of the statute,
    that effect is dicta, however. The Court decided in that case only that the
    amended fees provision did not apply retroactively, and therefore did not
    address the appropriate application of the new provision.
    30       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    or explained why the courts should add to the statute a
    requirement that is simply not in the text.
    Notably, the causation requirement often led, as it does
    here, to complicated, fact-bound determinations. See
    Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    745 F.2d 1476
    , 1496 (D.C.
    Cir. 1984) (explaining that the causation analysis required
    consideration of whether the agency “made a good faith effort
    to search out material and to pass on whether it should be
    disclosed” as well as inquiry into the number of requests
    pending before the agency and how time-consuming the
    search process could be) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted); Church of Scientology, 
    700 F.2d at 492
    (instructing the district court to determine on remand “what
    actually triggered the documents’ release” to the plaintiff)
    (emphasis added). Congress surely could have reinstated the
    body of pre-Buckhannon case law, with its fact-intensive
    inquiry into causation, by adopting language similar to that
    used in that case law. For example, it could have borrowed
    Judge Friendly’s formulation that “a plaintiff must show at
    minimum that the prosecution of the action could reasonably
    have been regarded as necessary and that the action had
    substantial causative effect on the delivery of the
    information.” Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v.
    Usery, 
    546 F.2d 509
    , 513 (2d Cir. 1976), abrogated by Union
    of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps. v. INS, 
    336 F.3d 200
    (2d Cir. 2003); see also Church of Scientology, 
    700 F.2d at 489
     (using the language from Usery); Lovell v. Alderete,
    
    630 F.2d 428
    , 432 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
    But Congress did not do that. Instead, Congress opted
    explicitly to define “substantially prevail[ing]” when it
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                          31
    amended the statute,6 and to do so differently than the pre-
    Buckhannon cases had. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E)(ii).
    III
    The lead opinion, and the decided cases reading the new
    statute to incorporate pre-Buckhannon law on the catalyst
    theory, make two points: (1) legislative history indicates that
    Congress meant to overrule Buckhannon and restore the
    status quo ante for FOIA suits;7 and (2) a reading of the
    statute in which complainants can “substantially prevail[]”
    without in any way causing the disclosure is implausible.
    Where the statutory text is clear, it should not be defeated
    by legislative history unless the plain meaning threatens
    entirely to frustrate Congress’s intentions in enacting the
    statute. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 
    135 S. Ct. 2480
    , 2495–96
    (2015) (adopting a reading of the Affordable Care Act in line
    with Congress’s aim to “improve health insurance markets,
    not to destroy them”). Legislative history can, however,
    sometimes throw new light on statutory language that may
    seem straightforward but that takes on a different coloration
    in light of a specialized context or linguistic understandings,
    demonstrated by “how the legislators considering the bill
    were speaking about the statute” at the time of enactment.
    James v. City of Costa Mesa, 
    700 F.3d 394
    , 409 n.2 (9th Cir.
    6
    Before 2007, the terse fees provision in FOIA provided for fees and
    costs “in any case under this section in which the complainant has
    substantially prevailed.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E) (2006).
    7
    See, e.g., Lead Op. at 18 (quoting floor statement); Or. Nat. Desert
    Ass’n, 
    572 F.3d at 616
     (same); Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade
    Representative, 
    641 F.3d 521
    , 526 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing extensively the
    committee reports and floor statements for the FOIA amendments).
    32        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    2012) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
    It can also clarify ambiguities created by “the evolution of
    language over time, a not-infrequent source of error in
    interpreting statutes of long-standing vintage.” United States
    v. Kimsey, 
    668 F.3d 691
    , 699 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
    Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 
    633 F.3d 723
    , 752–55 (9th Cir.
    2011) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (interpreting “religious
    corporation” as a term of art in light of old common-law
    usage and statutory history).
    Examining the legislative history in this instance is useful
    to confirm that there is no nonobvious reading of the statutory
    language compelled, or even supported, by that history. To
    the contrary, the history affirmatively indicates a purposeful
    decision to avoid the factually difficult causation question.
    The lead opinion is correct that the amendments appear to
    have been motivated by concern about the effect of
    Buckhannon on fees in FOIA cases.8 The so-called
    “Buckhannon fix” was drafted to “clarif[y] that
    Buckhannon’s holding does not and should not apply to FOIA
    litigation.” S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 6 (2007). But that
    explanation does not include an account of what standard
    should apply instead of “Buckhannon’s holding” and so in no
    way indicates that the straightforward language of Congress
    does not mean what it says.
    8
    In particular, the sponsors of the bill worried about the strategic
    timing of FOIA disclosures by agencies to avoid paying fees. See S. Rep.
    No. 110-59, at 3–4 (2007) (“[F]ederal agencies have an incentive to delay
    compliance with FOIA requests until just before a court decision that is
    favorable to a FOIA requestor.”); 153 Cong. Rec. S15,704 (daily ed. Dec.
    14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (same).
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                 33
    Moreover, the drafting history of the amended statute
    supports my view that § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) has no causation
    requirement. Earlier versions of the bill defined a
    complainant as “substantially prevailing” if she obtained
    relief through a judicial order or
    if the complainant’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous
    claim or defense has been a catalyst for a
    voluntary or unilateral change in position by
    the opposing party that provides a substantial
    part of the requested relief.
    OPEN Government Act of 2005, S. 394, 109th Cong. § 4
    (2005) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 867, 109th Cong. § 4
    (2005) (same language). But the next round of bills dropped
    the “catalyst” element, instead requiring only that a
    complainant obtain relief through “a voluntary or unilateral
    change in position by the opposing party, where the
    complaintant’s [sic] claim or defense was not frivolous.” S.
    849, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); see also H.R. 1309, 110th Cong.
    § 4 (2007) (same except “in a case in which” instead of
    “where”). In response to a few members’ concerns, “not
    frivolous” became “not insubstantial,” the language that was
    ultimately included in the statute as enacted.
    The remarks by drafters of the final bill directly confirm
    that the decision to leave out a causation concept was
    deliberate. “Floor statements by the sponsors of the
    legislation are given considerably more weight than floor
    statements by other members, . . . and they are given even
    more weight where, as here, other legislators did not offer any
    contrary views.” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal.,
    
    435 F.3d 1011
    , 1015 (9th Cir. 2006).
    34       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Senator Kyl, a proponent of the amendment that became
    the statutory language, believed the substantiality test was
    “well-suited” to evaluating fee requests because “courts
    should be able to apply [it] without further factual inquiry
    into the nature of a complaint.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10,989
    (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007). By so providing, Senator Kyl
    reported, the amendment “addresse[d] one of the Supreme
    Court’s major concerns in the Buckhannon case, that ‘a
    request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major
    litigation.’” 
    Id.
     (citing Buckhannon, 
    532 U.S. at 609
    )).
    Senator Kyl, in other words, explained Congress’s move
    away from the earlier “catalyst” language as a quest for a
    more administrable standard—one in which substantiality,
    and not causation, is the basis of a fee award. And Senator
    Kyl recognized that his “not insubstantial” amendment was
    “very generous to FOIA requesters” and “a pretty low
    standard” made “in the spirit of compromise.” 
    Id.
    Another sponsor of the bill, Senator Leahy, opined that “a
    FOIA requester can obtain attorneys’ fees when he or she
    files a lawsuit to obtain records from the Government and the
    Government releases those records before the court orders
    them to do so.” 153 Cong. Rec. S15,704 (daily ed. Dec. 14,
    2007). Senator Leahy’s careful explanation of the new fees
    provision in his own bill captures the mechanics of the
    provision, which—as his statement reveals—has no causation
    requirement.
    One line in the Senate report accompanying S. 894 did
    say that the bill “clarif[ies] that a complainant has
    substantially prevailed . . . if the pursuit of a claim was the
    catalyst for the voluntary or unilateral change in position by
    the opposing party.” S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 6 (2007)
    (emphasis added). But, as I have noted, the statutory
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                 35
    language does not use the term “catalyst,” or “causation,” or
    “because of,” or anything similar, in defining “substantially
    prevailed.” To substitute one phrase in one line in a
    committee report for the statute’s actual definition is to
    commit the precise sin which has led to the near-complete
    demise—in my view unfortunate—of legislative history in
    interpreting statutes: Congress as a whole voted on the statute
    as written, and should not be taken as instead adopting
    arguably contrary language in a committee report absent
    extremely good reason. See King, 
    135 S. Ct. at
    2492–96
    (relying on “context and structure” to reject the natural
    reading of a word because of the “calamitous result[s]” that
    would otherwise ensue). Here, there is no such reason.
    Clearly, Congress could have chosen to—and initially
    did—draft a provision codifying the pre-Buckhannon catalyst
    theory, by using the very word “catalyst,” which courts had
    construed for decades to include a causation requirement.
    But it ultimately chose not to do that. The statute enacted by
    Congress and signed by the president did not reinstate the
    pre-Buckhannon definition of “substantially prevailing,” but
    instead devised a new one. “[C]ourts must presume that a
    legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
    statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l. Bank v. Germain,
    
    503 U.S. 249
    , 253–54 (1992).
    IV
    We should take no comfort from the fact that other
    circuits have read into the fees provision a causation
    requirement, and should not join them in insisting upon this
    36         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    statutory mirage.9 In Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District,
    this Court recently disagreed with four other circuits in
    holding that the twenty-employee minimum in the Age
    Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to political
    subdivisions. 
    859 F.3d 1168
    , 1172–74 (9th Cir. 2017). The
    other appeals courts relied on parallel legislation and
    legislative history, notwithstanding the unambiguous words
    of the directly applicable statute. 
    Id.
     at 1174–75. Here, as
    there, the statute is clear; we need not go outside its text to
    know that FOIA plaintiffs don’t need to show causation to
    collect fees. The consensus of contrary authority should not
    disincline us from this reading when that consensus is just
    wrong. Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
    539 U.S. 90
    , 101
    (2003) (overruling four circuits’ requirement of direct
    evidence in mixed-motive Title VII cases because they
    neglected an intervening change in statutory language).
    The lead opinion suggests that the fee provision “cannot
    plausibly be read” in a way that does not incorporate a
    causation requirement. Lead Op. at 20. But the cases it cites
    for this proposition all pre-date Buckhannon and the statutory
    amendments. Id. at 20. They are evidence of nothing more
    than what a pre-Buckhannon plaintiff needed to show in order
    to be “substantially prevailing” under existing judge-made
    law on fees for catalyst complainants. To the extent they
    9
    Only one court seems to have entertained the notion that the statute,
    read plainly, does not include a causation requirement. See Sai v. Transp.
    Sec. Admin., 
    155 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 6 n.4 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[U]nder the literal
    terms of the statute, a plaintiff need only show that the agency has
    changed its position and that the plaintiff’s claim was ‘not
    insubstantial.’”). Sai then noted the legislative history discussed above,
    which it believed counseled in favor of such a requirement. Because
    causation was “likely a non-issue” in that case, however, it did not discuss
    the question further. 
    Id.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                  37
    impose a causal nexus requirement, they have been
    superseded by statute and have no bearing on whether fees
    are available to First Amendment Coalition or any requestor
    seeking fees under § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II).
    But even taking the lead opinion’s concern on its merits,
    my reading of the statute is an entirely plausible one. As
    Senator Kyl’s statement quoted above suggests, Congress
    probably wanted courts to avoid difficult determinations of
    causation—as shown by this case—by creating, in effect, a
    presumption of causation when agencies unilaterally change
    position as to a possibly meritorious disclosure request after
    a lawsuit has been filed. The pre-Buckhannon standard
    required difficult multi-factor inquiries by the district courts
    to determine whether the lawsuit “actually” caused the
    disclosure or not. Congress could sensibly want a more
    administrable test for screening out complainants who ought
    not to recover attorney fees.
    Additionally, Congress may have wanted to make whole
    plaintiffs who simply should not have had to resort to
    litigation to obtain the information they wanted, having
    necessarily already made an appropriate, “not insubstantial”
    request for disclosure to the agency, which was denied. See
    
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(2)-(3) (providing for disclosure of non-
    exempt agency documents). The agency’s subsequent release
    of the information, for whatever reason, could be seen as a
    likely indication that incurring the litigation expenses should
    have been unnecessary. That the agency has already passed
    on a chance (often more than one) to hand over requested
    information before litigation and so without exposure to fees
    makes FOIA litigation somewhat unusual, and helps explain
    why Congress concluded that FOIA plaintiffs should at this
    stage obtain attorney fees if the agency changes its mind
    38         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    about releasing information only after litigation costs have
    been incurred.
    In short, making FOIA complainants eligible for fees
    without demonstrating a causal nexus is neither absurd nor
    “threaten[s] to destroy the entire statutory scheme.” Guido,
    859 F.3d at 1174 (citing King, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2495
    ). Rather,
    the standard stated quite plainly in the statute is perfectly
    sensible. It forwards “the philosophy of full agency
    disclosure” undergirding FOIA, by paying the fees of those
    who make potentially meritorious requests for information to
    the agency and obtain the requested information only after
    filing suit.10 Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    ,
    360–61 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, at 3 (1965)). The lead
    opinion falls into error by insisting, as have other courts to
    consider the issue, that the amended statute includes a
    causation requirement that is just not there.
    V
    My objection to Judge Murguia’s analysis of fee
    eligibility is fundamentally the same as my objection to the
    lead opinion. Her alternative theory of eligibility is entirely
    divorced from the words of the statute we must apply to
    determine if FOIA plaintiffs are eligible for fees.
    10
    As a practical matter, where there is litigation pending and the basis
    for the release of information is substantial, I suspect instances in which
    the information is released for reasons entirely independent of the
    litigation are likely rare. The old catalyst theory, after all, required only
    a “substantial causative effect,” not that the lawsuit be the sole or
    determinant cause of disclosure. Cf. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
    Sec., 
    810 F. Supp. 2d 267
    , 274 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the litigation
    “substantially caused” the release of some documents even though others
    were released in the course of defendant’s administrative response).
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                          39
    Under Judge Murguia’s approach, First Amendment
    Coalition is eligible for fees because it would have prevailed
    on the merits but for unilateral government action, in this case
    the failure of the government to disclose to the district court
    that the White Paper had been officially released. Concurring
    Op. at 49. Judge Murguia maintains that her approach is
    “consistent with FOIA’s text,” Concurring Op. at 48, but her
    concurrence fails to engage with the text of 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) at all.
    Again, a plaintiff who does not obtain a judgment may
    nonetheless “substantially prevail,” and thus be eligible for
    fees, if she has obtained relief through a voluntary or
    unilateral change in agency position on a “not insubstantial”
    claim. 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). Judge Murguia’s
    approach replaces the words of the statute with a different
    substantive standard: the plaintiff is eligible if she is “correct
    on the merits” (emphasis added), or would have prevailed in
    the FOIA suit, but for the government’s unilateral action
    “outside [the plaintiff’s] control.”11 Concurring Op. at 50.
    However consistent this approach is with the “purpose”
    of FOIA, Concurring Op. at 48, it has no textual warrant in
    the statute. Whereas the lead opinion just reads an extra
    element into § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II), Judge Murguia sketches
    an additional theory of recovery that does not overlap at all
    with § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). Where the statute requires only a
    “not insubstantial” claim, her analysis demands an actually
    meritorious one. Concurring Op. at 50. Where the statute
    11
    Judge Murguia implies bad faith on the part of the government in
    this case, a suggestion on which I take no position. It is not clear if bad
    faith is required under her theory of eligibility or is merely one instance
    of action but for which a plaintiff would have recovered.
    40         FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    requires a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
    government agency, this approach calls for “unilateral action”
    that “prevent[s] [the plaintiff] from prevailing” on its claim.
    Id. at 12. Whatever the merits of this set of requirements as
    a policy for punishing bad-faith litigation conduct,12 it is
    contrary to the text of the statute we must apply when
    awarding fees to FOIA plaintiffs. The arguments against
    reading a causal nexus requirement into § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II),
    discussed in Parts II-IV above, apply with equal, if not more,
    force to an alternative basis for eligibility that finds support
    in neither the text of the statute nor once-applicable (but now
    superseded) circuit law on catalyst recovery.
    Finally, I note once again that one result of Judge
    Murguia’s alternative analysis is that there is no majority
    holding as to whether, absent judicial relief, a plaintiff must
    demonstrate a causal nexus between the lawsuit and the
    disclosure.
    VI
    Applied to the facts of this case, First Amendment
    Coalition is a “substantially prevailing” complainant. It
    obtained relief—the OLC-CIA memo—before judgment
    through a voluntary change in position by the Department of
    Justice on a “not insubstantial” claim. See Lead Op. at 18
    n.12 (noting the government’s concession that the claim is not
    insubstantial). The statute does not require us to, and indeed
    we may not, “read an absent word” (or provision) into the
    statute. Lamie, 
    540 U.S. at 538
    .
    12
    There are other measures for dealing with bad-faith litigation
    tactics, like sanctions, that have the virtue of not altering the substantive
    law.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                 41
    *    *   *    *    *
    For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment (with one
    exception noted, see note 1, supra).
    MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring
    in the judgment:
    I write separately to explain my reasoning in this
    challenging case.
    FOIA allows for an award of attorney fees to eligible
    parties who can show their entitlement to fees. Where a
    FOIA plaintiff prevails on the merits of her claim, eligibility
    for fees is straightforward. Where a FOIA plaintiff does not
    prevail on the merits of her claim, but the Government
    nonetheless releases some or all of the information sought
    through a unilateral disclosure, eligibility for fees is less
    straightforward. The leading test for analyzing eligibility in
    these circumstances asks whether the plaintiff’s litigation was
    a “substantial causative effect” of the disclosure of the
    information. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Postal
    Serv., 
    700 F.2d 486
    , 489 (9th Cir. 1983). In keeping with its
    name, the substantial causative effect test has long
    incorporated a causation requirement. See, e.g., Long v. IRS,
    
    932 F.2d 1309
    , 1313 (9th Cir. 1991). We sometimes refer to
    this as a “catalyst theory” of recovery. Oregon Nat. Desert
    Ass’n v. Locke, 
    572 F.3d 610
    , 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2009).
    This case concerns whether First Amendment Coalition,
    a FOIA plaintiff, is eligible for an award of attorney fees.
    The district court concluded that First Amendment Coalition
    42       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    did not prevail on the merits or satisfy the “substantial
    causative effect” test for a catalyst recovery, and was
    therefore ineligible for an award of fees. The appeal of that
    decision presents three distinct questions: (1) whether the
    catalyst theory and its “substantial causative effect” test still
    includes a causation requirement under the amended text of
    FOIA; (2) whether the district court clearly erred in its factual
    finding on causation; and (3) whether First Amendment
    Coalition is eligible for an award of attorney fees.
    On the first question, I join in the analysis of part II of the
    opinion, finding that recovery under a catalyst theory
    continues to require causation. On the second question, I do
    not join in the opinion’s analysis, because I do not agree that
    the district court clearly erred in its causation finding. On the
    third question, I conclude that First Amendment Coalition is
    eligible for fees. The Department of Justice (the DOJ)
    prevented First Amendment Coalition from prevailing on the
    merits, and the district court erred by failing to take into
    account the DOJ’s conduct when analyzing eligibility. I
    therefore concur in reversing the district court’s judgment on
    First Amendment Coalition’s eligibility for a fee award, and
    in remanding to consider First Amendment Coalition’s
    entitlement to fees.
    I. Background
    In 2010, lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in
    the DOJ wrote two memoranda analyzing the targeted killing
    of an American citizen abroad: a memorandum from the OLC
    to the U.S. Department of Defense (the OLC-DOD
    Memorandum) and a memorandum from the OLC to the
    Central Intelligence Agency (the OLC-CIA Memorandum).
    These memoranda were not public, and various Government
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                  43
    agencies refused to confirm or deny their existence. When
    First Amendment Coalition submitted its FOIA request in
    2011, these two memoranda were within the scope of the
    request. DOJ did not provide these memoranda to First
    Amendment Coalition, or confirm or deny their existence.
    First Amendment Coalition then litigated in pursuit of the
    still-undisclosed and unacknowledged responsive materials
    in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    California (NDCA). Other parties brought similar FOIA
    actions in the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of New York (SDNY).
    The SDNY plaintiffs lost on the merits of their suit in
    early 2013. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (NY
    Times I), 
    915 F. Supp. 2d 508
    , 516–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
    Later that year, the United States Government acknowledged
    the OLC-DOD Memorandum after a series of other related
    disclosures, most notably an internal “White Paper”
    summarizing the OLC legal rationales. The DOJ and other
    agencies, however, did not make the OLC-DOD
    Memorandum public, and did not disclose the existence of the
    OLC-CIA Memorandum.
    In the NDCA litigation, the DOJ and First Amendment
    Coalition filed cross-motions for summary judgment
    regarding the release of the materials First Amendment
    Coalition had requested. The DOJ did not mention the White
    Paper in the opening brief for its second motion for summary
    judgment. After First Amendment Coalition emphasized the
    leaked White Paper in its briefing, the DOJ in its reply to its
    motion for summary judgment and opposition to First
    Amendment Coalition’s cross-motion stated: “The White
    Paper is a draft document that was originally provided in
    confidence to Congress; the Executive Branch later
    44       FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    acknowledged the draft document.” The DOJ did not inform
    First Amendment Coalition or the district court that it had
    provided the White Paper to a news organization called
    Truthout in response to Truthout’s separate FOIA request.
    See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (NY Times III),
    
    756 F.3d 100
    , 110 n.9 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting the United
    States also never informed the ACLU, a plaintiff in the
    SDNY litigation of this release). This action constituted an
    intentional public release and disclosure of the White Paper,
    rather than a mere acknowledgment, and that distinction
    proved critical.
    In early 2014, the NDCA district court ruled against First
    Amendment Coalition on the merits of the cross-motions for
    summary judgment. In its order, the district court observed
    that First Amendment Coalition “makes much of the fact that
    the unclassified White Paper prepared for Congress has been
    leaked and acknowledged by the Government. However,
    there has been no ‘official disclosure’ of the White Paper.”
    The district court’s statement that there was no official
    disclosure was incorrect given the prior DOJ release of the
    White Paper in response to the Truthout FOIA request. 
    Id.
    Ten days after the NDCA district court ruled against First
    Amendment Coalition on the merits, the Second Circuit
    reversed the SDNY district court and ordered the release of
    a redacted version of the OLC-DOD Memorandum. N.Y.
    Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (NY Times II), 
    752 F.3d 123
    , 126 (2d Cir.), opinion revised and superseded, 
    756 F.3d 100
     (2d Cir. 2014). In its opinion, the Second Circuit
    determined that the OLC-DOD Memorandum’s legal analysis
    was no longer exempt from FOIA disclosure because of the
    release of the White Paper and public statements by United
    States officials. Id. at 141. The Second Circuit specifically
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                   45
    noted that the White Paper made a dispositive difference,
    focusing on the effect of the White Paper in showing waiver
    of the United States’ privilege arguments:
    Even if these statements assuring the public of
    the lawfulness of targeted killings are not
    themselves sufficiently detailed to establish
    waiver of the secrecy of the legal analysis in
    the OLC-DOD Memorandum, they establish
    the context in which the most revealing
    document, disclosed after the [SDNY] District
    Court’s decision, should be evaluated. That
    document is the DOJ White Paper[.]
    Id. at 138; see id. at 141 (“Whatever protection the legal
    analysis might once have had has been lost by virtue of public
    statements of public officials at the highest levels and official
    disclosure of the DOJ White Paper.”).
    The Second Circuit’s opinion also included the following
    paragraph, referencing the NDCA litigation:
    The recent opinion of the District Court for
    the Northern District of California, . . .
    denying an FOIA request for the OLC-DOD
    Memorandum, is readily distinguishable
    because the Court, being under the impression
    that “there has been no ‘official disclosure’ of
    the White Paper,” . . . did not assess its
    significance, whereas in our case, the
    Government has conceded that the White
    Paper, with its detailed analysis of legal
    reasoning, has in fact been officially
    disclosed.
    46            FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    Id. at 139 (internal citations omitted).
    The Second Circuit subsequently published the OLC-
    DOD Memorandum in a revised decision. See NY Times III,
    756 F.3d at 104. Shortly after, the DOJ disclosed the
    existence of and voluntarily released the OLC-CIA
    Memorandum to plaintiffs in the SDNY and to First
    Amendment Coalition. The precise reasons why the DOJ
    voluntarily disclosed the existence of and released the OLC-
    CIA Memorandum are in dispute between the parties and
    there is almost no direct evidence of why the DOJ made that
    decision.
    II. Catalyst Theory
    First Amendment Coalition argues that the NDCA
    litigation substantially caused the release of the OLC-DOD
    Memorandum and the OLC-CIA Memorandum. First
    Amendment Coalition’s principal theory for why it had a
    “substantial causative effect” on the DOJ’s release of both the
    OLC-DOD and OLC-CIA memoranda is that its NDCA
    litigation—and the prospect of Ninth Circuit review—
    affected the Government’s choices. First Amendment
    Coalition points to the DOJ’s decision not to contest the
    release of the OLC-DOD memorandum the Second Circuit
    ordered, and the DOJ’s decision to release the OLC-CIA
    memorandum before any federal court ordered the DOJ to do
    so. The NDCA district court rejected First Amendment
    Coalition’s arguments, finding that the DOJ “in this case
    released the documents largely as a result of the Second
    Circuit’s ruling in NY Times, not as a result of the ruling in
    this case.”1
    1
    It appears the district court was referring to NY Times II.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                           47
    The district court’s ruling on causation is a factual
    finding, and we review for clear error. See Ass’n of Cal.
    Water Agencies v. Evans, 
    386 F.3d 879
    , 886 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Here, there is evidence to support First Amendment
    Coalition’s position, but there is also evidence consistent with
    the district court’s finding.2 When one of two plausible
    explanations supports the district court finding, there cannot
    be a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed.” N. Queen Inc. v. Kinnear, 
    298 F.3d 1090
    , 1095
    (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 
    283 F.3d 1070
    , 1076
    (9th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, in my view, we must accept the
    district court’s finding of causation, even if there is some
    cause to doubt it. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, 
    386 F.3d at 886
    . Because I think we must uphold the district court’s
    factual finding with respect to both responsive memoranda,
    I conclude First Amendment Coalition cannot show eligibility
    for fees under a catalyst theory. See Long, 
    932 F.2d at 1313
    .
    2
    For instance, we have two available explanations for why the DOJ
    ultimately voluntarily disclosed the OLC-CIA Memorandum to First
    Amendment Coalition. The first explanation is that the DOJ concluded
    that the waiver determinations the Second Circuit made regarding the
    OLC-DOD Memorandum applied with equal force to the OLC-CIA
    Memorandum. See NY Times III, 756 F.3d at 117. In other words, in
    response to the Second Circuit decision and subsequent SDNY district
    court order, the DOJ conceded. The second explanation is that the DOJ
    wanted to end the NDCA litigation. (I note that the DOJ had not yet
    responded to the NDCA district court’s order to provide an explanation for
    why the DOJ conceded official disclosure of the White Paper in one
    federal forum but made no mention of official disclosure in another. The
    district court had ordered the DOJ to explain this inconsistency if the case
    was not moot, and disclosing the OLC-CIA Memorandum prevented the
    DOJ from needing to respond.) The first explanation supports the district
    court’s finding of causation; the second explanation suggests the district
    court’s finding of causation was in error, and supports First Amendment
    Coalition’s eligibility for fees.
    48        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    I therefore do not join in the opinion to the extent it reverses
    the district court while still applying a catalyst theory.
    III. A Different Ground for Fee Eligibility
    In the majority of FOIA fee cases, the catalyst theory of
    recovery will be the appropriate way to analyze the plaintiff’s
    eligibility for fees. But, to my mind, a catalyst theory of
    recovery does not suit the facts of this case.
    In my view, however, there is no need to rely on a catalyst
    theory or re-write the “substantial causative effect” test.3 We
    can instead resolve the case by returning to the purposes
    underlying the test, and reframing them for the unique
    circumstances presented here. After doing so, it is clear that
    First Amendment Coalition has another viable theory for
    eligibility, equally consistent with FOIA’s text and purpose.
    At the time of its adoption, the substantial causative effect
    test established “that a court judgment is not a prerequisite for
    an attorney fees award under” FOIA. Nationwide Bldg.
    Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 
    559 F.2d 704
    , 708–09 (D.C. Cir.
    1977). In practice, the test recognizes that plaintiffs in FOIA
    suits do not need to secure a judgment on the merits to
    receive attorney fees. The purpose behind this rule is simple:
    when the Government takes unilateral action—completely
    outside the plaintiff’s control—such action should not prevent
    the plaintiff from receiving compensation for a meritorious
    claim. See Church of Scientology, 
    700 F.2d at 492
     (noting
    that “the mere fact that defendants have voluntarily released
    3
    As noted above, I join in the opinion’s conclusion that causation
    remains a requirement of the “substantial causative effect” test for a
    catalyst theory of recovery. See Opinion, Part II.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                 49
    documents does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees to
    the plaintiff”).
    To illustrate, suppose the Government, on the eve of
    defeat in FOIA litigation, unilaterally releases the requested
    information, thereby mooting the case and preventing the
    plaintiffs from securing a judgment. The plaintiffs’ efforts in
    litigation compelled the disclosure of information, and the
    plaintiffs would have prevailed absent the Government’s
    conduct. Accordingly, we would award attorney fees to the
    plaintiffs under a catalyst theory, even though they did not
    secure a judgment on the merits. The instant case presents a
    different variation on this situation, but the same
    considerations should still apply.
    First Amendment Coalition and the SDNY FOIA
    plaintiffs sought the same underlying materials for the same
    reasons. The DOJ then took a unilateral action that prevented
    First Amendment Coalition from prevailing on the merits, by
    failing to describe the White Paper candidly to the NDCA
    district court. Because the DOJ did not inform First
    Amendment Coalition or the NDCA district court about the
    official release of the White Paper in response to the FOIA
    request, the DOJ deprived the NDCA district court of the
    opportunity to rule on a complete record. The district court
    even admitted that it “may not have been fully apprised of the
    facts surrounding the White Paper” in making its earlier
    ruling, a conclusion reached only with the clarity provided by
    the Second Circuit decision. The Second Circuit recognized
    the White Paper was critical, and that the DOJ’s
    representations to the NDCA district court had differed in a
    material way. Something has gone wrong when a district
    court learns of relevant information first from another court,
    let alone material, case-dispositive information. E.g., United
    50        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ
    States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 
    11 F.3d 450
    , 459 (4th Cir. 1993)
    (holding that failure to disclose information that “could
    conceivably have affected the outcome of the litigation . . .
    violates the general duty of candor that attorneys owe as
    officers of the court”).
    First Amendment Coalition failed to prevail primarily
    because of unilateral Government actions, outside its control.4
    The district court erred in not recognizing the significance of
    the DOJ’s litigation conduct for the FOIA eligibility analysis.
    By characterizing the White Paper inconsistently between
    two federal fora, the DOJ deprived First Amendment
    Coalition of the fair chance for the court to hear its arguments
    on the merits. The first and only federal court to consider the
    merits of whether the official disclosure of the White Paper
    affected the FOIA analysis concluded that the White Paper
    made a decisive difference. In the course of its decision, the
    Second Circuit also observed that the only apparent difference
    between the case before it and the case before the NDCA
    district court was that the NDCA district court had a different
    understanding of the White Paper’s significance. The district
    court here did not draw its understanding from the ether; it
    relied on the Government’s representations. If the NDCA
    district court had in front of it the same information available
    to the Second Circuit, the NDCA district court likely would
    have reached the same result as the Second Circuit—or we
    would have, on appeal.
    4
    In her opinion, Judge Berzon suggests that my reasoning implies bad
    faith on the part of the government in this case. I am not aware of the
    circumstances surrounding the DOJ’s action, but the fact that the district
    court was not made aware of the White paper’s disclosure was critical for
    First Amendment Coalition’s inability to prevail on the merits and
    establish eligibility for attorney fees.
    FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION V. USDOJ                          51
    Under these circumstances, the same rationales apply as
    in “substantial causative effect” cases. First Amendment
    Coalition acted in good faith, brought a timely action, and
    was correct on the merits. A ruling in First Amendment
    Coalition’s favor would likely have made First Amendment
    Coalition eligible without even the need to rely on any
    alternate theory of recovery. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(E)(i).
    First Amendment Coalition was unable to recover because of
    the DOJ’s unilateral action in how the DOJ characterized the
    White Paper to the court. The DOJ prevented First
    Amendment Coalition from prevailing and establishing its
    eligibility via a favorable judgment, 
    id.
     § 552(a)(4)(E)(i), and
    we therefore may look to alternate bases establishing First
    Amendment Coalition’s eligibility to recover,                 id.
    § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). The district court erred as a matter of law
    by not accounting for the DOJ’s actions when analyzing First
    Amendment Coalition’s eligibility for recovery, and by
    limiting its analysis to actual causation.
    Accordingly, I would reverse the district court for legal
    error, not for its underlying causation finding. When we take
    into account the DOJ’s conduct, First Amendment Coalition
    has established its eligibility for an award of fees. I therefore
    join my colleagues in reversing the district court ruling on
    eligibility, and remanding for a determination of First
    Amendment Coalition’s entitlement to fees.5
    5
    In analyzing whether First Amendment Coalition is entitled to fees,
    as opposed to merely eligible, the district court will be able to consider
    agency behavior or reasonableness. See Batton v. IRS, 
    718 F.3d 522
    , 527
    (5th Cir. 2013); Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
    779 F.2d 1378
    , 1390 (8th
    Cir. 1985).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-15117

Filed Date: 11/29/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/29/2017

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