Roger Adams v. Francisco Jacquez ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 06 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROGER R. ADAMS, No. 11-17733
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02266-JAM-
KJN
v.
FRANCISCO JACQUEZ, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 13, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN, District Judge.**
State prisoner Roger Adams appeals from the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable James C. Mahan, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
First, Adams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions and the firearm and gang enhancements imposed on him. In reviewing
the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
follow the two-step process established by Jackson v. Virginia. United States v.
Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (discussing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). First, we “must consider the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 1164.
Second, we must determine whether this evidence, when viewed in that light, is
adequate to allow “any rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “when we
assess a sufficiency of evidence challenge in the case of a state prisoner seeking
federal habeas corpus relief subject to the strictures of [the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)], there is a double dose of
deference that can rarely be surmounted,” as the state court’s “application of the
Jackson standard must be ‘objectively unreasonable’ to warrant habeas relief for a
state prisoner.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2011).
Viewing the evidence in this light, we reject Adams’s argument. The
evidence presented at trial, including evidence that Adams had ammunition on his
person and gun residue on his clothing, was sufficient to allow “any rational trier
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of fact” to convict him and impose the firearm enhancement. Moreover, the
California Court of Appeal’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to
support the gang enhancement was not “objectively unreasonable.” Adams’s
contention regarding the insufficiency of evidence that he was an “active”
participant in the gang is meritless under California law. See In re Ramon T., 57
Cal. App. 4th 201, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Second, Adams argues that the trial court made a variety of instructional
errors, including failing to define “materiality” in the jury instructions, failing to
provide instructions on lesser-related offenses, and failing to instruct the jury
adequately as to the elements of the gang enhancement. The state court did not
address the merits of these claims, instead holding that they were procedurally
barred. Regardless of whether we review these claims de novo or conduct a more
deferential AEDPA review, see Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir.
2012), they fail, because Adams has not shown that the putative errors so infected
his trial that his convictions violated due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 72–73 (1991) (holding that challenges to jury instructions do not state a federal
constitutional claim outside of a “very narrowly” defined category of infractions
that violate “fundamental fairness”) (citation omitted).
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Finally, Adams argues that the trial court made several incorrect evidentiary
rulings. Insofar as these claims involve the trial court’s application of state law,
they are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See id. at 67–68 (explaining that
it is “not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions”). Insofar as Adams’s claim that his trial
should have been bifurcated implicates federal law, it is rejected. See Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567–68 (1967) (stating that bifurcated jury trials “have never
been compelled by [the Supreme Court] as a matter of constitutional law”).
In light of our rejection of Adams’s claims on the merits, we do not reach
the issue of the procedural bar imposed by the state court under Ex parte Dixon,
264 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1953).
AFFIRMED.
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