United States v. Dongjun Li , 555 F. App'x 724 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-10087
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00023-RVM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DONGJUN LI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands
Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2014**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Dongjun Li (“Li”) appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a
counterfeit immigration document pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).1 We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Li does not appeal his companion conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3) for
making a false statement to a federal official.
jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1821 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294(4). Reviewing
de novo the legal conclusions underpinning the denial of a motion to dismiss a charge
in an indictment, United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2009), we
affirm the conviction.
Li, apprehended while possessing counterfeit documents purporting to authorize
his advance parole into the United States, argues Section 1546(a) does not apply to his
circumstances. Specifically, Li contends that under the legal entry fiction, whereby
a non-citizen may be physically within the United States’s border without legally
having effected entry, see Alvarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.
2004), the advance parole document would not authorize him to “enter” or lawfully
“stay” in the United States within the meaning of the criminal statute.2
However, “[w]here a statutory term is not defined in the statute, it is appropriate
to accord the term its ordinary meaning. When there is no indication that Congress
intended a specific legal meaning for the term, the court may look to sources such as
dictionaries for a definition.” United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th
Cir. 1999); Huffman v. Comm’r, 978 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Words of both
technical and common usage are construed in the latter sense unless the statute plainly
2
Li concedes the counterfeit non-permit document he possessed is authorized
by regulation, thereby satisfying the other elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). See 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(f).
2
indicates otherwise.”). Congress did not define “entry into” or “authorized stay” in
the statute or elsewhere in Chapter 75 of Title 18. Thus, we interpret “entry” to mean
physical entry, or the act of physically coming into the United States. See Webster’s
New Int’l Dictionary, 756–57 (3d ed. 2002) (“enter”); id. at 759 (“entry”). Because
Li possessed a fraudulent document purporting to allow him to physically enter the
United States (and because authentic versions of that document are authorized by
regulation), the motion to dismiss the indictment was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
3