Alsager v. Board of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery , 573 F. App'x 619 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                MAY 16 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DALE E. ALSAGER, D.O., Ph.D., as a               No. 13-35210
    professional licensed Osteopathic
    Physician and Surgeon in the State of            D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05030-RJB
    Washington, License No. OPOOOO1485,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE
    AND SURGERY, a Washington State
    Agency; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert J. Bryan, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 16, 2014**
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Page 2 of 4
    Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and WHYTE, Senior
    District Judge.***
    The district court correctly held that abstention under Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971), is required here. All four of the Younger conditions are met.
    First, the Board of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery’s disciplinary
    proceedings are an ongoing state proceeding for purposes of Younger. It is true
    that at the time Alsager filed his federal action, the Board had not yet filed a
    statement of charges against him. See 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.090
    . But it had
    initiated an investigation of the patient’s complaint, and the beginning of that
    investigation marked the beginning of Washington’s disciplinary proceedings. See
    Partington v. Gedan, 
    961 F.2d 852
    , 861 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Amanatullah v.
    Colorado Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
    187 F.3d 1160
    , 1163–64 (10th Cir. 1999). Under
    the statute, compliance with the Board’s requests for information is compulsory,
    
    Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.230
    , and the investigation is the first part of a multi-
    step disciplinary process. See 
    id.
     §§ 18.130.080, 18.130.090. Alsager’s reliance
    on Canatella v. California, 
    304 F.3d 843
     (9th Cir. 2002), is misplaced, because in
    that case “no affirmative action had been taken by the State [agency]” when the
    federal suit commenced. 
    Id. at 851
    .
    ***
    The Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Page 3 of 4
    Second, the Board’s disciplinary proceedings against Alsager implicate
    important state interests. We have previously held that regulating physician
    conduct and licensing is one such interest. See Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Med.
    Exam’rs, 
    678 F.3d 737
    , 747 (9th Cir. 2012).
    Third, the disciplinary proceedings afford Alsager an adequate opportunity
    to raise his constitutional claims. Washington’s disciplinary scheme provides for
    judicial review in state courts, 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.140
    , and the reviewing
    courts are authorized to consider constitutional claims. 
    Id.
     § 34.05.570. Alsager
    argues that this process is insufficient to protect his constitutional interests,
    because it requires him to provide information to the Board (which he contends
    would violate his constitutional rights) or risk penalties for noncompliance. But
    the Supreme Court has held that judicial review of state agency decisions provides
    a sufficient opportunity to raise federal claims, even when the state agency may not
    consider those claims in the first instance. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v.
    Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 619
    , 629 (1986). Moreover, Alsager can
    seek a stay of any adverse Board decision pending appeal, which would allow him
    to litigate his constitutional claims before the Board’s decision takes effect. See
    
    Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.550
    ; see also Kenneally v. Lungren, 
    967 F.2d 329
    ,
    332–33 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying California law). Under these circumstances,
    Page 4 of 4
    Alsager has not demonstrated that Washington’s procedures bar review of federal
    claims. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 
    481 U.S. 1
    , 14 (1987).
    Finally, Alsager’s suit also satisfies the fourth Younger requirement, that the
    federal court action would “would enjoin, or have the practical effect of enjoining,
    ongoing state [] proceedings.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 
    495 F.3d 1143
    ,
    1149 (9th Cir. 2007). Alsager’s federal complaint seeks a declaration that the
    investigatory component of Washington’s disciplinary process is unconstitutional
    and an injunction barring the use of certain information in the disciplinary
    proceedings. Either form of relief would “enjoin, declare invalid, or otherwise
    involve the federal courts” in the proceedings against him. See Gilbertson v.
    Albright, 
    381 F.3d 965
    , 970, 977–78, 981 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
    AFFIRMED.